Suchergebnisse

Das Buch gibt einen systematischen Überblick über die Verbreitung, die Ursachen und die Stabilität von links- und rechtsextremen Einstellungen in Deutschland zwischen 1994 und 2017. Es zeigt, dass es viele Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen Links- und Rechtsextremisten gibt, sowohl in Bezug auf ihre Ideologien als auch auf ihre individuellen Erfahrungen. Insgesamt lassen sich diese Ursachen auf drei Faktoren zurückführen: unbefriedigte individuelle Bedürfnisse (z.B. Deprivation oder Politikverdrossenheit), der Zugang zu ideologischen Narrativen, die vereinfachte Lösungen für individuelle Probleme versprechen, und die größeren gesellschaftlichen Lebensumstände (z.B. Transformationsprozesse, Arbeitslosigkeit oder Zuwanderung). Obwohl extremistische Einstellungen relativ selten sind, erweisen sie sich als sehr stabil: Einmal erworben, sind sie nur schwer wieder auf den demokratischen Weg zu bringen. Dieses Buch vergleicht erstmals systematisch linksextreme und rechtsextreme Einstellungen, leistet einen intensiven methodischen Beitrag zur Messbarkeit solcher Einstellungen und setzt deren Ursachen und Stabilität in Beziehung.

Das Buch gibt einen systematischen Überblick über die Verbreitung, die Ursachen und die Stabilität von links- und rechtsextremen Einstellungen in Deutschland zwischen 1994 und 2017. Es zeigt, dass es viele Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen Links- und Rechtsextremisten gibt, sowohl in Bezug auf ihre Ideologien als auch auf ihre individuellen Erfahrungen. Insgesamt lassen sich diese Ursachen auf drei Faktoren zurückführen: unbefriedigte individuelle Bedürfnisse (z.B. Deprivation oder Politikverdrossenheit), der Zugang zu ideologischen Narrativen, die vereinfachte Lösungen für individuelle Probleme versprechen, und die größeren gesellschaftlichen Lebensumstände (z.B. Transformationsprozesse, Arbeitslosigkeit oder Zuwanderung). Obwohl extremistische Einstellungen relativ selten sind, erweisen sie sich als sehr stabil: Einmal erworben, sind sie nur schwer wieder auf den demokratischen Weg zu bringen. Dieses Buch vergleicht erstmals systematisch linksextreme und rechtsextreme Einstellungen, leistet einen intensiven methodischen Beitrag zur Messbarkeit solcher Einstellungen und setzt deren Ursachen und Stabilität in Beziehung.

Intro -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- About the Author -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 What We Know About Political Extremism -- 1.2 Why We Need to Study Attitudes -- 1.3 Choosing the Political Context -- 1.4 Data -- 1.5 Outline of the Book -- References -- 2 What Is Political Extremism? -- 2.1 Right-Wing Extremism -- 2.2 Left-Wing Extremism -- 2.3 Critical Assessment and Conclusion -- References -- 3 A Theory of Political Extremism -- 3.1 Similarities Between LWE and RWE -- 3.2 Motivations for Political Extremism -- 3.3 A Unified Model of Political Extremism -- References -- 4 Research Design: From Theory to Application -- 4.1 Data Sets -- 4.2 Operationalization -- 4.3 Hypotheses -- 4.4 Method -- Appendix -- References -- 5 Measuring Extremist Attitudes -- 5.1 The Downside of Traditional Approaches -- 5.2 Attitudes vs. Ideology vs. Voting Behavior -- 5.3 Toward a Scale for Extremist Attitudes -- 5.4 Summary -- Appendix -- References -- 6 The Distribution of Extremist Attitudes Within German Society -- 6.1 Time Trends -- 6.2 Regional Distribution -- 6.3 Summary -- References -- 7 The Origins of Political Extremism -- 7.1 Individual-Level Factors -- 7.2 Contextual Level -- 7.3 Robustness Checks -- 7.4 Stability of Political Extremism -- 7.5 Summary -- Appendix -- References -- 8 Conclusion -- 8.1 Limitations -- 8.2 Outlook -- References -- Index.

Affective polarization has increased substantially in the United States and countries of Europe over the last decades and the ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic have the potential to drastically reinforce such polarization. I investigate the degree and dynamic of affective polarization during the COVID-19 pandemic through a two-wave panel survey with a vignette experiment in Germany fielded in April/May and July/August 2020. I 1) compare the findings to a previous study from 2017, and 2) assess how economic distress due to the crisis changes perceptions of other partisans. Results show that the public today experiences slightly stronger polarization between AfD voters and supporters of other parties. Yet, higher economic distress decreases the negative sentiment of voters of other parties towards AfD supporters. I argue that experiencing economic distress increases the awareness of political debate and the responsiveness to government decisions. Thus, in times of broad cross-party consensus, this can translate into public opinion so that it makes people less hostile towards other partisans.

