Suchergebnisse

Diese Arbeit untersucht die Bedeutung von Kohlenstoffpreisen und Technologiepolitiken zur Reduzierung von CO2-Emissionen, die bei der Verbrennung fossiler Energieträger anfallen. Die Politikinstrumente werden hierbei nach ihrer Wirkung auf Wohlfahrt, Emissionen, Energiepreise und Knappheitsrenten für fossile Rohstoffe ausgewertet. Für die ökonomische Analyse werden kleine analytische, partielle Gleichgewichtsmodelle und vor allem das numerische, intertemporale allgemeine Gleichgewichtsmodell PRIDE (Politik- und Regulierungsinstrumente in einer dezentralen Ökonomie) entwickelt und untersucht. Ein besonderer Schwerpunkt dieser Modelle liegt auf der intertemporalen Anreizwirkung von Politikinstrumenten bezüglich der Förderung fossiler Rohstoffe und der Investitionen in neue, kohlenstoffarme Technologien. Eine innovative Stärke des PRIDE-Modells liegt in der Berechnung des wohlfahrtsmaximierenden Potenzials von CO2-Steuern und Emissionshandelssystemen sowie Subventionen, Einspeisetarifen oder Portfolio Standards für Erneuerbare Energien und Kohlenstoffabscheidung und -speicherung (CCS). Die Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass ein Preis für CO2 (festgesetzt durch eine Steuer oder ein Emissionshandelssystem) das wichtigste Klimaschutzinstrument auf lange Sicht ist -- Emissionen auf Dauer mit Subventionen auf saubere' Technologien reduzieren zu wollen, ist äußerst kostspielig. Technologiepolitik kann jedoch kurz- und mittelfristig eine bedeutende Rolle spielen: Erstens kann sie die Wohlfahrt erhöhen und die Kosten des Klimaschutzes senken, wenn sie auf gezieltes Marktversagen bei Innovationen gerichtet ist. Zweitens stellt sie eine pragmatische, zeitlich begrenzte Alternative zum CO2-Preis dar, wenn dieser wegen politökonomischer Gründe überhaupt nicht oder nur in abgeschwächter Form eingeführt werden kann. Drittens können technologiepolitische Maßnahmen den Verteilungskonflikt um fossile Rohstoffrenten und soziale Konflikte um steigende Energiepreise entschärfen. Die analytischen wie auch die numerischen Modellergebnisse zeigen die Bedeutung und die Notwendigkeit einer zu schaffenden globalen, öffentlichen Institution auf, die die Knappheit der Atmosphäre und die damit verbundene Knappheitsrente ('Klimarente') verwaltet und Investitionen in emissionsarme Technologien fördert. ; This thesis examines the role of carbon pricing and low-carbon technology policies for reducing CO2 emissions from burning fossil fuels. Policies are evaluated according to their impact on welfare, emissions, fossil resource rents and energy prices. For the economic analysis, small analytical partial equilibrium models and, most importantly, the elaborate numerical intertemporal general equilibrium model PRIDE (Policy and Regulatory Instruments in a Decentralized Economy) are developed and studied. A major focus of these models lies on the intertemporal incentive effects of policies on fossil resource extraction and investments into new low-carbon technologies. An innovative strength of the PRIDE model is to calculate the welfare-maximizing potential of policies like carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes as well as subsidies, feed-in-tariffs or portfolio standards for renewable energy and carbon capture and sequestration (CCS). The results indicate that a price on carbon emissions - established through a carbon tax or an emissions trading scheme - is the most important climate policy in the long run; reducing emissions permanently with subsidies on 'clean' technologies becomes very expensive. Technology policies, however, may have an important role in the short to medium run: First, technology policies addressing innovation market failures can increase welfare and reduce mitigation costs substantially even under a 'perfect' emissions trading scheme. Second, technology policies can serve as a temporary 'second-best' policy to reduce emissions when an 'optimal' carbon price cannot be established due to political economy reasons. Finally, technology policies may help to reduce the distributional conflict concerning fossil resource rents and the social conflict regarding increasing energy prices. The analytical and numerical results further highlight the relevance and the need of creating a global public institution that manages the use of the atmosphere and the associated 'climate rent' and fosters investments into low-carbon technologies.

The year 2020 marks the centennial of the publication of Arthur Cecil Pigou's magnum opus The Economics of Welfare. Pigou's pricing principles have had an enduring influence on the academic debate, with a widespread consensus having emerged among economists that Pigouvian taxes or subsidies are theoretically desirable, but politically infeasible. In this article, we revisit Pigou's contribution and argue that this consensus is somewhat spurious, particularly in two ways: (1) Economists are too quick to ignore the theoretical problems and subtleties that Pigouvian pricing still faces; (2) The wholesale skepticism concerning the political viability of Pigouvian pricing is at odds with its recent practical achievements. These two points are made by, first, outlining the theoretical and political challenges that include uncertainty about the social cost of carbon, the unclear relationship between the cost–benefit and cost-effectiveness approaches, distributional concerns, fragmented ministerial responsibilities, an unstable tax base, commitment problems, lack of acceptance and trust between government and citizens as well as incomplete international cooperation. Secondly, we discuss the recent political success of Pigouvian pricing, as evidenced by the German government's 2019 climate policy reform and the EU's Green Deal. We conclude by presenting a research agenda for addressing the remaining barriers that need to be overcome to make Pigouvian pricing a common political practice.

The year 2020 marks the centennial of the publication of Arthur Cecil Pigou's magnum opus The Economics of Welfare . Pigou's pricing principles have had an enduring influence on the academic debate, with a widespread consensus having emerged among economists that Pigouvian taxes or subsidies are theoretically desirable, but politically infeasible. In this article, we revisit Pigou's contribution and argue that this consensus is somewhat spurious, particularly in two ways: (1) Economists are too quick to ignore the theoretical problems and subtleties that Pigouvian pricing still faces; (2) The wholesale skepticism concerning the political viability of Pigouvian pricing is at odds with its recent practical achievements. These two points are made by, first, outlining the theoretical and political challenges that include uncertainty about the social cost of carbon, the unclear relationship between the cost–benefit and cost-effectiveness approaches, distributional concerns, fragmented ministerial responsibilities, an unstable tax base, commitment problems, lack of acceptance and trust between government and citizens as well as incomplete international cooperation. Secondly, we discuss the recent political success of Pigouvian pricing, as evidenced by the German government's 2019 climate policy reform and the EU's Green Deal. We conclude by presenting a research agenda for addressing the remaining barriers that need to be overcome to make Pigouvian pricing a common political practice. ; TU Berlin, Open-Access-Mittel – 2021