Suchergebnisse

As in the private sector, the principle that resources should not be wasted should also be a key element of decision-makers in the public sector. Alexander Kalb applies advanced and novel econometric as well as linear programming techniques to investigate the sources of potential inefficiencies for local governments in Germany. He uncovers socio-economic, fiscal and political sources of inefficiencies. Finally, he makes recommendations how these inefficiencies in the provision of public goods and services can be reduced in the future.

In this paper we use a simple bureaucracy model of fiscal illusion to analyze the impact of intergovernmental grants on the cost effciency of local jurisdictions. We find that a higher degree of redistribution within a system of fiscal equalization or an increase in the amount of grants received by a local jurisdiction leads to an extension of organizational slack or X-ineffciency in that jurisdiction. This theoretical prediction is tested by conducting an empirical analysis using a broad panel of German municipalities. The results of the empirical analysis are consistent with the theoretical findings and therefore support the existence of a negative incentive effect of intergovernmental grants on local authorities' cost effciency.

In this paper we investigate the determinants of local governments' technical efficiency in road maintenance for a panel of German counties using a broad variety of estimation approaches. More specifically, we calculate efficiency indices using non-parametric (DEA) and parametric (stochastic frontier analysis) reference technologies, and examine how these efficiency indices can be explained by estimating and comparing four different regression models. The results of our analysis show that (controlling for numerous characteristics of the counties) the disposable income of the counties' citizens, intergovernmental grants (for county roads), and the payments to the counties influence efficiency negatively. Concerning political variables we find weak evidence that efficiency decreases with an increasing share of seats of left-wing parties in the county council; the hypothesis that efficiency decreases with the degree of political concentration in the county council could not be confirmed.

Für das Zielsystem, an dem die EU ihr Handeln orientiert, spielen heute zwei Komplexe zumindest in wirtschaftspolitischer Hinsicht eine zentrale Rolle. Diese lassen sich mit den Begriffen "Lissabon" und "Maastricht" titulieren. Während "Lissabon" seit dem Jahr 2005 insbesondere für die Ziele Wachstum und Beschäftigung steht, repräsentiert "Maastricht" das im Maastrichter Vertrag und in den anschließenden Präzisionen vor allem im Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt (SWP) definierte geldund fiskalpolitische Regime des einheitlichen Währungsraumes, der sich mehr oder weniger verbindlichen budgetpolitischen Spielregeln unterworfen hat. Vor diesem Hintergrund hat das ZEW gemeinsam mit der Bertelsmann Stiftung den LiMa-Benchmark entwickelt, welcher diese zweidimensionale Zielerreichung in einem Ländervergleich darstellt. "Li" steht für Lissabon und "Ma" für Maastricht. Dieser Beitrag stellt die zentralen Ergebnisse der Studie vor.