Suchergebnisse

In 1838, Governor John Franklin introduced civil registration in Tasmania to replace the defective ecclesiastical registration system. Tasmania thus became the first British colony to introduce civil registration, just two years after the British Act. Kippen examines the working of the 1838 system, focusing on such issues as compliance, the statistical value of the 1838 Act, the merger with the Colonial Secretary's Office, and Governor Denison's threat to abolish the system in 1848. She briefly describes the merger with the Supreme Court in 1857 and the transfer to the Government Statistician, R.M. Johnston, in 1882. In 1895 a new Registration Act consolidated existing statutes and introduced amendments to improve the administration of civil registration.

In 1838, Governor John Franklin introduced civil registration in Tasmania to replace the defective ecclesiastical registration system. Tasmania thus became the first British colony to introduce civil registration, just two years after the British Act. Kippen examines the working of the 1838 system, focusing on such issues as compliance, the statistical value of the 1838 Act, the merger with the Colonial Secretary's Office, and Governor Denison's threat to abolish the system in 1848. She briefly describes the merger with the Supreme Court in 1857 and the transfer to the Government Statistician, R.M. Johnston, in 1882. In 1895 a new Registration Act consolidated existing statutes and introduced amendments to improve the administration of civil registration.

This article uses reconstituted family data from birth, death, and marriage registers to measure ex-nuptial fertility and premarital pregnancies in nineteenth-century Tasmania. It also examines the extent to which convict origins of European society on the island caused a departure from English norms of family formation behavior, during a period when men greatly outnumbered women. Illegitimacy was high during the convict period. From the mid-1850s, after the convict system collapsed, levels of ex-nuptial births were relatively constant until the end of the century, as indicated both by the illegitimacy rate and by the proportion of marriages associated with prenuptial births. By the end of the nineteenth century, rates of illegitimacy and prenuptial conceptions in Tasmania were well within the range of those of contemporary English-speaking populations.

In recent years, there has been intense debate about the population size to which Australia should aim in the 21st century. Some argue for a much lower population than we have now. The environmentalist, Tim Flannery, for example, has suggested that Australians might opt for a future population of between 6 and 12 million people. Others argue for a considerably larger population. For example, former Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, would like to see a population of 45 to 50 million people in the next 50 years. This paper shows that the targets specified by both Flannery and Fraser are unattainable in the next 50 years because such targets can only be reached through levels of immigration which are impossibly negative on one side or impossibly large on the other side. The demographic reality is that the options for Australia's future population size are much more limited than the options that are considered in popular debate. The limiting factor is our low, and falling, level of fertility. The powerful demographic effects of low fertility have been little appreciated. One of the aims of this paper is to provide such an appreciation. We show that with zero net migration, Australia's projected levels of fertility and mortality would lead to the population rising initially to 20 million and then falling slowly in the first half of next century and rapidly in the second half. The population would age dramatically and the size of the labour force would fall markedly. We argue that these are not desirable outcomes and that, as a consequence, we should seek to have immigration levels which, at the least, lead to zero population growth. A level of net annual migration of around 80 000, in combination with our low fertility rate, would lead to zero population growth in about 25 years and a population size of about 24-25 million. Given current trends in fertility and mortality, annual net migration to Australia of at least 80 000 persons is necessary to avoid spiralling population decline and substantial falls in the size of the labour force. This level of annual net migration also makes a worthwhile and efficient contribution to the retardation of population ageing. Levels of annual net migration above 80 000 become increasingly ineffective and inefficient in the retardation of ageing. Those who wish to argue for a higher level of immigration must base their argument on the benefits of a larger population, not upon the illusory 'younging power' of high immigration. The level of about 80 000 is close to the average net migration of the past eight years and of the past 50 years. Thus, if present settings do not change, we are headed towards this outcome. There is an upper limit to annual net migration. We argue that there were difficulties in the late 1980s when net migration rose for just two years to over 150 000 per annum. While it is not possible to be prescriptive, a sustained net migration level of 120 000 per annum is at the high end of what Australia seems to be able to manage. Furthermore, it is little understood that the Australian Government has only a very limited degree of control over the final level of annual net migration. It has almost no control over movements out of the country and little control over long-term (as distinct from permanent) movement into the country. Even major components of permanent movement into the country (New Zealand citizens and spouses or children of Australian residents) are largely beyond the government's control. That is, it is not possible for any Australian government to precisely determine the level of annual net migration. For example, net migration was 72 000 in 1997 and 112 000 in 1998. The increase of 40 000 between these two years was not the outcome of deliberate government policy. If the desirable range of annual net migration is as narrow as 80 000 to 120 000 and if government is unable to determine this level with any degree of precision, heated debate about immigration levels seems pointless. In these circumstances, the major parties should reconsider the advantages of a bipartisan approach to immigration policy. Our analysis in the paper is based on the assumption that the fertility rate in Australia will not fall below 1.65 births per woman on average in the long term. In our view, population policy for Australia should revolve around ensuring that fertility does not fall below this level.

