Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe literature on the returns to training has pointed out that, immediately following a training episode, wages of participants in employer‐sponsored training increase substantially while wages of participants in government‐sponsored training hardly change. We argue that there is a potential selection issue—most of the government‐sponsored trainees are occupation switchers while most participants in employer‐sponsored training are occupation stayers. An occupational switch involves a substantial destruction of human capital, and once we account for the associated decline in wages, we find a large positive impact of both employer‐ and government‐sponsored training on workers' human capital.

We build a heterogeneous agents life cycle model that captures a large number of salient features of individual male labour supply over the life cycle, by education, both along the intensive and extensive margins. The model provides an aggregation theory of individual labour supply, firmly grounded on individual-level micro-evidence, and is used to study the aggregate labour supply responses to changes in the economic environment. We find that the aggregate labour supply elasticity to a transitory wage shock is 1.75, with the extensive margin accounting for 62% of the response. Furthermore, we find that the aggregate labour supply elasticity to a permanent-compensated wage change is 0.44. ; Andrés Erosa and Luisa Fuster acknowledge financial support from the Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad of Spain (grants ECO2012-31653 and MDM 2014-0431) and Comunidad de Madrid, MadEco-CM (S2015/HUM-3444). Luisa Fuster also acknowledges financial support from the European Community under the Marie Curie International Reintegration grant PIRG03-GA-2008-231099. Gueorgui Kambourov has received funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada grants #410-2011-1051 and #435-2014-0815 and from the European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC grant agreement n. 324085.