Suchergebnisse

U.S. private interest groups and legislated sanctions affecting South Africa.

Examines the pressures of a small group of animal rights activists and preservationists that led to a ban on ivory trade under the Oct. 1989 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Faun and Flora (CITES).

Compares the effectiveness of expected and actual workings of sanctions.

Economic sanctions against South Africa presumably are intended to cause economic damage. Trade sanctions should induce the South African terms of trade to deteriorate, and investment sanctions should cause capital flight and cause the exchange rate to deteriorate. However, due to the nature of the South African economy and to certain policies of the South African government, these impacts may be difficult to achieve.

SUMMARYMany advocates of sanctions against South Africa have proposed that such measures will reduce the wealth of white South Africans and thereby raise the costs of apartheid to those who benefit from it by such a large amount that whites will voluntarily choose to terminate the apartheid system. This paper examines the likely effects of disinvestment sanctions on the survivability of apartheid. An 'interest‐group' model of the South African state is developed, in which apartheid policies are treated as endogenous outcomes of a political decision‐making process. The effects of sanctions are introduced through the impact of international capital flows and asset prices on the major interest groups within the white electorate. It is shown that disinvestment policies may not diminish apartheid via market effects, but could have an impact upon the political costs of maintaining apartheid institutions.

Traditionally, Coll football telecasts were strictly limited, for the stated purpose of protecting live attendance at games. The 40% increase in Coll football TV exposures in 1978 is examined, & it is shown that live attendance at the 72 NCAA Division I-A & I-AA schools studied responded by increasing in a complementary relationship rather than by decreasing as would be expected if attendance & TV exposure were substitutes. 2 Tables, 12 References. HA

Wintrobe's (1990, 1998) dictatorship model is adapted to examine the impacts of economic sanctions on an autocrat. It is shown that the dictator's choice of the level of power, and the quantities of loyalty and repression used as inputs in the production of power, are affected by the type and magnitude of sanctions and by the impact of sanctions on the political effectiveness of opposition groups. Sanctions have direct and indirect effects on the prices of loyalty and repression as well as potentially generating rents that might be captured either by the dictator or by the opposition.