Suchergebnisse

Presidential Activism and Veto Power in Central and Eastern Europe -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- List of Abbreviations -- Political Parties -- Other abbreviations -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Presidential Powers in Academic Debates -- 1.2 A Study of Presidential Activism in Central and Eastern Europe -- 1.3 Defining Presidential Activism -- 1.4 Explaining Presidential Activism: Theory, Research Design and Data -- 1.5 Practical Relevance and Contributions -- 1.6 Structure of the Book -- Notes -- References -- Part I Patterns of Presidential Activism -- 2 Determinants of Presidential Activism -- 2.1 Presidency versus President: Studies of Presidential Activism -- 2.1.1 Presidency-Centred Explanations -- 2.1.1.1 Constitutional Factors -- 2.1.1.2 The Political Environment -- 2.1.2 President-Centred Explanations -- 2.1.3 Summary: Individuals or Institutions? -- 2.2 A Unified Theoretical Framework of Presidential Activism -- 2.2.1 Rationality, Goals and the Relative Importance of Explanatory Factors -- 2.2.2 The Effect of Direct Elections and the Political Environment -- 2.3 Conclusion: Considering Explanations and Their Limitations -- Notes -- References -- 3 The Use of Presidential Vetoes in Central and Eastern Europe -- 3.1 Describing Patterns of Veto Use -- 3.2 An Event Count Model of Presidential Veto Use -- 3.3 An Event History Model of Presidential Veto Use -- 3.4 Case Selection for In-depth Analysis -- 3.4.1 Principles of Case Selection -- 3.4.2 Selection of Countries -- 3.4.3 Selection of Episodes -- 3.4.4 Estonia -- 3.4.5 Hungary -- 3.4.6 Poland -- 3.4.7 Slovakia -- 3.5 Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Part II Presidential Activism in Practice -- 4 Veto Use in Estonia and Poland -- 4.1 Presidential Veto Use in Estonia -- 4.1.1 Meri II - Laar II: A President Exploiting Intra-Governmental Divisions

Parties across parliamentary republics compete fiercely over capturing the presidential office. However, they are often torn between seeing their preferred candidate elected and exploiting the election for publicity purposes. The German case, specifically parties' ability to nominate extra-parliamentarian electors (EPEs) as part of the electoral college, offers a particularly interesting perspective on how parties balance these competing goals. While EPEs allow parties to boost their profile and strengthen ties with selected groups, they also present a risk factor as their voting behaviour is more difficult to predict. Based on a novel data set on party delegations in German presidential elections, 1949-2017, the analysis shows that – contrary to traditional assumptions – competition in the electoral college did not play a role in EPE nominations. Rather, party strategies were influenced by the varying signalling power of the elections. Parties were more risk-averse and nominated fewer EPEs during grand coalitions, when they were part of the federal government, or when federal elections approached, yet nominated more EPEs when they had a larger support base to reward. The results call for further comparative research on indirect elections and different types of EPEs in Germany. This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in German Politics (2019) © Taylor & Francis.

This article assesses the effects of common features in the indirect election of presidents in parliamentary republics. In particular, it examines the influence of majority requirements, selectorate composition and uncertainty on party strategies, using Estonia (1996-2016) as a crucial case for analysis. The analysis demonstrates that the lack of a plurality run-off effectively eliminated incentives for inter-party cooperation and strategic voting. It furthermore shows that shifts in the partisan composition and control of the selectorate from parliament to electoral college provided considerable opportunities for agenda manipulation. Subsequently, results only rarely reflected the parliamentary balance of power. Last, although overall indicators suggest greater congruence between parliament and electoral college over time, this proliferated rather than reduced parties' uncertainty over the electoral outcome as non-parliamentary electors voted based on local interests and acted independently from national party leaders.

Book Review: Chaisty, Paul, Cheeseman, Nic & Power, Timothy J. Coalitional Presidentialism in Comparative Perspective. Minority Presidents in Multiparty Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, xiii + 267pp. £60.00 h/b.

Why do authoritarian presidents still use their legislative power? Although recent studies have argued that authoritarian legislatures are more than "rubberstamps" and can serve as arenas for elite bargaining over policy, there is no evidence that legislators would pass bills that go against presidential preferences. This article investigates this apparent paradox and proposes a theoretical framework to explain presidential activism in authoritarian regimes. It argues that any bills that contravene constraints on policy-making set by the president should generally be stopped or amended by other actors loyal to the regime. Thus, presidents will rather use their veto (1) to protect the regime's output legitimacy and stability, and/or (2) to reinforce their power vis-à-vis other actors. The argument is tested using two case studies of veto use in Kazakhstan and Russia over the last 10 years. The analysis supports the propositions of the theoretical framework and furthermore highlights the potential use of vetoes as a means of distraction, particularly in relation to international audiences. The article extends research on presidential veto power to authoritarian regimes and its findings contribute to the growing literature on the activities of authoritarian legislatures. This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Democratization (2019) © Taylor & Francis, available online at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510347.2019.1678029.

Dr Philipp Koeker explains how elite interviews differ from other interviews, and he offers suggestions for success. He identifies elite characteristics, access difficulties, power challenges, and reliability.