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ARTICLE EXAMINES THE OPTIONAL PREFERENCE VOTING SYSTEM AS IT OPERATES IN THE ITALIAN ELECTORAL PROCESS FOR THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES. IT IS DEMONSTRATED THAT THE ABILITY OF THE PARTIES TO DETERMINE WHICH CANDIDATE WILL BE ELECTED BY STRUCTURING THEIR LISTS IS SUBSTANTIALLY LESS THAN OFTEN SUGGESTED.

The paper examines the perceptions that representatives and would-be representatives have of their roles as MEPs, what accounts for those differences and what impact they have on MEP behaviour. Three dimensions of role differences were identified. Two of them, AGENT and TRUSTEE can be found in most assemblies but a third, a federal/confederal distinction, is perhaps peculiar to the EU. Individual attitudes to Europe explained this one quite well, nationality explained differences on the AGENT dimension and left-right position provided some explanation for differences on the TRUSTEE role. The combination of role perceptions appear to have some impact on MEPs' activities. (European Journal of Political Research/ FUB)

THE AUTHOR COMMENTS ON AN ESSAY, "THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEMS: CHANGING PATTERNS OF ELECTORAL VOLATILITY" BY MOGENS N. PEDERSEN, WHICH WAS FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1979. PEDERSEN ARGUED THAT IT HAD BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN THAT EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEMS WERE STABLE AND REFLECTED THE SOCIAL CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES OF THE PAST. RATHER, EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEMS IN TERMS OF ELECTORAL VOLATILITY WERE DRIFTING AWAY FROM EACH OTHER. SOME OF THE PARTY SYSTEMS THAT HAD TRADITIONALLY BEEN CONSIDERED VOLATILE WERE BECOMING LESS SO WHILE SOME OTHER SYSTEMS WERE TAKING ON THE CHARACTER OF HIGHLY-VOLATILE PARTY ARRANGEMENTS.

Auflistung der Mitglieder der amerikanischen Regierung unter Führung von Präsident Bush und kurzer Überblick über die Hauptthemen der nationalen Politik im Jahr 1991

UNTIL RECENT YEARS, TWO MAJOR TRENDS IN EUROPEAN POLITICS--THE GROWTH OF STATE SERVICES AND INCREASED POLITICAL PARTICIPATION--HAVE COMPLEMENTED THE CENTRAL ROLE OF PARTIES. THIS PAPER ARGUES THAT THE RELATIONSHIP MAY HAVE BEGUN TO CHANGE AND QUESTIONS THE FUTURE VIABILITY OF THE MASS PARTY AS A RESULT OF A SHIFT IN THE BALANCE OF PERCEIVED ADVANTAGES OF THE MASS PARTY BY BOTH LEADERS AND MEMBERS. IT ALSO DISCUSSES SEVERAL POTENTIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP FOR LEADERS AND MEMBERS.

INTRAPARTY PREFERENCE VOTING IS A POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT POSSIBILITY FOR VOTERS IN MANY PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SYSTEMS, ESPECIALLY THE ITALIAN SYSTEM. THREE HYPOTHESES-THAT PREFERENCE VOTING IS AN INDICATOR OF TRADITIONALISM OR THE VOTO DI SCAMBIO, SOPHISTICATION OR THE VOTO D'OPINIONE, AND MOBILIZATION OR THE VOTO D'APPARTENENZA-ARE CONSIDERED USING SURVEY DATA AND LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS. ALL THREE HYPOTHESES ARE SUPPORTED BY THE DATA. OVERALL, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE THREE EXPLANATIONS ARE COMPLEMENTARY RATHER THAN CONTRADICTORY, AND THAT CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS MUST BE CONSIDERED IN A FULL ACCOUNT OF PREFERENCE VOTING.

IN RESPONSE TO CRITICISMS OF THE PROPOSED CARTEL PARTY, THIS ARTICLE SUGGESTS THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTICIPATION IN AN INTER-PARTY CARTEL AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDIVIDUAL PARTIES PARTICIPATING IN THE CARTEL IS STRONG ENOUGH TO GENERATE A "CARTEL" PARTY AS A PARTY TYPE. THE ARTICLE ALSO ARGUES THAT IN RECENT YEARS THE CARTEL PARTY HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY TYPICAL RATHER THAN ABERRATIONAL. WHILE THERE ARE NO FULLY FLEDGED CARTEL PARTIES, THE TYPE HAS DEVELOPED SUFFICIENTLY AS TO JUSTIFY THE SPECIFICATION OF AN ADDITION "CORNER" IN SPACE, RELATIVE TO WHICH REAL-WORLD CASES CAN BE ANCHORED.

MANY RECENT DISCUSSIONS OF THE DECLINE OF PARTY ARE PREDICATED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE DUVERGER/SOCIALIST MASS-PARTY MODEL IS THE ONLY MODEL FOR PARTIES. THE AUTHORS CONTEND THAT THIS ASSUMPTION IS MISCONCEIVED, THAT THE MASS-PARTY MODEL IS ONLY ONE, TEMPORALLY LIMITED AND CONTINGENT MODEL, AND THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO DIFFERENTIATE NOTIONS OF ADAPTATION AND CHANGE FROM NOTIONS OF DECLINE OR FAILURE. FOLLOWING AN ANALYSIS OF HOW VARIOUS MODELS OF PARTY CAN BE LOCATED IN TERMS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE, THE AUTHORS CONTEND THAT THE RECENT PERIOD HAS WITNESSED THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW MODEL OF PARTY, THE CARTEL PARTY, IN WHICH COLLUDING PARTIES BECOME AGENTS OF THE STATE AND EMPLOY THE RESOURCES OF THE STATE (THE PARTY STATE) TO ENSURE THEIR OWN COLLECTIVE SURVIVAL. FINALLY, THE AUTHORS SUGGEST THAT THE RECENT CHALLENGE TO PARTY IS IN FACT A CHALLENGE TO THE CARTEL THAT THE ESTABLISHED PARTIES HAVE CREATED FOR THEMSELVES.