Suchergebnisse

The increase in abstinence and the change in parties in power are the main characteristics of the 2012 elections in Serbia. The coalition gathered around the Democratic Party, the Socialist Party and the G17, which previously had a majority in 2008 elections and formed the government, won slightly fewer votes in the May elections, but this ruling coalition failed to retain power. The change of government was caused by the defeat of the DS (Democratic Party) leader Boris Tadić in the presidential elections. The victory in the presidential elections of Tomislav Nikolić, the leader of the Serbian Progressive Party opened the door to the changes in the relations of the parliamentary parties and the formation of new political alliances. SNS (Serbian Progressive Party) was the winner of the general elections: they defeated the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) by taking over their members, officials and voters; the SNS candidate became the head of state, they formed the government and they are in power in most local governments. The leader of DS, Boris Tadić was the biggest loser in the general elections: after years of dominance on the political scene, he has lost the presidency of the Republic, and the Democrats have become the opposition in Parliament. This defeat cost B. Tadić the leadership of his Democratic Party. The turning point in the formation of the government was enabled by the coalition gathered around the Socialists. Having won 80% more votes than in the previous elections, the Socialists left their 'strategic partner' thus making possible the electoral shift. The transformed Radicals and Socialists, who were political partners in the 1990's, after twelve years, are in power again. ; Povećanje apstinencije i promena stranaka na vlasti, glavne su karakteristike izbora 2012.godine. Koalicije okupljene oko Demokratske stranke, Socijalističke partije i G17, koje su prethodnim izborima 2008.godine imale većinu i formirale vladu, osvojile su neznatno manje glasova na majskim izborima, ali vladajuća koalicija nije zadržala vlast. Promenu vlade uzrokovao je poraz lidera DS, Borisa Tadića na predsedničkim izborima. Pobeda Tomislava Nikolića, predsednika Srpske napredne stranke, na predsedničkim izborima otvorila je promene u odnosima parlamentarnih stranaka i formiranje novih političkih saveza. SNS je pobednik opštih izbora: porazili su Srpsku radikalnu stranku tako što su joj preuzeli članstvo, funkcionere i biračko telo; njihov kandidat vršiće funkciju šefa države; formirali su Vladu i vrše vlast u većini jedinica lokalne samouprave. Lider DS B.Tadić najveći je gubitnik opštih izbora: posle višegodišnje dominacije na političkoj sceni on je izgubio mesto predsednika Republike, a demokrate su opozicija u parlamentu. Taj poraz B.Tadića koštao je i mesta lidera stranke. Preokret u formiranje vlasti omogućila je koalicija okupljena oko socijalista. Osvojivši oko 80% glasova više nego na prethodnim izborima, socijalisti su napustili doskorašnjeg 'strateškog partnera' i omogućili izborni preokret. Transformisani radikali i socijalisti, politički partneri iz 90-tih, posle dvanaest godina, ponovo su na vlasti. Politika koju će voditi pokazaće da li su u pravu skeptici koji tvrde da se radi o restauraciji starog režima i politike ili jačanju konsolidacije demokratije.

The referendum and the popular initiative as the forms of direct democracy are more and more present in the decision making process within the model of the representative democracy. 'Let the citizens be the lawmakers for one single day' is a principle especially current in the European states. Envisaged as a corrective, but not as the substitution for representative democracy, it is both glorified and contested at the same time. From their basic function consisting of the elected politicians control and the wider citizen's participation in the politics, they can also become a means of the manipulation. The Serbian experience with these political mechanisms is not so different comparing with the average situation - we have more referendums, but less popular initiatives, especially on the local level. The Serbian constitution from 2006. has precise and aggravated the conditions of using of the referendum and popular initiative. On the basis of this constitution was made the draft of law. The proposed solutions are in accordance with the EU recommendations regarding good referendum practice, but they also admit the dilemmas about the setting of the turnout quorum and quorum for acceptance of the referendum decisions. ; Referendum i narodna inicijativa kao oblici direktne demokratije sve su prisutniji u procesu donošenja odluka u modelu predstavničke demokratije. Da građani 'bar jedan dan budu zakonodavci' posebno je rasprostranjeno u evropskim državama. Zamišljeni kao korektiv, a ne zamena predstavničkoj demokratiji oni se glorifikuju koliko i osporavaju. Od kontrole izabranih i veće participacije građana u politici oni mogu postati i sredstvo manipulacije. Iskustva Srbije u korišćenju ovih mehanizama ne odudaraju od proseka - više je referenduma, a manje inicijativa, posebno na lokalnom planu. Ustav RS iz 2006. godine razradio je i pooštrio uslove korišćenja referenduma i inicijative. Na osnovu njega sačinjen je nacrt Zakona. Predložena rešenja slede preporuke EU o dobroj referendumskoj praksi, ali ostavljaju i dileme oko određivanja kvoruma izlaznosti i kvoruma za prihvatanje referendumskih odluka.

