Suchergebnisse

This article analyses the effect of economic assessments on attitudes towards the European Union. The literature has mostly studied this question with observational data (which does not allow to establish a causal link), and has not explored how different countries's experiences during economic hardship shape opinions about the European Union. To account for this, I run a survey vignette experiment in Germany – a creditor countries's during the Great Recession – and Spain – a debtor country. I find that having worse perceptions about the impact of the crisis erodes attitudes towards the European Union. The mechanism is, however, different across countries. In Germany, worse economic evaluations reduce the perception that the European Union is a beneficial project. Conversely, in Spain, negative assessments about the financial crisis are linked to beliefs that democratic representation is limited in the European Union. These results are relevant to understand the conditions and mechanisms by which attitudes towards the European Union are worsened.

Party systems diverge in their levels of nationalisation. While in some countries parties obtain similar levels of electoral support in all districts, in others parties get very asymmetric electoral shares across districts. The distributive consequences of this have been seldom studied. The argument tested here is that when political parties have nationalised electorates they have stronger incentives to provide social policies that spread benefits all over the territory. This argument is tested in 22 OECD democracies for the period 1980-2006. The results show that, regardless of the electoral system in place, there is a positive relation between party system nationalisation and social spending. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractParty systems diverge in their levels of nationalisation. While in some countries parties obtain similar levels of electoral support in all districts, in others parties get very asymmetric electoral shares across districts. The distributive consequences of this have been seldom studied. The argument tested here is that when political parties have nationalised electorates they have stronger incentives to provide social policies that spread benefits all over the territory. This argument is tested in 22 OECD democracies for the period 1980−2006. The results show that, regardless of the electoral system in place, there is a positive relation between party system nationalisation and social spending.

Abstract
We study the effect of compulsory civic duty on turnout. We take advantage of a natural experiment in Spain, where electoral officers are selected through a lottery and being an electoral officer is compulsory for those drafted. We analyze whether acting as an officer changes turnout and attitudes in subsequent elections. Our findings show that compulsory civic duty has a strong short-term and positive effect on electoral participation, but has no impact on political attitudes. The positive effect of the civic duty treatment, however, fades after a few months. Our results have implications for theories about civic duty and the formation of political habits.

Do negative economic shocks change fiscal policy preferences? We examine this question via the large COVID-19 shock, as the virus and ensuing lockdowns caused one of the largest acute economic contractions in recent history. While previous evidence that recessions meaningfully change fiscal preferences is limited, we hypothesize that the health pandemic should have had distinct effects. We argue that this is due to the large breadth, uncertainty, and socio-tropic basis of the economic contraction, and that worse economic evaluations and reduced economic optimism should correspond with greater support for fiscal interventions to address the crisis. To test these hypotheses, we use new panel evidence from Spain, a hard-hit country, surveying individuals prior to the pandemic and the same individuals during the pandemic. We find that individuals became more economically pessimistic across many measures. However, there is little evidence that this translates into support for more expansive fiscal policies. Second, we find through a framing experiment that this could be because individuals believe that the government's fiscal policies would disproportionately benefit lower-income individuals. The findings indicate the theoretical importance of recessions for changing individual and socio-tropic economic expectations, but do not support the claim that large economic shocks can significantly change fiscal preferences.

AbstractOne of the most significant economic trends in the last decades has been the integration of countries in international markets. What have been the consequences of global economic integration upon the territorial organization of the states? Has it contributed to centralize powers or to further decentralization? The literature so far has provided inconclusive evidence. In this article we shed new light on the relationship between economic globalization and territorial politics by using a varied source of data such as the Regional Authority Index, and the KOF indices of globalization for the period 1970–2010. Results show that economic globalization is positively associated to decentralization, particularly in those countries with more regionalist parties and where levels of inequality are lower.

One of the most significant economic trends in the last decades has been the integration of countries in international markets. What have been the consequences of global economic integration upon the territorial organization of the states? Has it contributed to centralize powers or to further decentralization? The literature so far has provided inconclusive evidence. In this paper we shed new light on the relationship between economic globalization and territorial politics by using a varied source of data such as the Regional Authority Index, and the KOF indices of globalization for the period 1970-2010. Results show that economic globalization is positively associated to decentralization, particularly in those countries with more regionalist parties and where levels of inequality are lower. Conversely, higher levels of regional inequality can revert the effect.

AbstractThe literature on party system nationalisation has yet to provide a better understanding of the impact of short‐term factors upon the nationalisation of politics. This article helps to fill this literature gap by analysing the effect of economic conditions on party system nationalisation. The argument is that economic crises will decrease levels of nationalisation by amplifying territorial variation in preferences for redistribution, limiting political parties' capacity to coordinate divergent interests across districts and triggering the emergence of new political forces. Data on 47 countries for the 1960–2011 period confirm this hypothesis and show that lower economic growth during the years prior to the election is associated with a decrease in levels of party system nationalisation in the next election. The result is robust to variation in the specification of the econometric model and to the use of different measures of nationalisation. Results also show that federal institutions increase the impact of economic conditions on the nationalisation of politics, whereas any moderating effect of electoral system proportionality on the economy is not found.

There is a large body of research showing that the provision of social policies is higher under proportional electoral systems than under majoritarian systems. This article helps advance this literature by showing that the geographic distribution of social recipients plays an essential role in moderating the impact of electoral institutions on social provision. Using data from twenty-two OECD countries, the results show that majoritarian systems increase the provision of social spending when recipients are concentrated in certain regions. When levels of concentration are high, social spending in majoritarian countries can surpass levels of provision in proportional representation systems.

This paper studies the extent to which economic crises bust different reactions depending on individual ideological identity. Our argument is that individual left-right identification shapes how citizens evaluate the functioning of democracy, and consequently, it moderates the impact of economic crises on democratic discontent. We argue that left-wing individuals' views on democratic performance would be more heavily affected by economic results and strongly shaped by the (in)capacity of a democracy to represent its citizens in its reaction to the economic crisis. After testing our argument with data from the ESS, we provide evidence from a survey experiment conducted in Spain. Both analyses show that economic crises are relevant in explaining democratic dissatisfaction, but the strength of their impact depends on ideological identities. Economic results have a stronger effect on the satisfaction with democracy of left-wing individuals by negatively affecting their perception of the functioning of democratic representation.