Correction to: Synergies in lobbying? Conceptualising and measuring lobbying coalitions to study interest group strategies, access, and influence
In: Interest groups & Advocacy, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 177-178
ISSN: 2047-7422
27 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Interest groups & Advocacy, Band 11, Heft 1, S. 177-178
ISSN: 2047-7422
In: Interest groups & Advocacy, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 21-37
ISSN: 2047-7422
AbstractTreating interest groups mainly as independent units of observation overlooks highly frequent coalition activities between actors and risks affecting the results of studies of lobbying and political influence. Yet, conceptualising and measuring lobbying coalitions is inherently difficult. In order to facilitate important future research, this article provides a roadmap of the main conceptual and methodological choices involved in studying lobbying coalitions. It distinguishes three main approaches to identify coalescing actors: a preference similarity approach, a behavioural approach, and an organisational approach. The article presents concrete operationalisations of coalitions from these vantage points and provides empirical evidence that various forms of cooperation activities on specific issues, as well as general cooperation structures, are highly frequent in lobbying in European countries. The article is relevant for scholars of interest groups and political advocacy more broadly by informing the design of new research on lobbying strategies, access, or influence.
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 27, Heft 6, S. 873-892
ISSN: 1466-4429
In: American journal of political science, Band 63, Heft 3, S. 660-674
ISSN: 1540-5907
AbstractLobbyists frequently join forces to influence policy, yet the success of active lobbying coalitions remains a blind spot in the literature. This article is the first to test how and when characteristics of active coalitions increase their lobbying success. Based on pluralist theory, one can expect diverse coalitions, uniting different societal interests, to signal broad support to policy makers. Yet, their responsiveness to this signal (i.e., signaling benefits) and contribution incentives within the coalition (i.e., cooperation costs) are likely to vary with issue salience. This theory is tested on a unique data set comprising 50 issues in five European countries. Results reveal a strong moderating effect of salience on the relationship between coalition diversity and success: On less salient issues, homogenous coalitions are more likely to succeed, whereas the effect reverses with higher salience, where diverse coalitions are more successful. These findings have implications for understanding political responsiveness and potential policy capture.
In: Junk , W M 2019 , ' When Diversity Works : The Effects of Coalition Composition on the Success of Lobbying Coalitions ' , American Journal of Political Science , vol. 63 , no. 3 , pp. 660-674 . https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12437
Lobbyists frequently join forces to influence policy, yet the success of active lobbying coalitions remains a blind spot in the literature. This article is the first to test how and when characteristics of active coalitions increase their lobbying success. Based on pluralist theory, one can expect diverse coalitions, uniting different societal interests, to signal broad support to policy makers. Yet, their responsiveness to this signal (i.e., signaling benefits) and contribution incentives within the coalition (i.e., cooperation costs) are likely to vary with issue salience. This theory is tested on a unique data set comprising 50 issues in five European countries. Results reveal a strong moderating effect of salience on the relationship between coalition diversity and success: On less salient issues, homogenous coalitions are more likely to succeed, whereas the effect reverses with higher salience, where diverse coalitions are more successful. These findings have implications for understanding political responsiveness and potential policy capture.
BASE
In: Governance: an international journal of policy and administration, Band 32, Heft 2, S. 313-330
ISSN: 1468-0491
Lobbying access to policy discussions determines how political interests are voiced and potentially exert influence. This article addresses whether access to the national legislature and the media favors umbrella organizations, which represent interests of their member groups. It theorizes that the role of umbrellas goes beyond signaling a large individual membership or constituency of people, but that umbrellas are distinct in transmitting interests from other organizations. This function is expected to be valuable in exchanges with legislators who seek efficiency, input legitimacy, and policy implementation, but less valuable in the media arena. Using a new data set on lobbying by 286 groups on 12 issues in the United Kingdom and Germany, the article serves support for this theory: Umbrellas enjoy higher legislative access, but lower media access than groups without member organizations, irrespective of their individual membership or claimed constituency. The findings have implications for how we understand and study political representation.