The tendency of increasing number of municipalities from which there are no deputies in the legislative body and specific metropolization of the political representation reflected in overrepresentation of large cities, especially Belgrade and Novi Sad, is present in all legislative periods from 1990 to 2008. That tendency was less developed by applying the majoritarian electoral model but it was hardened and strengthened by applying of the proportional electoral system, especially in the variant of one constituency. The implication is non-representation, averagely of a quarter of the electoral body and the same number of the local self-government units that have not a direct representative in the national legislative body. It is mostly about the municipalities, which are emphaticaly undeveloped according to various criteria's. The pro­portional electoral system, one constituency, a closed list, are not the unique inducements of the described phenomenon. Migrations, depopulation, population growth rate, structural changes in a community and in economy, etc. Political elites remained indifferent towards the necessary reforms of the electoral system that could lessen the repercussions which derogate legitimacy of the representation. That is why the reform of the electoral system that would preserve proportionality and also induct the vote for the candidates who would be tied to narrower constituencies is proposed. . ; U svim legislaturnim periodima od 1990. do 2008. godine prisutna je tendencija rasta broja opština iz kojih nema narodnih poslanika u zakonodavnom telu i specifična metropolizacija političke reprezentacije koja se ogleda u nadpredstavljenosti velikih gradova, posebno Beograda i Novog Sada. Ta tendencija bila je manje razvijena primenom većinskog izbornog modela da bi se ustalila i osnažila primenom proporcionalnog izbornog sistema, posebno u varijanti jedne izborne jedinice. Posledica je nepredstavljenost prosečno četvrtine biračkog tela i isto toliko jedinica lokalne samouprave koji nemaju direktnog predstavnika u nacionalnom zakonodavnom telu. Radi se pretežno o opštinama koje po raznim kriterijumima spadaju u izrazito nerazvijene. Proporcionalni izborni sistem, jedna izborna jedinica, zatvorena lista, nisu jedini uzroci opisane pojave. Na nju utiču i migracije, depopulacija, stopa priraštaja, strukturne promene u društvu i privredi, i slično. Političke elite ostale su indiferentne za nužne reforme izbornog sistema kojima bi se ublažile posledice koje krnje legitimnost predstavništva. Zato se predlaže reforma izbornog sistema koja bi očuvala proporcionalnost, ali uvela i glasanje za kandidate koji bi bili vezani za uže izborne jedinice. .

Re-designing of local franchise in local self-government of Serbia - the maintenance of proportional representation electoral system with one electoral unit, higher legal electoral threshold, stricter conditions for candidateship, suspension of a free mandate for councilor - it will make more problematic the issue of sub-representation of village unites in local self-government assemblies, depersonalization of the councilors, joint party mandates and abstinention. In this text author comparatively presented various models of electoral systems in local self-government in the context of different views of local self-government and significance of local elections. The author concluded that synchronous local and parliamentary elections could reduce negative consequences of electoral engineering that is directly aimed at reducing opportunity for involvement of citizen groups, reduction in the number of parties in local assemblies and the party scene enlargement. ; Redizajniranje izbornog prava lokalne samouprave u Srbiji - zadržavanje proporcionalnog izbornog sistema sa jednom izbornom jedinicom, viši zakonski izborni prag, oštriji uslovi kandidovanja, suspendovanje slobodnog mandata odbornika - produbiće probleme potpredstavljenosti seoskih sredina u skupštinama lokalne samouprave, depersonalizovanosti odbornika, vezanog partijskog mandata i apstinencije. Autor prikazuje komparativno različite modele izbornih sistema u lokalnoj samoupravi u kontekstu različitih shvatanja o lokalnoj samoupravi i važnosti lokalnih izbora. Zaključuje se da će istovremeno održavanje lokalnih i parlamentarnih izbora prigušiti negativne posledice izbornog inžinjeringa koji je direktno usmeren na sužavanje mogućnosti za učestvovanje grupa građana, smanjivanje broja partija u lokalnim skupštinama i ukrupnjavanje partijske scene.

