Preplay negotiations and the prisoner's dilemma
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 1, Heft 4, S. 375-379
6 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 1, Heft 4, S. 375-379
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 1, Heft 1, S. 137
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 24, Heft 2, S. 224
ISSN: 1756-2171
In: Public choice, Band 34, Heft 1, S. 87-97
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 34, Heft 1, S. 87-97
ISSN: 0048-5829
If the class of admissible preference orderings is restricted in a manner appropriate for economic & political models, then K. J. Arrow's (Social Choice and Individual Values, New York: Wiley, 1963) impossibility theorem for social welfare function continues to be valid. Specifically, if the space of alternatives is R****, n(greater than or equal to) 3, where each dimension represents a different public good, & if each person's preferences are restricted to be convex, continuous, & strictly monotonic, then no social welfare function exists that satisfies unanimity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, & nondictatorship. 1 Figure. HA.
In: Econometric Society monographs 29