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 236-254
ISSN: 1350-1763
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 23, Heft 2, S. 236-254
ISSN: 1466-4429
In: West European politics, S. 1-27
ISSN: 1743-9655
In: Junk , W M & Rasmussen , A 2019 , ' Framing by the Flock : Collective Issue Definition and Advocacy Success ' , Comparative Political Studies , vol. 52 , no. 4 , 1 , pp. 483 . https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414018784044
The framing of issues is part of the tool kit used by lobbyists in modern policy making, yet the ways in which framing works to affect lobbying success across issues remain underexplored. Analyzing a new dataset of lobbying in the news on 50 policy issues in five European countries, we demonstrate that it is not individual but collective framing that matters: Emphasis frames that enjoy collective backing from lobbying camps of like-minded advocates affect an advocate's success, rather than frames being voiced by individual advocates. Crucially, it matters for advocacy success whether the advocate's camp frames its policy goals on an issue in unity with "one voice" and whether the actor's camp wins the contest of framing the issue vis-à-vis the opposing camp. Our results emphasize the need to consider the collective mechanisms behind the power of framing and have implications for future research on framing as an advocacy tool.
BASE
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 52, Heft 4, S. 483-513
ISSN: 1552-3829
The framing of issues is part of the tool kit used by lobbyists in modern policy making, yet the ways in which framing works to affect lobbying success across issues remain underexplored. Analyzing a new dataset of lobbying in the news on 50 policy issues in five European countries, we demonstrate that it is not individual but collective framing that matters: Emphasis frames that enjoy collective backing from lobbying camps of like-minded advocates affect an advocate's success, rather than frames being voiced by individual advocates. Crucially, it matters for advocacy success whether the advocate's camp frames its policy goals on an issue in unity with "one voice" and whether the actor's camp wins the contest of framing the issue vis-à-vis the opposing camp. Our results emphasize the need to consider the collective mechanisms behind the power of framing and have implications for future research on framing as an advocacy tool.
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research
ISSN: 1475-6765
AbstractCentral theories of public policy imply that lobbying is demand‐driven, meaning highly responsive to the levels of access that political gatekeepers offer to interest organizations. Others stress drivers at the supply side, especially the severity of disturbances which affect an organization's constituency. We test these central arguments explaining lobbying activities in a comparative survey experiment conducted in 10 polities in Europe. Our treatments vary the severity of two types of external threats faced by interest organizations: (1) barriers that restrict their access to decision‐makers and (2) disturbances that compromise an organization's interests. We operationalize these threats at the demand and supply side of lobbying based on an (at that point) hypothetical second wave of COVID‐19. Our findings show that while severe access barriers trigger a flight response, whereby groups suspend their lobbying activities and divert to protest actions, higher disturbances mobilize groups into a fight mode, in which organizations spend more lobbying resources and intensify different outside lobbying activities. Our study serves novel causal evidence on the important dynamic relationship between policy disturbances, political access and lobbying strategies.
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 56, Heft 4, S. 530-560
ISSN: 1552-3829
The first mover advantage is a critical factor for the productivity of firms that enter new markets. Surprisingly, however, the importance of timing is rarely explored in studies of interest groups and their influence on new policy agendas. In this article, we therefore develop a theory of first mover advantages in lobbying. We argue that especially more resourceful and more highly affected organizations should be able to benefit from early lobbying. Using granular survey data on the timing of lobby efforts by interest groups on Covid-19 related policies in 10 European democracies, we test this novel theory. Our results show that timing is an important predictor of lobbying influence, but that interest groups which are hardly affected by a new policy cannot benefit from early mover advantages in the same way as affected organizations. Moreover, we give evidence for differences in first mover advantages depending on organizational staff resources.
In: Public choice, Band 191, Heft 1-2, S. 193-215
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Crepaz , M , Hanegraaff , M & Junk , W M 2022 , ' Is there a first mover advantage in lobbying? A comparative analysis of how the timing of mobilization affects the influence of interest organizations in 10 polities ' , Comparative Political Studies .
The first mover advantage is a critical factor for the productivity of firms that enter new markets. Surprisingly, however, the importance of timing is rarely explored in studies of interest organizations and their influence on new policy agendas. In this article, we therefore develop a theory of first mover advantages in lobbying. We argue that especially more resourceful and more highly affected organizations should be able to benefit from early mobilization. Using granular survey data on the timing of mobilization of interest organizations on Covid-19 related policies in 10 European democracies, we test this novel theory. Our results show that timing is an important predictor of lobbying influence, but that organizations that are hardly affected by a new policy cannot benefit from early mover advantages in the same way as affected organizations. Moreover, we give evidence for differences in first mover advantages depending on organizational staff resources.
BASE