Parliamentary elections on 21 January 2007 were the seventh elections in line since the elections for the parliament members in 1990. They are the third elections that have been made by proportional voting system with one voting unit. They were organized not for purpose of the fall of government but for purpose of the adoption of new Constitution of Republic of Serbia. In these elections the abstinention of the voters was decreased. Serbian Radical Party won majority of the votes and mandates. Democratic Party almost doubled the number of votes in comparison with former elections. Serbian Renewal Party - the leader party of the opposition in 1990's stayed out of the Parliament for the second time. Socialist Party of Serbia, dominating the political scene in period 1990 - 2000, continued the trend of losing votes and mandates. The result of these elections was the Government alliance - Democratic Party of Serbia, Democratic Party, G 17 +, formed after 125 days of negotiation, at the period of expiry of the constitutional deadline. Distrust reigning among the alliance partners, as well as numerous problems and differences in approach to their solutions caused instability of this government. ; Parlamentarni izbori 21. januara 2007. godine sedmi su po redu izbori za narodne poslanike od 1990. godine. To su treći izbori koji se održavaju po proporcionalnom izbornom sistemu sa jednom izbornom jedinicom. Sazvani su ne zbog pada Vlade, nego zbog usvajanja novog Ustava Republike Srbije. Na ovim izborima smanjena je apstinencija birača. Srpska radikalna stranka osvojila je najviše glasova i mandata. Demokratska stranka gotovo je udvostručila broj glasova u odnosu na prethodne izbore. Srpski pokret obnove - stranka predvodnik opozicije iz 90-tih godina - po drugi put je ostala van parlamenta. Socijalistička partija Srbije koja je dominirala političkom scenom od 1990-2000. godine nastavila je trend osipanja glasova i mandata. Rezultat ovih izbora je koaliciona Vlada - Demokratska stranka Srbije Demokratska stranka, G17 plus - formirana posle 125 dana pregovaranja, na samom isteku ustavnog roka. Nepoverenje koalicionih partnera, brojni problemi i razlike u pristupu njihovog rešavanja učiniće ovu vladu nestabilnom.

Elections are the most wide-spread form of political participation in which as a rule, the greatest number of voters take part. By making an electoral decision, citizens, as individuals, constitute representative bodies, which are un-proportionally smaller than the voting body, and which will make decision that are of concern of the whole community - of all citizens. That is why it is important that a large number of citizens participates in electoral process, as it increases legitimacy of representative bodies takes away doubts that the community is run by a minority and constrains a possibility that laws which are against the will of majority are passed. Contemporary democracies, almost without an exception, encounter the problem of abstinence of voters which jeopardizes basic principles of representation. Uneven participation of voters at elections brings about uneven influence at making political decisions. Obligatory voting is one of the instruments which stays at disposal of designers of electoral system in prevention of abstinence. This paper discusses advantages and disadvantages of this electoral institute, various experiences in its use, as well as its political consequences in a party and parliamentary system. ; Izbori su najrasprostranjeniji oblik političke participacije u kome, po pravilu, učestvuje najveći broj građana. Donoseći izbornu odluku, kao pojedinci, glasanjem građani konstituišu predstavnička tela, po broju nesrazmerno manja nego što je to biračko telo, a ono će donositi odluke koje se odnose na čitavu zajednicu - na sve građane. Upravo zato je važno da u donošenju izborne odluke učestvuje što veći broj građana, jer to povećava legitimnost predstavničkih tela, otklanja sumnje da zajednicom upravlja manjina, i sprečava mogućnost da se donose zakoni suprotno volji većine. Savremene demokratije, gotovo bez izuzetka, sreću se sa problemom apstinencije koji ugrožava osnovne principe pred-stavljanja. Nejednako učešće birača na izborima proizvodi nejednak uticaj na donošenje političkih odluka. Obavezno glasanje jedan je od instrumenata koji stoji na raspolaganju dizajnerima izbornog sistema u sprečavanju apstinencije. Ovaj članak posvećen je prednostima i nedostatcima ovog izbornog instituta, iskustvima njegovog korišćenja, kao i političkim posledicama u partijskom i parlamentarnom sistemu.