While the origins and consequences of populist attitudes in adults are being studied extensively, it is still unknown when populist attitudes might emerge in a person's life. Drawing on the existing literature on political socialization, we focus on populist attitudes during adolescence and explore the contributing role of negative relationships with parents, peers, and teachers. We provide the first comprehensive analysis of populist attitudes among a representative sample of children aged 12 to 18 (mean: 14.66 years) using a unique dataset gathered through interviews conducted in schools in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland (n=3,123). Our findings reveal a strong association between perceived unjust teacher behavior and the level of populist attitudes in adolescents, while the connection of peers and parents with populist attitudes appears to be limited. Further analyses using panel data from the UK support these findings.

The income gradient in political participation is a widely accepted stylized fact. Based on nine panel datasets from six countries, this research note asks whether income changes trigger short-term effects on political involvement. Irrespective of indicator, specification, and method (hybrid random effects models, fixed effects models with lags and leads, and error correction models), there are few significant short-term effects of income changes. In conjunction with earlier research, this finding suggests that the income gradient in political participation is likely to reflect stable differences between rich and poor voters emerging early in the life course.

AbstractThe income gradient in political participation is a widely accepted stylized fact. Based on nine panel datasets from six countries, this research note asks whether income changes trigger short‐term effects on political involvement. Irrespective of indicator, specification, and method (hybrid random effects models, fixed effects models with lags and leads, and error correction models), there are few significant short‐term effects of income changes. In conjunction with earlier research, this finding suggests that the income gradient in political participation is likely to reflect stable differences between rich and poor voters emerging early in the life course.

Abstract
This article addresses hitherto overlooked factors that might contribute to lower political knowledge among citizens with socio-economic problems. Based on findings in psychology and behavioral economics, we argue that economic worries undermine the motivation and cognitive resources to acquire knowledge. The argument is tested in a representative online survey and an experiment during the 2020 COVID-19 outbreak in Germany. The results of the survey are in line with the theoretical expectations. Subjective crisis exposure, particularly when it comes with anxiety and ruminating thoughts, is associated with lower "surveillance" knowledge about politics. A follow-up experiment designed to randomly activate worries about the economic consequences of the COVID-19 crisis could not establish a causal relationship.

The income gradient in political participation is a widely accepted stylized fact. This article asks how income effects on political involvement unfold over time. Using nine panel datasets from six countries, it analyzes whether income changes have short-term effects on political involvement, whether effects vary across the life-cycle, and whether parental income has an independent influence. Irrespective of indicator, specification, and method (hybrid models, inclusion of lags and leads, error-correction models), we find neither significant short-term effects of income changes nor life-cycle variation in these effects. However, parental income does seem to affect political socialization. Descriptive evidence and latent-growth-curve modeling based on household panels show that participatory inequality by parental income is already large before voting age. Poorer voters do not catch up with their richer peers in their twenties. This implies an urgent need for research on (political) inequality in youth and childhood.

The income gradient in political participation is a widely accepted stylized fact. This article asks how income effects on political involvement unfold over time. Using nine panel datasets from six countries, it analyzes whether income changes have short-term effects on political involvement, whether effects vary across the life-cycle, and whether parental income has an independent influence. Irrespective of indicator, specification, and method (hybrid models, inclusion of lags and leads, error-correction models), we find neither significant short-term effects of income changes nor life-cycle variation in these effects. However, parental income does seem to affect political socialization. Descriptive evidence and latent-growth-curve modeling based on household panels show that participatory inequality by parental income is already large before voting age. Poorer voters do not catch up with their richer peers in their twenties. This implies an urgent need for research on (political) inequality in youth and childhood.

The income gradient in political participation is a widely accepted stylized fact. This article asks how income effects on political involvement unfold over time. Using nine panel datasets from six countries, it analyzes whether income changes have short-term effects on political involvement, whether effects vary across the life-cycle, and whether parental income has an independent influence. Irrespective of indicator, specification, and method (hybrid models, inclusion of lags and leads, error-correction models), we find neither significant short-term effects of income changes nor life-cycle variation in these effects. However, parental income does seem to affect political socialization. Descriptive evidence and latent-growth-curve modeling based on household panels show that participatory inequality by parental income is already large before voting age. Poorer voters do not catch up with their richer peers in their twenties. This implies an urgent need for research on (political) inequality in youth and childhood.

In recent decades, a new integration-demarcation cleavage has emerged in Europe, pitting political parties in favour of globalisation against those opposing globalisation. Although a lot is known about the socio-structural basis and the political organisation of this cleavage, we do not know the extent to which these political divides have led to social divides. Therefore, this article investigates how losers and winners of globalisation oppose each other. On the basis of representative online experiments in Germany and Austria, this article studies attitudes and behaviour towards people with different nationalities, education, and party preferences, which correspond to the cultural, socio-structural, and organisational elements of the new cleavage. More particularly, the extent to which people are willing to interact with each other in daily life and how much they trust each other is investigated. The main results show that people who identify with different parties (especially if they belong to the other side of the cleavage) oppose each other much more strongly than people with different nationalities. There is no divide, however, between the low-skilled and high-skilled. Finally, it appears that the social divides are asymmetrical: the winners of globalisation resent the losers more than the other way round.