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In this paper, we put forward a new research agenda for ecological economics, based on three realisations. We then show how these can be connected through research and used to generate insights with the potential for application in broader, systemic change. The first realisation is that the core ambition of ecological economics, that of addressing the scale of human environmental resource use and associated impacts, often remains an aspirational goal, rather than being applied within research. In understanding intertwined environmental and social challenges, systemic approaches (including system dynamics) should be revitalised to address the full scope of what is possible or desirable. The second realisation is that the focus on biophysical and economic quantification and methods has been at the expense of a comprehensive social understanding of environmental impacts and barriers to change&mdash ; including the role of power, social class, geographical location, historical change, and achieving human well-being. For instance, by fetishising growth as the core problem, attention is diverted away from underlying social drivers&mdash ; monetary gains as profits, rent, or interest fuelled by capitalist competition and, ultimately, unequal power relations. The third realisation is that ecological economics situates itself with respect to mainstream (neoclassical) economics, but simultaneously adopts some of its mandate and blind spots, even in its more progressive camps. Pragmatic attempts to adopt mainstream concepts and tools often comfort, rather than challenge, the reproduction of the very power relations that stand in the way of sustainability transitions. We consider these three realisations as impediments for developing ecological economics as an emancipatory critical research paradigm and political project. We will not focus on or detail the failings of ecological economics, but state what we believe they are and reformulate them as research priorities. By describing and bringing these three elements together, we are able to outline an ambitious research agenda for ecological economics, one capable of catalysing real social change.

This study presents fossil-fuel related CO2 emissions in Austria and Czechoslovakia (current Czech Republic and Slovakia) for 1830–2000. The drivers of CO2 emissions are discussed by investigating the variables of the standard Kaya identity for 1920–2000 and conducting a comparative Index Decomposition Analysis. Proxy data on industrial production and household consumption are analysed to understand the role of the economic structure. CO2 emissions increased in both countries in the long run. Czechoslovakia was a stronger emitter of CO2 throughout the time period, but per-capita emissions significantly differed only after World War I, when Czechoslovakia and Austria became independent. The difference in CO2 emissions increased until the mid-1980s (the period of communism in Czechoslovakia), explained by the energy intensity and the composition effects, and higher industrial production in Czechoslovakia. Counterbalancing factors were the income effect and household consumption. After the Velvet revolution in 1990, Czechoslovak CO2 emissions decreased, and the energy composition effect (and industrial production) lost importance. Despite their different political and economic development, Austria and Czechoslovakia reached similar levels of per-capita CO2 emissions in the late 20th century. Neither Austrian "eco-efficiency" nor Czechoslovak restructuring have been effective in reducing CO2 emissions to a sustainable level.

We focus on three questions: one, what have been the quantitative dynamics and the main drivers of the global use of natural resources (energy and materials) in the past century? Two, how will these trends continue over the next decades, and what would be more sustainable scenarios? In other words, what is the size of the challenge? Three: how can policy interventions into resource use be argued and justified?

Non-technical summary: Discourses of climate delay' pervade current debates on climate action. These discourses accept the existence of climate change, but justify inaction or inadequate efforts. In contemporary discussions on what actions should be taken, by whom and how fast, proponents of climate delay would argue for minimal action or action taken by others. They focus attention on the negative social effects of climate policies and raise doubt that mitigation is possible. Here, we outline the common features of climate delay discourses and provide a guide to identifying them. Technical summary: Through our collective observations as social scientists studying climate change, we describe 12 climate delay discourses and develop a typology based on their underlying logic. Delay discourses can be grouped into those that: (1) redirect responsibility; (2) push non-transformative solutions; (3) emphasize the downsides of climate policies; or (4) surrender to climate change. These discourses are distinct from climate denialism, climate-impact scepticism and ad hominem attacks, but are often used in combination to erode public and political support for climate policies. A deeper investigation of climate delay discourses is necessary in order to understand their prevalence and to develop inoculation strategies that protect the public from their intended effects. Our typology enables scientists, climate advocates and policymakers to recognize and counter these arguments when they are used. We urge all proponents of climate action to address these common misrepresentations of the climate crisis and to better communicate the dramatic pace of global warming, the gravity of its impacts and the possibility of effective and just mitigation policies. Social media summary: Discourses of climate delay: redirect responsibility, push non-transformative solutions, emphasize downsides, surrender. © 2020 The Author(s). Published by Cambridge University Press.