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This article discusses the origin and consolidation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reserve cadre system and considers its impact on the resilience and perpetuation of the Party's authoritarian regime. Reserve cadres are essentially the Party's "disciples"; through careful selection and training, the CCP is able to build a legion of youthful political elites with exceptional administrative ability and correct political thinking. Upon assumption of Party and government posts, these reserve cadres are able to reinforce the Party's autonomy and resist outside pressures to democratize, thereby manifesting the very nature of a resilient authoritarian regime. (China Q/GIGA)

Within the operational procedures of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cadre appointment system, age restrictions hinder cadre promotion. As a result, three different methods have emerged to bypass these restrictions, allowing officials to attain faster promotion. These three methods are the Communist Youth League route, temporary transferred duty and non-regulation promotion. This article will explain the age restriction system, and then outline the three methods and discuss their impact on the appointment system as a whole. The examples of Zhou Qiang and Lu Hao, rising political stars, demonstrate how these methods are used to gain substantial age advantages for successful career progression. (China J/GIGA)

The PLA has been a key player in Chinese elite politics since 1949. However, a series of developments over the last four years has prompted China watchers to re-evaluate Party-military relations. This paper argues that CCP-PLA relations in the Xi Jinping era are characterized by the centralization of power in a single civilian individual. This centralization is reflected by events such as a new emphasis on the CMC chairman responsibility system, the establishment of new coordination bodies under the top leader, radical reforms to the military command structure, the promotion of Xi's public image as the top leader, and large-scale personnel reshuffes during which Xi's trustees have gradually come to occupy key military posts while his rivals have been removed. For Xi, these measures are an antidote to the principal-agent problem in CCP–PLA relations caused by both information asymmetry and the discrepant interests of civilian leaders and the top brass of the PLA. (China Q/GIGA)

The purpose of this study is to explain the political role of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) during the June 1989 Tiananmen Incident. In light of the fact that a number of retired & active service PLA officers opposed the use of force before June 4 & some even refused to enforce martial law during the crackdown operation, why did no PLA unit defect from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)? (1) Although a number of retired & active service PLA officers publicly opposed the use of force against students, these military men were both unwilling to see the collapse of communist rule & hesitant to be involved in a direct conflict with Deng Xiaoping. These attitudes diluted PLA dissatisfaction with the party's repression orders. (2) Alerted that some officers would probably be unreliable if ordered to repress protesters, Deng took action to prevent PLA members from forming any unofficial coordination network that might be used to organize a coup. The measures taken by Deng manipulated the exchange of information between servicemen during the incident & thus served as additional security mechanisms to prevent the defection of any PLA unit. While the first factor was noticed by outside watchers, the second factor lacked systematic analyses. 1 Table. Adapted from the source document.

During the past decade Xi Jinping has reasserted the Chinese Communist Party's dominance of state and society, tightening political and social controls to consolidate the Party's monopoly on political power in China. This volume brings leading China experts together to examine the changing mechanics of authoritarian rule in China, and the Party's systematic efforts to neutralise potential threats. The book examines critical but little understood changes to the architecture of state, which enables more effective top-down rule and the efficient operation of an increasingly professional bureaucracy. It also explores the policies and mechanisms the Party has used to squash dissent and prevent criticisms. This volume will be of interest to anyone who wants to understand how the CCP has consolidated its rule at home and how it relates to the Party's global ambitions for China's great national rejuvenation.

Political elites are a key topic in contemporary China studies, and have been investigated in relation to factional politics, generation politics, technocracy, and crucially, institutionalization. The institutionalization of elite replacement began in China in the 1980s and quickly accelerated after the early 1990s, as mechanisms emerged to regulate political elites' entry and exit, including age limits, term limits, and step-by-step promotion.By examining the various processes of elite selection, this book explores the role played by institutionalization in elite recruitment, promot

This book reveals the complex relationship between elite perceptions and behaviour, and governance, in China. It moves away from existing scholarship by focusing on functionaries, grass-roots elites, leading intellectuals, and opinion-makers in China and by looking beyond the top leadership, makes a significant contribution to our understanding of shared governance and broadened political participation in China.The chapters in this collection explore the elites' role as opinion-makers, technical experts, producers of knowledge, and executives or managers, and pose a number of questio

Political elites are a key topic in contemporary China studies, and have been investigated in relation to factional politics, generation politics, technocracy, and crucially, institutionalization. The institutionalization of elite replacement began in China in the 1980s and quickly accelerated after the early 1990s, as mechanisms emerged to regulate political elites' entry and exit, including age limits, term limits, and step-by-step promotion. By examining the various processes of elite selection, this book explores the role played by institutionalization in elite recruitment, promot.

Under Xi Jinping, the cadre recruitment policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been adapted. What are the political implications of these adaptations? This paper argues that Xi has sought to consolidate his power among the political elite and strengthen grassroots governance by introducing a new cadre recruitment policy. We propose the concept of "dual elite recruitment logic" as an aid to interpreting the cadre recruitment strategy in the Xi era: the CCP's system for appointing and promoting cadres at the full provincial/ministerial level (正部级 zhengbuji) and the grassroots follows' criteria that are different from those formulated under the previous "rejuvenation of cadres" principle. While China under Xi may be able to maintain political stability and promote socio-economic development in the short term, the lack of a new succession mechanism is the biggest obstacle to China's future political development.

AbstractThis article discusses the origin and consolidation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reserve cadre system and considers its impact on the resilience and perpetuation of the Party's authoritarian regime. Reserve cadres are essentially the Party's "disciples"; through careful selection and training, the CCP is able to build a legion of youthful political elites with exceptional administrative ability and correct political thinking. Upon assumption of Party and government posts, these reserve cadres are able to reinforce the Party's autonomy and resist outside pressures to democratize, thereby manifesting the very nature of a resilient authoritarian regime.