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Game Theoretic Models and the Empirical Analysis of EU Policy Making: Strategic Interaction, Collective Decisions, and Statistical Inference
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change; Studies in Public Choice, S. 247-265
Why Don’t Veto Players Use Their Power?
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change; Studies in Public Choice, S. 165-186
Why Don't Veto Players Use Their Power?
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 10, Heft 4, S. 507-534
ISSN: 1741-2757
Why do member states with veto power usually support policy change proposed by a Commission initiative when their own position is located closer to the status quo? Why do we frequently witness consensus in the Council and rarely observe a rejection of Commission initiatives even after additional veto players, such as new member states or the European Parliament, have increased the constraints on policy change by legislative decision-making in the European Union (EU)? To answer these questions, this study investigates the voting preferences and logrolling opportunities of the member states on 48 Commission proposals. We find that models that derive the voting preferences from each Commission initiative are scarcely able to explain the consensus in the Council. One reason is that the Commission attempts to avoid a divided Council by initiating proposals for which member states favour a policy change in the same direction. When member states still dispute the size of policy change, we show that they can find a solution by mutually benefiting from logrolling across proposals that either belong to the same policy domain or are negotiated during the same period. Hence, intertemporal and domain-specific logrolling can provide a powerful explanation for consensus even in a contested Council.
Why Don't Veto Players Use Their Power?
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 10, Heft 4, S. 507-534
ISSN: 1741-2757
Why do member states with veto power usually support policy change proposed by a Commission initiative when their own position is located closer to the status quo? Why do we frequently witness consensus in the Council and rarely observe a rejection of Commission initiatives even after additional veto players, such as new member states or the European Parliament, have increased the constraints on policy change by legislative decision-making in the European Union (EU)? To answer these questions, this study investigates the voting preferences and logrolling opportunities of the member states on 48 Commission proposals. We find that models that derive the voting preferences from each Commission initiative are scarcely able to explain the consensus in the Council. One reason is that the Commission attempts to avoid a divided Council by initiating proposals for which member states favour a policy change in the same direction. When member states still dispute the size of policy change, we show that they can find a solution by mutually benefiting from logrolling across proposals that either belong to the same policy domain or are negotiated during the same period. Hence, intertemporal and domain-specific logrolling can provide a powerful explanation for consensus even in a contested Council. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]
Why Don't Veto Players Use Their Power?
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 10, Heft 4, S. 507-534
ISSN: 1465-1165
What's Wrong With Eu Spatial Analysis?: The Accuracy and Robustness of Empirical Applications To the Interpretation of the Legislative Process and the Specification of Preferences
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 19, Heft 4, S. 465-487
ISSN: 1460-3667
EU legislative analysis has been enriched by insightful controversies over the interpretation of the policy process. This debate has concentrated on the interpretation of the process by focusing on the identification of the agenda setter and the relevance of voting weights, but little attention has been paid to the accurate specification of the second component of spatial analysis, the preferences of the actors involved. Although a misspecification can seriously distort the predictions of spatial theory, empirical applications often tend to reduce the number of dimensions, exclude actors' saliencies and assume continuous policy issues. Using computer simulation we show that spatial models are more robust to a misinterpretation of the policy process than to a misspecification of actors' preferences, and that their institutional elements are less decisive for the models' outcome predictions. Our empirical analysis confirms these results and provides detailed insights into the impact of the institutional and the preference component of spatial theory. We conclude that scholars should pay more attention to the accurate specification of the preference component of the models to improve our understanding of legislative decision making in the EU.
What's Wrong With Eu Spatial Analysis?: The Accuracy and Robustness of Empirical Applications To the Interpretation of the Legislative Process and the Specification of Preferences
In: Journal of theoretical politics, Band 19, Heft 4, S. 465-488
ISSN: 0951-6298
What's Wrong With Eu Spatial Analysis?
In: Journal of Theoretical Politics, Band 19, Heft 4, S. 465-487
EU legislative analysis has been enriched by insightful controversies over the interpretation of the policy process. This debate has concentrated on the interpretation of the process by focusing on the identification of the agenda setter and the relevance of voting weights, but little attention has been paid to the accurate specification of the second component of spatial analysis, the preferences of the actors involved. Although a misspecification can seriously distort the predictions of spatial theory, empirical applications often tend to reduce the number of dimensions, exclude actors saliencies and assume continuous policy issues. Using computer simulation we show that spatial models are more robust to a misinterpretation of the policy process than to a misspecification of actors' preferences, and that their institutional elements are less decisive for the models' outcome predictions. Our empirical analysis confirms these results and provides detailed insights into the impact of the institutional and the preference component of spatial theory. We conclude that scholars should pay more attention to the accurate specification of the preference component of the models to improve our understanding of legislative decision making in the EU. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2007.]
Legislative Gridlock and Bureaucratic Politics in the European Union
In: British journal of political science, Band 45, Heft 4, S. 777-797
ISSN: 1469-2112
How does the risk of gridlock affect the type of legislative output? Do bureaucratic agents expand their activities when they can expect that the principals are unable to overrule them? This article introduces a novel approach for calculating the risk of gridlock in bicameral legislatures in order to estimate its impact on bureaucratic activities, combining data on all secondary and tertiary acts of the European Union (EU) from 1983 to 2009. The findings reveal that bureaucratic activities expand when the risk of gridlock increases and an overruling of tertiary acts becomes less likely. This may sustain the EU's overall decision-making productivity, but its bureaucratic nature may raise further questions about democratic legitimacy and principal-agent problems in the representation of interests.