Organization of government is a most controversial part of the 1990 Constitution of Serbia. Principle of government share; position of National Parliament; president of Republic and the government; decentralization electoral system and its inter-relations and interactions - the constitutional design which crucially influences consequences of political system - was operationally systemized so that in Serbia there was a mixed or semi-presidential system in force. In our circumstances such model of the government was estimated and reviewed as presidential system, Caesarism Sultanism, etc. Creator of the Constitution had a goal of discontinuity with politics and the Constitution as embodied by the government of the Socialist Party of Serbia and Slobodan Milosevic. This paper is dedicated to analysis of constitutional design of the Constitution of Serbia in 2006-to the objects and methods of the change of the government by the creator of the Constitution and whether the criticized mechanisms - direct election of head of the state, absence of signature of approval (absence of premapotpis) possibility of dissolving deputy bodies, etc. - have been abolished or not. The analysis of newly constituted institutes has been made through models of manipulative and neutral constitutional design. ; Organizacija vlasti je najosporavaniji deo Ustava Srbije iz 1990. godine Princip podele vlasti, pozicija Narodne skupštine, predsednika Republike i Vlade; decentralizacija; izborni sistem i njihovi međusobni odnosi - ustavni dizajn koji presudno utiče na posledice u političkom sistemu operacionalizovanje tako daje u Srbiji funkcionisao mešoviti ili polupredsednički sistem. Takav oblik vlasti u našim uslovima proglašavanje i kritikovan kao prezidancijalizam, cezarizam, sultanizam. Cilj ustavo-tvorca bio je diskontinuitet s politikom i Ustavom koju su oličavale vlade Socijalističke partije Srbije i Slobodan Milošević. Ovaj prilog posvećen je analizi ustavnog dizajna u Ustavu Srbije iz 2006. godine - šta i kako je ustavotvorac promenio organizaciji vlasti i da li je otklonio mehanizme koje je posebno kritikovao - neposredan izbor šefa države, odsustvo premapotpisa mogućnosti raspuštanja predstavničkog tela, i sl. Analiza novokonstituisanih instituta vrši se kroz modele manipulativnog i neutralnog ustavnog dizajna.

The author analyzed influence of the limit issue in allocation clause largeness of electoral unit and D'Onte formula for parliamentarian party system in Serbia in five electoral cycles from 1992 to 2003. Through analysis of the allocation clause of inclusivity and exclusivity, the author noted that lower allocation clause would significantly increase number of parliamentarian parties and caused fragmentation of parliamentarian party system. In contrast to calls for lowering the limit in the allocation clause the author pointed out danger of further fractionalization of the parties unstable parliamentarian majority and weak government, and urged for integral electoral reform. ; Autor analizira uticaj visine izbornog praga, veličine izborne jedinice i D' Ontove formule na parlamentarni stranački sistem u Srbiji u pet izbornih ciklusa od 1992. do 2003. godine. Kroz analizu izbornog praga inkluzivnosti i ekskluzivnosti, autor pokazuje da bi niži izborni prag znatno povećao broj parlamentarnih stranaka i uslovio fragmentaciju parlamentarnog stranačkog sistema. Protiveći se idejama za snižavanje izbornog praga, autor ukazuje na opasnosti dalje frakcionalizacije stranaka, nestabilne parlamentarne većine i slabe vlade, i pledira za celovitu izbornu reformu.

