The author makes a plea for loosening the constraints that limit France's military operational capabilities. Simple, robust and mobile systems and sufficient manpower are needed for France to shoulder her overseas responsibilities and maintain her military standing.
For decades the President of the French Republic has used the title of Commander-in-Chief given to him by Article 15 of the Constitution to embark on overseas adventures without prior approval by Parliament. This interpretation is wrong. It is the law that must define how power is to be shared between the executive & legislative branches of government. Adapted from the source document.
The French defense code recently published regroups a total of 71 texts dating from 1791 to 2004. But this regrouping, as suggested here, fails to fill the legislative void that exists in matters of modern defense action, such as external operations of use of nuclear force. None of the texts concerned defines the power-sharing between the president & the republic, the government, & the parliament. Given these & other faults, it is here argued that these texts should be more deeply revised in order to reflect the reality of today's defense requirements & contingencies. Otherwise, executives may be placed in the difficult & untenable situation of not being able to verify the legality of orders they may receive in today's radically different defense environment. This article examines these claims against a series of contemporary security issues. Adapted from the source document.