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Frontmatter -- Contents -- Figures and Tables -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1. Neoclassical Realism -- 2. From Power to Foreign Policy: The Causal Chain -- 3. Power -- 4. Domestic Pathologies -- 5. Iran's Policy in Iraq -- 6. Iran and the Arab-Israeli Conflict -- 7. Iran's Nuclear Program -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index

Making strategic analysis matter / Jeremy Ghez and Gregory F. Treverton -- When the dominant discourse encounters small state realities : strategic analysis in New Zealand and the theory-policy gap / Robert Ayson -- How intelligence analysis education tries to improve strategic analysis / Tim Walton -- Here (very likely) be dragons : the challenges of strategic forecasting / Rex Brynen -- The US National Intelligence Council's global trends : both more and less than meets the eye / Mat Burrows -- The Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department / Tom King -- The role of strategic analysis in operations : a case study from Afghanistan / Paul Dickson -- How to create an "institutional think tank" within a ministry of defence (and make it last) : France's Institut d'etudes stratégiques de l'ecole militaire (IRSEM) / Frédéric Charillon -- The practice of open intelligence : the experience of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service / Jean-Louis Tiernan -- NATO defense college : navigating between critical analysis, strategic education and partnerships / Trine Villumsen Berling and Brooke A. Smith-Windsor -- Stratfor : merging intelligence and geopolitics / Kamran Bokhari -- Strategic thinking or thinking strategically? : the ambiguous role of American think tanks / Donald Abelson -- Balancing responsiveness, relevance and expertise : lessons from the history of strategic analysis in the Canadian Department of National Defence / Michael Roi and Paul Dickson

Saudi Arabia faced multiple threats from Yemen in 2015: its southern neighbor had collapsed; a hostile sub-state actor, the Houthis, was entrenching itself along the border; and the presence of its rival Iran was growing. Responding was rational; it would have been sub-optimal for Riyadh to underbalance by doing little to counter the threat. Instead, however, Saudi Arabia overbalanced by launching a major air campaign and imposing a maritime and air blockade; as a result, it became bogged down in a costly war it cannot win. Why was this the case, and with what consequences? To answer this question, this article develops and applies a neoclassical realist theory of overbalancing. The first objective is nomothetic: to develop a theory of overbalancing, an important phenomenon neglected by the balancing literature. The second is empirical: to shed light on the Saudi decision to launch the war in Yemen.

Abstract
Neoclassical realism has carved a unique niche by offering a theoretically derived and empirically rich foreign policy analysis framework. Over the years, it has branched out as a theory of mistakes (Type I), a theory of foreign policy (Type II), and a theory of international politics (Type III). This article proposes another challenge to consolidate its offer of a progressive research agenda to position it as a theory for correcting mistakes. The theory of mistakes version differentiates ideal from actual foreign policy. The ideal corresponds to foreign policy that follows the pressures and incentives of the international system; structural realism, the basis for this optimal baseline, is here viewed as a normative theory. If there is a gap between the ideal baseline and the actual outcome, then foreign policy is sub-optimal and therefore costly. According to neoclassical realists, this is the result of the intervention of domestic political processes hijacking foreign policy. It follows that pointing out how to reduce the distorting impact of these domestic variables should help steer foreign policy toward optimality. By identifying the negative consequences that follow from a sub-optimal foreign policy, a theory for correcting mistakes also opens the door to developing prescriptions to manage the inevitable fallout.

Neoclassical realism has carved a unique niche by offering a theoretically derived and empirically rich foreign policy analysis framework. Over the years, it has branched out as a theory of mistakes (Type I), a theory of foreign policy (Type II), and a theory of international politics (Type III). This article proposes another challenge to consolidate its offer of a progressive research agenda to position it as a theory for correcting mistakes. The theory of mistakes version differentiates ideal from actual foreign policy. The ideal corresponds to foreign policy that follows the pressures and incentives of the international system; structural realism, the basis for this optimal baseline, is here viewed as a normative theory. If there is a gap between the ideal baseline and the actual outcome, then foreign policy is sub-optimal and therefore costly. According to neoclassical realists, this is the result of the intervention of domestic political processes hijacking foreign policy. It follows that pointing out how to reduce the distorting impact of these domestic variables should help steer foreign policy toward optimality. By identifying the negative consequences that follow from a sub-optimal foreign policy, a theory for correcting mistakes also opens the door to developing prescriptions to manage the inevitable fallout.

In August 2018, Saudi Arabia expelled the Canadian ambassador to Riyadh, recalled its own ambassador in Ottawa, and imposed sanctions on Canada. This overreaction to tweets by the Canadian foreign ministry demanding the release of jailed activists was consistent with the pattern of foreign policy assertiveness that has accompanied the rise of Mohammed bin Salman (MbS). The Saudi–Canadian spat is not very important: bilateral ties were never essential for either country. But the dispute carries lessons for Canada and its allies as they reflect on future ties to the Kingdom. This partnership was always necessary but costly. MbS, however, has amplified and exposed these costs. By bringing unprecedented scrutiny to Saudi actions, recent events have opened a window of opportunity for Canada and its allies to re-evaluate relations. They should increase pressure on Riyadh to change the costliest aspects of its policies. Should this fail, they should downgrade the partnership.