During four years of intensive discussions and attempts of three governments to adopt a new Constitution of Serbia, ten constitutional projects have been accomplished. They all share the same agenda of theoretical concept of the power sharing. Special attention is paid to the relations between legislative and executive aspects of it. All projects call for bicefal executive power with various competencies of the head of the state included, in most of the cases in the role of the President of Republic except in the case of the proposition for establishment of the monarchy by Prof Dr. Pavle Nikolic. The proposed constitutional models thoroughly subsume the parliamentary system with classic warranties for the National Parliament, the president of Republic and the government. The proposed concepts are not very inventive when it comes to the control of the government's activity and domination of the executive regulation over the Parliament. According to these, in many regards, the key aspects of the content of the Constitution, there is no any controversial constitution proposal which could endanger the adoption of the new Constitution. ; Za četiri godine intenzivnih rasprava i pokušaja tri vlade da se donese novi Ustav Srbije sačinjeno je deset ustavnih projekata. Svi oni polaze od teorijskog koncepta podele vlasti. Posebna pažnja posvećena je odnosu legislative i egzekutive. Svi projekti plediraju za bicefalnu egzekutivu ali sa različitim ovlašćenjima šefa države, najčešće kao predsednika Republike, osim u jednom slučaju - predlogu za uspostavljanje monarhije prof. dr Pavla Nikolića. Ponuđeni ustavni modeli dosledno razrađuju parlamentarni sistem sa klasičnim ovlašćenjima Narodne skupštine predsednika Republike i Vlade. Predloženi koncepti ne odlikuju se inventivnošću kada je u pitanju kontrola rada vlade od strane zakonodavne vlasti i dominacija egzekutive nad parlamentom. Sudeći po ovim, po mnogo čemu ključnim aspektima ustavne materije, ne postoje predlozi koji bi pomogli predmet sporenja do tačke koja bi značila nemogućnost donošenja novog Ustava.

The author of this article analyzes character of free mandate in Serbian parliamentary system, in light of the Constitutional Court's decision to suspend provisions on the causes for suspension of the mandate. These provisions were suspended primarily on the basis of suspension of the deputy's membership in political party and the ban on the political party's activity. The author gives theoretical premises about the genesis of imperative and free mandates and analyzes the dilemma whether the free mandate was constitutional and legal fossil because of influence of political parties. The author points out problems of implementation of the free mandate on the basis of examples of problems of treatment of the deputy mandates in the National Assembly of Republic of Serbia. The author also pointed out problems which would eventually arise during application of the Constitutional Court's decision. The author's stance is that a new Constitution of Serbia has to clearly define free character of the deputy mandate, but also to neutralize, through other measures, the trading of the deputy mandates and the possibility of betrayal of citizens' will by non-election methods. ; Autor u članku analizira karakter slobodnog mandata u parlamentarnom sistemu Srbije i u svetlu odluke Ustavnog suda da suspenduje pojedine odredbe o razlozima za prestanak mandata prvenstveno zbog prestanka članstva u političkoj stranci sa čije je liste poslanik izabran i zabrane rada političke stranke. Autor izlaže teorijske stavove o genezi imperativnog i slobodnog mandata i analizira dilemu da li je - zbog uticaja političkih stranaka slobodni mandat ustavno-pravni fosil. Na primerima problema u tretiranju poslaničkog mandata u Narodnoj skupštini Republike Srbije autor ukazuje na probleme ostvarivanja slobodnog mandata i probleme koji će nastati u primeni odluke Ustavnog suda. Stav je autora da novi Ustav Srbije mora jasno definisati da je poslanički mandat slobodan, ali da se drugim merama moraju bar otežati postupci trgovine poslaničkim mandatima i mogućnost da se na takav način izneveri i neizbornim metodama izmeni volja građana.

All proposed projects within the discussion round on new Constitution of Serbia emphasize the principle of authority division. The division on legislative and executive authority has been thoroughly implemented, even into the proposal of P. Nikolić, whose concept of authority division is related to the model of parliament monarchy. Differences between proposed projects on the authority organization in the new Constitution are results of the level and model of decentralization, not of the authority of the government body. Nor they are, as the polemics may lead to wrong conclusion results of the role and authority of the president of Republic. In all the projects the function of the head of the state is standard for the system of double centered executive authority dominated by the government, while the role of the head of the state is of protocol character only. Direct selection of president of the state, as proposed by the project of Serbian Democratic Party, is not sufficient to secure the moderator role, as envisioned by the propose. ; U raspravama o novom ustavu Srbije svi predloženi projekti insistiraju na načelu podele vlasti. Podela na zakonodavnu i izvršnu vlast dosledno je izvedena po parlamentarnom modelu organizacije vlasti čak i u predlogu P. Nikolića čiji koncept počiva na parlamentarnoj monarhiji. Razlike među predloženim projektima novog ustava posmatrane kroz organizaciju vlasti proizilaze prvenstveno iz stepeni i oblika decentralizacije, a ne iz nadležnosti organa ili, kako bi se iz polemika moglo pogrešno zaključiti, iz položaja i uloge predsednika Republike. Šef države u svim projektima ima funkcije standardne za sistem bicefalne egzekutive u kojem dominira vlada, a šef države ima protokolarnu ulogu. Neposredan izbor predsednika države koji se predlaže u projektu Demokratske stranke Srbije nije dovoljan da obezbedi moderatornu ulogu za koju se predlagač zalaže.

