Nakbat Haifa: Collapse and Dispersion of a Major Palestinian Community
In: Middle Eastern studies, Band 37, Heft 4, S. 25-70
ISSN: 1743-7881
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In: Middle Eastern studies, Band 37, Heft 4, S. 25-70
ISSN: 1743-7881
In: Israel affairs, Band 4, Heft 2, S. 47-71
ISSN: 1353-7121
In: Israel affairs, Band 3, Heft 3-4, S. 117-132
ISSN: 1353-7121
In: The journal of strategic studies, Band 19, Heft 3, S. 303-320
ISSN: 0140-2390
World Affairs Online
In: Bulletin of peace proposals: to motivate research, to inspire future oriented thinking, to promote activities for peace, Band 22, Heft 1, S. 11-24
ISSN: 0007-5035
IN AN ATTEMPT TO ILLUSTRATE THE MERITS OF NEUTRALIZATION IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONTEXT, THIS ARTICLE ANALYZES THE ESSENCE OF THIS CONCEPT AND THE FACTORS WHICH BEAR UPON ITS POLITICAL FEASIBILITY. IT ALSO DELINEATES THE PROPOSED NEUTRALIZATION PACKAGE AND INDICATES THE REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ADVANTAGES RESULTING FROM ITS IMPLEMENTATION.
In: The Middle East journal, Band 44, Heft 2, S. 256-268
ISSN: 0026-3141
In the case of the Iran-Iraq war, the general cause is often attributed to the ethnic and religious divide that has separated Arabs and Persians, Shi'i and Sunni Muslims since at least the seventh century. This article offers an alternative explanation. It argues that geopolitics is the most important single factor that has influenced Iranian-Iraqi relations for generations and, in consequence, accounts for the outbreak of the war. More concretely, the war began because the weaker state, Iraq, attempted to resist the hegemonic aspirations of its stronger neighbor, Iran, to reshape the regional status quo according to its own image. (DÜI-Hns)
World Affairs Online
In: International affairs, Band 64, Heft 1, S. 83-95
ISSN: 0020-5850
THIS ARTICLE PRESENTS THREE INTERCONNECTED ARGUMENTS. FIRST, THE IRAQI INVASION OF IRAN DID NOT EMANATE FROM A PREMEDIATED GRAND DESIGN BUT WAS A PREEMPTIVE MOVE INTENDED TO FORESTALL THE IRANIAN THREAT TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE BOATH REGIME BY DESTROYING OPPOSING FORCES AND DENYING TERRITORY. SECOND, IRAQ DID NOT OVERESTIMATE ITS MILITARY POWER: IN 1980 IT ENJOYED AN UNDENIABLE MILITARY EDGE. THIRD, IRAQ'S MISTAKE WAS THAT IT DID NOT USE ITS ADVANTAGE DECISIVELY. IRAQ'S STRATEGY FAILED BECAUSE ITS OBJECTIVES WERE TOO LIMITED.
In: International affairs, Band 62, Heft 2, S. 265-278
ISSN: 0020-5850
World Affairs Online
In: The world today, Band 41, Heft 12, S. 214-217
ISSN: 0043-9134
World Affairs Online
In: Middle Eastern studies, Band 32, Heft 4, S. 367
ISSN: 0026-3206
In: Israel affairs, Band 2, Heft 1, S. 75-92
ISSN: 1353-7121
In: Osteuropa, Band 63, Heft 9, S. 45-56
ISSN: 0030-6428