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Nine days after the transformational 9/11 attacks, President G.W. Bush proclaimed that the nation is fighting a Global War on Terror (GWOT), an attention-grabbing phrase designed as a rallying cry for America to win the battle against al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations threatening our homeland as well as our allies and interests abroad. Eight years later, President Obama inherited what had become an even more dangerous situation, which led to the unexpected and courage attack that felled bin Laden and splintered al Qaeda. However, this success was short-lived when the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) suddenly emerged as our primary terrorist adversary – a new and brutal threat that President Obama vowed to "degrade and ultimately destroy" by doing what it takes to win the war against this and other terrorist organizations. While there has been some progress in halting and reversing ISIS territorial gains with the US providing support to newly trained Iraqi forces, this terrorist organization is not fully contained and far from being destroyed.

On November 17, 1969, after a three-year delay, the United States and the Soviet Union initiated Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Involving strategic systems and policies vital to the security of both superpowers, their allies, and the world, these talks have the potential of becoming the most important series of United States-Soviet negotiations since World War II. They can affect not only the military-technical aspects of the strategic balance but United States-Soviet political relations and the future role of nuclear weapons. Given the complexity and sensitivity of the subject, it is not surprising that negotiations are still continuing. Even if an early, limited agreement is reached, SALT meetings can be expected to span a period of many years.

That are the policy implications regarding proliferation and counterproliferation of nuclear weapons among Third World states? How does deterrence operate outside the parameters of superpower confrontation as defined by the cold war's elaborate system of constraints enforced by concepts like mutual assured destruction, and counter-value and counter-force targeting? How can U.S. policymakers devise contingencies for dealing with nuclear threats posed by countries like North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Iran, and Syria? These are some of the unsettling but nevertheless important questions addressed by the author. Mr. Jerome Kahan examines the likelihood that one or more of these countries will use nuclear weapons before the year 2000. He also offers a framework that policymakers and planners might use in assessing U.S. interests in preempting the use of nuclear weapons or in retaliating for their use. Ironically, with the end of the cold war, it is imperative that defense strategists, policymakers, and military professionals think about the "unthinkable." ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1895/thumbnail.jpg