Suchergebnisse

I Theory -- 1 The Problem: Economic Analysis and the Rise of New Regulation -- 2 Ideology: An Explanation for Public Policy Making -- 3 Roll Call Voting by Congress -- II Evidence -- 4 Public Interest Lobbies -- 5 Voting on Minimum Wages -- 6 Ideology and Logrolling -- 7 Empirical Estimation of the General Equilibrium Model -- III Contributions -- 8 A Comparison of the 1972 and 1978 Elections: Role of the PACs -- 9 Some Additional Effects of Contributions -- 10 Conclusions and Implications -- Appendix: Analysis of Econometric Models with Qualitative Dependent Variables -- References.

Theories of the size of government focus on either the demand for government or the supply of tax revenues. Demand-side theories such as those of Peltzman, Meltzer & Richard, Husted & Kenny, & Lott & Kenny are essentially political theories. They emphasize the role of voters or interest groups in expanding government. Supply-side theories such as those of Kau & Rubin, Baumol, West, & Ferris & West emphasize the ability of government to collect taxes. In this paper, we combine both demand- & supply-side theories. For demand, we use the Poole-Rosenthal time-series data on the ideology of Congress, on the theory that all political forces must ultimately express themselves in voting which is measured by ideology. For supply, we use the Kau-Rubin measures of the ability of government to collect taxes as a function of the deadweight costs of tax collection & ability of individuals to hide revenues. We find that female labor force participation & the associated ability to tax female productivity is the most important factor associated with government, & it alone explains about 60% of the actual growth of government. The ideology of the Senate is also significant, but has a small effect. This paper may be the first to examine the influence of ideology on the time path of a policy; other research examining ideology (including ours) has been cross sectional. Further research on the role of ideology in changing policies over time is clearly warranted. 4 Tables, 35 References. Adapted from the source document.

The determinants of membership in Common Cause & Public Citizen, two "public interest" lobbies, are examined empirically, using state-level data on per capita membership & various state characteristics. The % of Coll graduates in a state is significantly associated (.05 level) with membership in both lobbies. For the other variables -- % in metropolitan areas, % black, income per capita, & % voting -- the only association approaching significance is that of % in metropolitan areas with Public Citizen membership rates (.10 level). Examination of voting by congressmen on 5 bills on which one or the other group had taken a stand gives evidence in 4 cases that number of members in a state was associated (.05 level) with voting by congressmen from the state, after adjusting for all economic variables. These results suggest that participation by citizens does have some impact on the legislative process. 2 Tables, Appendix. Modified HA.