The role of international organizations in observing selections and determination of their minimum selection standards has begun with OUN's activity in the process of establishing independent former colonies in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Role of OEBS and the Council of Europe became stronger in period of the beginning of transitional processes in former socialist states. What is the minimum for defining democratic process of the selections? What do the national selection legal bodies have to decide within the selection legal process in order to complement it with international democratic standards, as proposed by the OEBS and the Venetian Council's acts? Both these two acts emphasize importance of general, equal direct and secret voting rights, establishment of the selection legal bodies which guarantees presence of representatives of all parties in question, equal media coverage, quick and transparent process of calculation and announcement of voting results, financing of selection campaigns and protection of voting rights. As the tendency to unification of the selection systems and establishment of the network of voting process observes is being noticed, it is possible to define it as a real industry of observing selection missions. ; Uloga međunarodnih organizacija u praćenju izbora i određivanju minimuma standarda da bi se oni smatrali demokratskim započela je aktivnostima OUN u procesu sticanja samostalnosti bivših kolonija širom Afrike, Azije i Latinske Amerike. Početkom tranzicije bivših socijalističkih država sve više jača uloga OEBS-a i Saveta Evrope. Šta je minimum da bi se određeni izborni procesi smatrali demokratskim, šta nacionalna izborna zakonodavstva moraju propisati u izbornom pravu da bi izborne institucije bile saglasne međunarodnim demokratskim standardima, utvrđeno je u dva dokumenta obavezujućim stavovima OEBS-a i Kodeksu Venecijanske komisije. Oba dokumenta prvenstveno pažnju posvećuju garantovanju opšteg, jednakog neposrednog i tajnog biračkog prava; formiranju izbornih organa na takav način da u njima učestvuju svi izborni akteri; ravnopravnom pristupu medijima; brzom i transparentnom procesu utvrđivanja rezultata i njihovog objavljivanja; finansiranju izbornih kampanja i zaštiti biračkog prava. Uočljiva je tendencija unifikacije izbornih sistema i stvaranje mreže organizacija koje se bave posmatranjem izbornih procesa, tako da možemo govoriti o pravoj industriji posmatračkih izbornih misija.

The author analyses the situation of the key institutions of political system of Srbija as a result of transitional reforms in the period from 2000-2002. The institutions of political system are observed as institutes which should provide through reforms stable patterns of behaviour. As analytical matrix for the analysis, it is used Linz/Stephen pattern of consolidation of democracy in transition. The author points out the institutional chaos and problems in the foundation for a such analysis - existence of state, according the pattern of axiom for establishing democracy; degradation of parliament and legal authority; dominance of the executive; the selective respect and application of law, dominance of parties in power, but without real elected authorization; pushing out the civic sphere and its discreditation as a preparatory polygon for partizan actions; the consequences of shock-therapy in economy on the basis of confidence in the institutions of political system. The author makes conclusion that the transition has come to destruction of numbered institutions, that the new ones were not constituted, that such institutions create institutional chaos and that in political system begins to appear damaged consequences of a such institutional arrangement. ; Autor analizira stanje ključnih institucija političkog sistema Srbije kao posledice tranzicionih reformi u periodu 2000-2002. Institucije političkog sistema posmatraju se kao ustanove koje treba da kroz reforme obezbede stabilne obrasce ponašanja. Kao analitička matrica za analizu koristi se Linc/Stepanov model konsolidovanja demokratije u tranziciji. Autor ukazuje na institucionalni haos i probleme u osnovama za takvu analizu - postojanje države, prema navedenom modelu aksioma za uspostavljanje demokratije; degradaciju parlamenta i sudske vlasti, dominaciju egzekutive; selektivno poštovanje i primenjivanje zakona; dominaciju partija u vlasti bez realne izborne legitimacije; potiskivanje civilne sfere i njeno diskreditovanje kao pripremnog poligona za stranačke akcije; posledice šok terapije u ekonomiji na poverenje u institucije političkog sistema. Autor zaključuje da je tranzicija dovela do urušavanja brojnih institucija, da nove nisu uspostavljene, da takvo stanje stvara institucionalni haos i da se u političkom sistemu počinju reprodukovati štetne posledice takvog institucionalnog aranžmana.