In 1999 and 2000, net long–term visitor migration to Australia exceeded net permanent migration for the first time. A shift in Australia's migration entry from permanent settlers to long–term visitors has many implications. This paper focuses on the longer–term demographic impacts of this change.In conventional projections of Australia's population, particular levels of annual net overseas migration are assumed and there is an implicit assumption that these levels represent permanent migration. The question addressed in this paper is: if permanent residents and temporary residents of Australia are treated as two separate populations, does this change the outcomes of population projections?The paper uses a new projection model that divides the Australian population into these two components. Each population is projected separately with provision for movement from the visitor population to the permanent population. Visitors who do not convert to permanent residence are "tagged" with their expected year of departure and are taken out of the population in that year. They are also assumed to have a zero birth rate (because any births they have will leave with them).A conventional population projection based on 1999 levels of annual net overseas migration (88,000) results in an Australian population of around 25 million in 2050. In contrast, a "standard" projection, which is also based on 1999 migration levels, but considers permanent movements (50,000 net annually) and long–term visitor movements (125,000 annual arrivals) separately results in a population of 23 million by 2050.Other projections are carried out in which specified net migration targets are met through varying either the level of net permanent–resident migration, the level of long–term visitor arrivals, or the rate of conversion of long–term visitors to permanent residence.The central conclusion of the study is that dividing the Australian population into two parts, permanent residents and long–term visitors, and projecting them separately into the future makes a considerable difference to the results of population projections.

Over the past 20 years, policy attention has been focused upon the implications of below‐replacement fertility for the aging of populations. This article argues that another potential consequence, a decline in the absolute size of the labor force, may prove to be an equally compelling issue because of its impact on rates of economic growth. Because the United States will experience both increasing labor productivity and an increase in its labor supply, the growth orientation of the global economy is likely to persist. In this circumstance, given relatively comparable changes in the productivity of labor across countries, countries that face major declines in their labor supply will fare less well than countries that are able to maintain their labor supply at least constant. The article examines the labor supply prospects of 16 developed countries for the period 2000–2050, drawing attention to the ways in which countries may be able to influence the future levels of their labor supply.

This paper uses survey data to examine the effect of the income-contingent charge mechanism, the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS), and other demographic and attitudinal variables on fertility expectations in Australia over the recent past. HECS requires former Australian students to fund some of the costs of higher education through the repayment of interest-free loans made by the Australian government. Its defining characteristic is that repayments only occur when and if students' future incomes exceed a particular level. Since its introduction in 1989, media and other populist commentary has suggested that HECS has had unanticipated effects on behaviour. Most recently, attention has focused on the effects of HECS on fertility, with some arguing that university graduates are delaying births, and having fewer children, because of their HECS debts. This paper demonstrates that the introduction of HECS has had no discernible impact on Australian fertility rates, nor on the number of children that people expect to have. However, education, age and a number of attitudinal factors are associated with significant differences in fertility expectations.

This paper uses survey data to examine the effect of the income-contingent charge mechanism, the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS), and other demographic and attitudinal variables on fertility expectations in Australia over the recent past. HECS requires former Australian students to fund some of the costs of higher education through the repayment of interest-free loans made by the Australian government. Its defining characteristic is that repayments only occur when and if students' future incomes exceed a particular level. Since its introduction in 1989, media and other populist commentary has suggested that HECS has had unanticipated effects on behaviour. Most recently, attention has focused on the effects of HECS on fertility, with some arguing that university graduates are delaying births, and having fewer children, because of their HECS debts. This paper demonstrates that the introduction of HECS has had no discernible impact on Australian fertility rates, nor on the number of children that people expect to have. However, education, age and a number of attitudinal factors are associated with significant differences in fertility expectations.