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This text investigates the intellectual history of the laws of war. It reconstructs the distinctive ways of thinking about the legal regulation of war in history, contrasts these to more familiar just war and realist approaches, and shows how closely connected they have been to the process of spelling out the nature, function, and powers of state sovereignty.

Abstract
Over the past 25 years, criminal prosecutions for war crimes have become a central element in the long-standing project of governing hostilities in international law. According to many, the threat of criminal prosecutions can be a general deterrent against violations of the laws of war, and can contribute more broadly to the diffusion and domestic appropriation of humanitarian norms. This article discusses some unintended effects of this "anti-impunity turn" in the laws of war in the context of non-international armed conflicts. Specifically, it examines the consequences of the fact that states typically have a monopoly over the means of legitimate criminal investigation for alleged crimes committed in their territory. Far from operating on a level playing field, criminal investigations in war contexts must be undertaken under institutional conditions that tend to favor state agents over non-state opposition groups. The article spells out some implications of this form of state bias and argues that it can contribute to exacerbate conflict and prolong violence in war.

Since its early origins, just war discourse has had two contrasting functions: it has sought to speak law and morals to power, and thus to restrain the use of force, but it has also served to authorize and legitimize the use of force. Critical voices have recently alerted to the increasing use of authorization and legitimization in a broader context of hegemonic and unilateral appropriations of just war discourse. In this article, I show that such critiques of just war have a long history, and reconstruct the powerful challenge that two of the foremost international jurists of the Enlightenment—Christian Wolff and Emer de Vattel—mounted against early modern accounts of just war. Their neglected theory of "regular war" helps us to recover a sense of what a truly pluralist and anti-hegemonic doctrine of ius ad bellum may look like, and reveals a deep tension in the just war tradition between the criteria of political authority and just cause.

Recent scholarship in just war theory has challenged the principle of symmetrical application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This revisionist work, which is increasingly dominating the field of contemporary war ethics, rejects the idea that the rules of conduct of war (jus in bello) should be agnostic about the justice of the decision to go to war (jus ad bellum). Just wars are perceived to be inherently at odds with the principle of symmetrical application of IHL, which appears to create a hard choice between justice and legality. I show that this challenge to IHL is misplaced. It derives from a widespread view among just war theorists according to which only one side in a just war can be justified in using force. By looking closely at the nature of adjudication of just causes of war, I show that there can be cases of war in which both sides are justified in using force, and cases in which, though not objectively justified, both sides may be excused for fighting. On the basis of this understanding ofjus ad bellum, I argue that the principle of symmetrical application of IHL in fact best reflects the uncertainty and complexity that should characterize the practical doctrine ofjus ad bellum.

By 1995, the war in the former Yugoslavia had left 1.3 million refugees and nearly 1.3 million internally displaced persons, out of a total population of 4.3 million in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1948 East Germany, almost one quarter (4.3 million) of the total population was made up of refugees and expellees coming from Central and Eastern Europe, and the country was short of about one million homes. In this article I would like to examine a question that emerges naturally from these cases: how should the burdens of material losses caused by a war be allocated? My theoretical approach will be broadly liberal. I will use Locke's writings on war and property as a setting from which to consider how a normative conception of war and post-war liability coupled with a theory of property may interact to illuminate the question of post-war allocation of burdens. Adapted from the source document.