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"Many think Marx a totalitarian and Soviet Marxism the predictable outcome of his thought. How might one combat this completely mistaken image? What if one could demonstrate that Western European social democracy represents Marx's thought far more than did Soviet Marxism? What if one shows that Marx and social democracy are quite compatible? What if one shows that Marx actually supported social democratic parties? If social democracy is closer to being the true face of Marxism after Marx, then all claims of totalitarianism evaporate. There is nothing remotely totalitarian about social democracy. And from the start, social democrats were highly critical of the undemocratic tactics of Soviet Marxism. To demonstrate the relationship between Marx and social democracy it will be necessary to show that for Marx socialist society is compatible with a market economy-as long as markets are controlled to eliminate alienation. It will also be necessary to show that markets can be controlled democratically, that Marx was very much a democrat, and that he and Engels worked quite actively with democratic parties. It will also be necessary to show that Marx developed a theory of revolution compatible with a democratic electoral movement engaged in by a social democratic party. It will also be necessary to show that Marx and Engels, from the late 1860s on, worked extensively with and supported the Social Democratic Party of Germany-which eventually became the largest party in Germany and the largest socialist party in the world"--

Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- 1. The Idea of Right -- Spirit -- Freedom -- Right -- End of History -- Structure, Method, and Development -- 2. Abstract Right -- Right and Spirit -- Property -- Punishment -- 3. Moralität -- The Right of Subjectivity -- The Categorical Imperative -- Moralität and Freedom -- 4. Sittlichkeit: The Family -- Transition from Moralität to Sittlichkeit -- The Family and Love -- Marriage -- 5. Sittlichkeit: Civil Society -- Civil Society as Sittlichkeit -- The Failure of Civil Society? -- Corporations -- The Solution -- Alienation -- 6. Sittlichkeit: The State -- Democracy vs. Monarchy -- The Realization of Rationality -- World History -- The Absolute -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index

Intro -- Hegel and the Other -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Introduction: Structure and Method of the Phenomenology -- 1. Consciousness and the Transcendental Deduction -- I. Kant's Transcendental Deduction -- II. Sense-Certainty -- III. Perception -- IV. Force and the Understanding -- 2. Self-Consciousness and the Other -- I. Self-Consciousness -- II. Lordship and Bondage -- III. Theory and the Object -- IV. Theory and Power -- V. Stoicism and the Flight from Heteronomy -- VI. Scepticism and the Attack on the Transcendental Self -- VII. Unhappy Consciousness and the Highest Good -- 3. Reason in the World -- Part A. Theoretical Reason -- I. Affirmation of Idealism -- II. Inner and Outer -- III. Physiognomy and Phrenology -- Part B. Practical Reason -- IV. Pleasure and Necessity -- V. The Law of the Heart -- VI. Virtue and the Way of the World -- Part C. Individuality that Takes Itself to Be Real In and For Itself -- VII. The Spiritual Animal Kingdom and Deceit, or the Fact Itself -- VIII. Reason as Lawgiver -- IX. Reason as Testing Laws -- 4. Culture and Reality -- I. The Transcendental Deduction and Culture -- II. The Ethical Order, Women, and Oppression -- III. Legal Status and the Emperor -- IV. Culture and Estrangement -- V. Enlightenment's Attack on Belief -- VI. Reason, Revolution, and Terror -- VII. Phenomenology or History? -- VIII. Morality and the Final Purpose -- 5. Culture, Religion, and Absolute Knowing -- I. Religion -- II. Alienation and Estrangement Overcome -- III. The Absolute and Its Deduction -- IV. A Culturally Relative Absolute -- V. Hegel's Ethnocentrism and Racism -- VI. Cultural Relativism and Truth -- Notes -- Introduction -- 1. Consciousness and the Transcendental Deduction -- 2. Self-Consciousness and the Other -- 3. Reason in the World -- 4. Culture and Reality.

One: The Development of Marx' Doctrine of Nature and Essence (1841–1845) -- I. Metaphysics and Essence -- II. Doctrine of Nature and Essence -- III. Method -- IV. Epistemology -- Two: The Method and Epistemology of Marx' Materialist View of the World (1845–1856) -- I. Abandonment of the Doctrine of Essence -- II. Historical Materialism and Method -- III. Historical Materialism and Epistemology -- Three: Marx' Dialectical Method (1857–1883) -- I. Dialectical Method -- II. Dialectical Method and Hegel -- III. Dialectical Method and Historical Materialism -- IV. Laws and Prediction -- V. Dialectical Method and Epistemology -- VI. Dialectical Method and a New Concept of Essence -- VII. Dialectical Method and the Later Writings -- VIII. Withering Way of Social Science -- IX. Science and Metaphysics -- Four: Engels and Dialectics -- I. Historical Materialism and Determinism -- II. Dialectical Method -- III. Epistemology -- IV. Dialectic of Nature -- Conclusion -- Abbreviations -- Notes.

An especially accessible introduction to Hegel's moral and political philosophy.In this book, Philip J. Kain introduces Hegel's Philosophy of Right by focusing on disagreements, both with standard interpretations of his work and with Hegel himself. Arguing that Hegel's justification for punishment ultimately fails, Kain shows how this failure brings into focus the inherent difficulties in justifying punishment at all, thus producing a valuable Hegelian argument against punishment. Whereas many of Hegel's critics have argued that he misunderstands Kant's categorical imperative, Kain argues the opposite: that Hegel has a sophisticated understanding of it and simply attempts to provide a broader ethical context for Kant's position. In addressing these and other questions, such as whether Hegel's theory of recognition, properly understood, can provide philosophical support for same-sex marriage, and whether supporting monarchy over democracy means that Hegel seeks less rather than greater power for the state, Kain makes Hegel's work more approachable by drawing out philosophical points of independent importance. ; https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/faculty_books/1376/thumbnail.jpg

Hegel is not a democrat. He is a monarchist. But he wants monarchy because he does not want strong government. He wants to deemphasize power. He develops an idealist conception of sovereignty that allows for a monarch less powerful than a president—one whose task is to expresses the unity of the state and realize the rationality inherent in it. A monarch needs to be a conduit through which reason is expressed and actualized, not a power that might obstruct this process.

On what might be called a Marxist reading, Hegel's analysis of civil society accurately recognizes a necessary tendency toward a polarization of classes and the pauperization of the proletariat, a problem for which Hegel, however, has no solution. Indeed, Marxists think there can be no solution short of eliminating civil society. It is not at all clear that this standard reading is correct. The present paper tries to show how it is plausible to understand Hegel as proposing a solution, one that is similar to that of social democrats, and one that could actually work.

Philip J. Kain deftly demonstrates the historical antecedents to and continuing relevance of Karl Marx's thought. Kain reveals the unappreciated pluralism of Marx, how it has endured and how it will continue to adapt to the challenges of modern day thought such as feminist theory. ; https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/faculty_books/1254/thumbnail.jpg