Suchergebnisse

Just a few months after the federal elections in Germany, the so called pension package entered into force. It mainly contains three measures: higher pensions for mothers with children born before 1992 ("mother pension"), a reduced retirement age for persons who contributed to the pension system for at least 45 years ("pension with 63") and boost pensions of people who cannot work due to disability ("disability pensions augmentation"). In this paper, we derive the effects of these measures in a computable general equilibrium model on the contribution and replacement rates, as well as on employment, the capital stock and GDP. Furthermore, we analyse the welfare effects of these three measures. Our results indicate that the reforms induce a higher contribution rate, a lower replacement rate, as well as negative, but small employment, capital and GDP effects. Moreover, the strongest beneficiaries will be already retired persons, people between 50 and 65 years, who contributed to the pension system for at least 45 years, and people who will receive a disability pension in the future.

There is an intensive debate about old-age poverty in Germany that has induced political parties to develop proposals for higher pensions of poor pensioners in light of the federal elections of September 2013. In addition, several proposals from economists aim at reforming the pension system in a way that mitigates oldage poverty. In this paper, we consider these proposals in a computable general equilibrium model in order to derive their effects on the income distribution, on employment, on the capital stock and on GDP. Our results indicate that negative employment, capital and GDP effects are induced by such reforms as compared to the alternative of basic means-tested social welfare in old-age. Moreover, the strongest beneficiaries would be the currently higher age employees with low income and much less the respective younger employees, while younger and higher age employees with high and medium incomes will lose.

There is an intensive debate about old-age poverty in Germany that has induced political parties to develop proposals for higher pensions of poor pensioners in light of the federal elections of September 2013. In addition, several proposals from economists aim at reforming the pension system in a way that mitigates old-age poverty. In this paper, we consider these proposals in a computable general equilibrium model in order to derive their effects on the income distribution, on employment, on the capital stock and on GDP. Our results indicate that negative employment, capital and GDP effects are induced by such reforms as compared to the alternative of basic means-tested social welfare in old-age. Moreover, the strongest beneficiaries would be the currently higher age employees with low in-come and much less the respective younger employees, while younger and higher age employees with high and medium incomes will lose.