Suchergebnisse

Tritium is the neglected material in controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is used by all nuclear weapons states to increase the explosive yield of atomic bombs and at the same time to miniaturize them. However, this radioactive material has not yet been put under appropriate international control comparable to the nuclear safeguards applied for plutonium and uranium. A carefully designed tritium control would be beneficial both for non-proliferation of tritium as well as for reserving the nuclear arms race

Tritium is the neglected material in controlling the Profiliferation of nuclear weapons. It is used by all nuclear weapons states to increase the explosive yield of atomic bombs and at the same time to miniaturize them. However, this radioactive material has not yet been put under appropriate international control comparable to the nuclear safeguards applied for plutonium and uranium. A carefully designed tritium control would be beneficial both for non-Profiliferation of tritium as well as for reserving the nuclear arms race.

Der Verfasser schlägt vor, die ureigene Thematik der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung in den Mittelpunkt zu stellen - die direkte und indirekte Gewaltanwendung zwischen Staaten oder substaatlichen Gruppen. Dazu gehören die Erforschung des klimatischen Einflusses auf die Entstehung von Gewalt sowie präventive Ansätze zur frühzeitigen Erkennung von Friedensgefahren etwa mithilfe der Entwicklung von Szenarien und Risikoabschätzungen durch die Analyse von Umkipppunkten oder durch Brennpunktanalysen. In diesem Zusammenhang hebt er vier Forschungsschwerpunkte besonders hervor: Kooperation im Bereich der internationalen Normenbildung und deren Umsetzung; Vermeidung und Verhinderung von direkter Gewalt im Sinne eines "negativen Friedens"; präventive Vermeidung von struktureller Gewalt und als Sonderfall davon die bisher vernachlässigte Auseinandersetzung mit der durch den Klimawandel bewirkten prozessual vermittelten indirekten Gewalt. (ICE2)

Civil Society is increasingly involved in the policy area of international arms control. Their opportunities are very limited for compliance control in the nuclear nonproliferation regime due to its particular sensitivity. This paper starts off with a discussion of technical failures in the official verification of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and of its political obstruction and biased interpretation. The severe gaps not being able to detect clandestine facilities render little civil society contributions highly influential and controversial. More and more data get available for the civil society that can be used to expose potential violations of the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Based on case studies and on systematic considerations the contributions that civil society may offer are analyzed with regard to the different stages of verification and to the various degrees of integration with the official procedures. Adapted from the source document.

Examines data on plutonium separation within the country and abroad, export-import trade, processing and use of mixed plutonium-uranium oxide fuel, and plutonium inventories. Reprocessing in Germany, France, Great Britain, Belgium, and Russia, MOX, the Hanau vault "plutonium bunker", and potential future consumption.