Suchergebnisse

Russlands invasjon av Ukraina kom som julekvelden på kjerringa. Blant hovedårsakene til mange observatørers måpende overraskelse var inngrodde forestillinger, faste forventninger og vante antagelser om interstatlige forhold. Mange av disse har lenge vært vedlikeholdt av en såkalt nyrealistisk tilnærming til internasjonal politikk. Denne artikkelen begynner med å identifisere nyrealismens betydelige blindsoner. Den belyser deretter et sentralt tema som nyrealismen systematisk overser: hvordan særegne styreformer og tankesett internt i stater som Russland og Ukraina har utviklet seg etter den kalde krigens slutt. Russlands særegne styreform – her betegnet som Putins nypatrimoniale regimetype – har formet den russiske beslutningen om å invadere Ukraina. Denne styreformen har også vært en årsak til overraskelser på russisk side: ikke minst Putin-regimets feilvurdringer om ukrainernes motstand, Vestens bistand og krigens generelle gang. Artikkelen avslutter med å drøfte forskjellige former for feilvurderinger. Den spekulerer også om hvorfor amerikanernes vurderinger var gode i forkant av krigen, mens land som Tyskland og Frankrike, som hadde samme empiri som USA, var uenige med amerikanerne og vurderte Putins intensjoner annerledes.
Abstract in EnglishSurprises Rarely Come Alone. On Misunderstandings, Myths and the Invasion of UkraineRussia's invasion of Ukraine was a bolt from the blue. Among the chief reasons for the surprise were simplistic preconceptions – entrenched beliefs and routine views that upheld easy assumptions about the behaviour of sovereign states. Some of those preconceptions have been cultivated by the so-called neorealist approach to international relations. This article begins by identifying significant blind spots in the neorealist approach. It proceeds by exploring phenomena that neorealism overlooks, such as systems of governance and thought. It argues that Russia's peculiar system of governance – here referred to as Putin's neo-patrimonial regime – exercised a formative influence on the foreign policy views of Russian decisionmakers and their decision to invade Ukraine. The article then refines the notion of surprise, showing surprises were unevenly distributed in the international system. It discusses how Russia was taken aback by Ukraine's resistance and by its own military failures. And it argues that the leading powers of the EU were shocked by the Russian invasion, whereas the Atlantic powers were not. In fact, the Biden administration had long warned its NATO allies about the likelihood of invasion. Why were these warnings not heeded by countries like Germany and France? The article concludes with some speculation on the strengths of US intelligence and on the sources of intelligence failure in Germany and France.

Part I: Preludes. - 1. Gods, sinners and the origins of IR theory. - 2. Renaissance politics: the roots of the Modern Ages. - Part II: The modern ages. - 3. Reformation politics: guns, ships and printing presses. - 4. Absolutist politics: the growth of the interstate system. - 5. Enlightenment politics: the rise of popular sovereignty. - 6. Ideological politics: systems of thought and mass participation. - Part III: The contemporary age. - 7. Intermezzo: becoming contemporary. - 8. World War I, the League and the twenty-years' crisis. - 9. World War II, UN and a new world order. - 10. The rivals: the early cold war and the heyday of Realism. - 11. The thaw and the Third World. - 12. Arms races and revolutions. - 13. The turn and the twist. - Part IV: The science of International Relations. - 14. Unipolar world?. - 15. A Science of International Relations?

Iver Neumann has been one of the most productive and visible foreign policy and IR scholars of his generation. He has had great influence both internationally and at NUPI. He has, however, not become a prophet in his own country. Norway's political science community has expressed little interest in the three traditions that have been the lasting anchor points in Neumann's works: the English School, the German tradition of critical theory and French post-modernism. This article suggests that Norwegian political studies have expressed a lack of curiosity – if not an active skepticism – towards political theory in general and continental approaches in particular. The errand here is not to wonder why. Rather, it is to provide the briefest of glimpses into some of the perspectives that lie outside the Anglo-American, methodological mainstream of Norwegian political science.

Denne boka er en innsidedrøfting av en viktig og stormfull periode i USAs utenrikspolitiske historie. Den gir ingen nøytral framstilling: dette er Henry Kissingers versjon av verden på 1970-tallet, av USAs plass og rolle og av tiårets mange statsledere – Leonid Bresjnev, Mao Zedong, Anwar Sadat og, først og fremst, Richard Nixon. Boka har det muntlige intervjuets form: den består av et dusin kapitler hvor redaktøren stiller spørsmål og Kissinger gir svar. Hvert kapittel er organisert rundt et bestemt tema.

"Cumulative Knowledge, Science, and the Emergence of International Relations" published on by Oxford University Press.