The author analyses electoral systems as a rule of decision-making and representation and points to the problems in classifying different kinds of majority and proportional electoral systems. The author emphasizes the electoral unit, the threshold, the manner of voting and the formula for transposing votes into mandates as the elements of the electoral system which have the greatest political influence on the political consequences of the electoral system, party system, parliament, government, etc. Interpreting Duverger's, Rea's, Lijphart's, Sartori's and Nohlen's electoral determinism, the author points to the theoretical and empirical argumentation of the consequences of different electoral systems, their advantages and shortcomings. Simplicity, participation, aggregation effectiveness and legitimacy - are the criteria in evaluating the expected and real consequences of the electoral system that the author uses to compare different electoral models, emphasizing that electoral reforms are partial, party-motivated, lacking clear aims, all of which results in a combination of contradictory elements that produce effects opposite to those desired. ; Autor analizira izborne sisteme kao pravilo odlučivanja i pravilo predstavljanja, ukazujući na probleme klasifikacije različitih varijanti većinskog i proporcionalnog izbornog sistema. Izbornu jedinicu, izborni prag, način glasanja i formula transponovanja glasova u mandate - autor potencira kao elemente izbornog sistema koji imaju najveći uticaj na političke posledice izbornog sistema, na stranački sistem, parlament, vladu itd. Interpretacijom izbornog determinizma Diveržea, Rea, Lijpharta Sartorija i Nolena ukazuje se na teorijsku i empirijsku argumentaciju konsekvenci različitih izbornih sistema, njihovih prednosti i nedostataka. Jednostavnost, participacija, agregacija i efektivnost reprezentacija i legitimitet - kriterijumi su vrednovanja očekivanih i realnih konsekvenci izbornog sistema kojima autor poredi različite vrste izbornih modela, ukazujući da su izborne reforme parcijalne, stranački motivisane, bez jasnih ciljeva, što često rezultira kombinovanjem protivrečnih elemenata koji proizvode suprotne efekte od željenih.

Four electoral cycles for the National Assembly of Serbia, with two different electoral models, simulating the real electoral results in variations of electoral census 3% and 5% and one electoral unit did not confirm expectations of political actors who were promoters of such electoral solutions. Proportional electoral models would produce three parties, in best case five party parliamentary structure and eliminate small parties and national minorities- parties from division of mandates. This electoral model would lead to smaller fragmentation, than models with larger numbers of smaller electoral units, which would make parties moderate in order to gain coalition partners. If that would not happen that model would often lead to extraordinary elections. ; Četiri izborna ciklusa za Narodnu skupštinu Srbije, sa dva različita izborna modela, simulacijom realnih izbornih rezultata u varijantama izbornog cenzusa 3 % i 5 % i jedne izborne jedinice nisu potvrdi očekivanja političkih aktera koji su bili promoteri takvih izbornih rešenja. Proporcionalni izborni modeli sa jednom izbornom jedinicom proizveli bi trostranačku, u najboljem slučaju petostranačku parlamentarnu strukturu i eliminisali male stranke i stranke nacionalnih manjina iz raspodele mandata. Ovakav izborni model vodio bi manjoj fragmentaciji, nego modeli sa većim brojem manjih izbornih jedinica, što bi parlamentarne stranke primoravalo na umerenost radi pridobijanja koalicionih partnera. Ako bi to izostalo ovakav model vodio bi čestim prevremenim izborima.