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The article is devoted to a critical analysis of current controversies concerning the Polish national identity, and the interpretation of the impact of nobles' democracy on the demise of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth. It considers the role of national identity as a factor influencing civic culture and, therefore, determining its usefulness in assuring the proper functioning of the constitutional order. The analysis assumes that (1) the current global order is the product of the emergence of nation-states; (2) that a nation-state cannot exist without civil society grounded in the concept of national identity and patriotism. Patriotism is opposed here to nationalism; similarly, cosmopolitism is opposed to internationalism. Patriotism and cosmopolitism are compatible and imply an open-minded, inclusive attitude to different national identities. Both nationalism with its focus on superiority of one's own nation, and internationalism — rejection of the nation-state in the name of an imaginary global, stateless community — are exclusive. These both exclusive postures present a threat to civil society.

Russia's continuing aggression against Ukraine is exceptional both in terms of its scale and its global implications. A peaceful and prosperous future for Ukraine, neighbouring states and indeed the entire continent, depends upon two interrelated factors. The first is Ukraine's ability to win, with Western support, the war initiated against it by the Russian Federation under Putin. This would bring about a new global opening, ending the Moscow-Beijing anti-Western axis in world politics. The second factor is Ukraine's ability to take advantage of the constitutional moment that will present itself as attention shifts from the military effort toward the process of state reconstruction. Presenting the situation of Ukraine in regional, historical, and global context, we draw attention to specific challenges and choices that state elites will face post-war. We explain the internal and external implications of these choices to show why Ukraine should seize its upcoming constitutional moment. Drawing on both political theory and real world examples of constitutional revolutions, we explain the factors involved in the effective exploitation of the constitutional moment. We suggest that, channelled to constructive purposes, the demands and aspirations of Ukrainian citizens may help propel the political and economic reforms needed to secure social trust and a stable future. We conclude that multi-level political and civic engagement in a new constitutional process will be indispensable for reconstructing the institutional foundations for peace, democratic governance and the rule of law in post-conflict Ukraine.

In this article, we develop an analytical framework drawing upon Acemoglu's and Robinson's theory that links developmental potential of the state to its political and economic institutions (inclusive and extractive), and that of Etel Solingen's relating type of governing coalitions to foreign policy strategies and regional politics. States that adopted inclusive institutions tend to be governed by internationalist coalitions and their external interactions are based on cooperation, whereas those with extractive institutions tend to pursue adversarial regional strategies. Using the developed analytical framework, the article addresses the following three questions:(1) How has the choice of a strategy for dismantling state socialism shaped the transition towards market-based democracy?(2) What impact did choices made have upon patterns of intra-European relations in terms of cooperation and confrontation?(3) What factors may explain differences in respective trajectories and external strategies?The post-communist systemic transformation took place in an international environment favouring cooperation with the elites of the former Soviet bloc in introducing institutional changes. Western friendly policies and assistance helped internationalist coalitions maintain power but had no impact on the transition from the statist-nationalist-confessional coalition, even when it was weak. Despite initial attempts and strong encouragement from international community, Russia failed to establish inclusive political and economic institutions. The prevalence of the statist-national coalition adversely affected transition processes in its immediate vicinity – primarily in the former 'Slavic republics', such as Ukraine and Belarus.

Przedmiotem artykułu są pokomunistyczne przemiany ustrojowe rozpatrywane w perspektywie politologii i ekonomii politycznej konstytucjonalizmu. Pierwsza część dotyczy występujących w literaturze założeń teoretycznych oraz hipotez empirycznych. Nacisk położono na wybór typu rządów, rodzaju ordynacji wyborczej i organizacji pionowej państwa. Część druga proponuje model teoretyczny służący wyjaśnieniu dróg przemian ustrojowych i ich skutków. Zawiera on czynniki wewnętrzne i zewnętrzne. Wśród pierwszych główną rolę odgrywa stopień zdominowania społeczeństwa przez komunistyczne monopaństwo: im jest większy, tym wyższe prawdopodobieństwo ustroju autorytarnego. Czynnik zewnętrzny to położenie kraju w stosunku do Zachodu (Bruksela) lub Wschodu (Moskwa): bliskość Moskwy podnosi prawdopodobieństwo opcji autorytarnej. Analiza strategii przemian ustrojowych skupia się na wyborze typu rządów oraz ordynacji wyborczej. Efekty transformacji mierzone są za pomocą zagregowanego indeksu ustroju politycznego. Uzyskane rezultaty odbiegają od przewidywanych na podstawie teorii przedstawionej w pierwszej części artykułu.JEL: A10; A12; B25; P10; P20; P21; P30

Przedmiotem artykułu są pokomunistyczne przemiany ustrojowe rozpatrywane w perspektywie politologii i ekonomii politycznej konstytucjonalizmu. Pierwsza część dotyczy występujących w literaturze założeń teoretycznych oraz hipotez empirycznych. Nacisk położono na wybór typu rządów, rodzaju ordynacji wyborczej i organizacji pionowej państwa. Część druga proponuje model teoretyczny służący wyjaśnieniu dróg przemian ustrojowych i ich skutków. Zawiera on czynniki wewnętrzne i zewnętrzne. Wśród pierwszych główną rolę odgrywa stopień zdominowania społeczeństwa przez komunistyczne monopaństwo: im jest większy, tym wyższe prawdopodobieństwo ustroju autorytarnego. Czynnik zewnętrzny to położenie kraju w stosunku do Zachodu (Bruksela) lub Wschodu (Moskwa): bliskość Moskwy podnosi prawdopodobieństwo opcji autorytarnej. Analiza strategii przemian ustrojowych skupia się na wyborze typu rządów oraz ordynacji wyborczej. Efekty transformacji mierzone są za pomocą zagregowanego indeksu ustroju politycznego. Uzyskane rezultaty odbiegają od przewidywanych na podstawie teorii przedstawionej w pierwszej części artykułu.JEL: A10; A12; B25; P10; P20; P21; P30 ; While there is a wealth of studies on selected aspects of economic and political transitions from communism, there are few, if any, analyses of the emergence of new political orders in terms of constitutional engineering, i.e. the adoption of the meta-rules governing the rules defining both the political structure and determining underpinnings of the ordinary law-making process. The paper begins with the review of menu of institutional choices related to type of government, electoral system and vertical organisation of the state and their impact on performance as reported in political science and constitutional political economy literature. It is posited that the binary outcome: democracy vs. autocracy is a function of two variables assuming two values: society (weak vs. autonomous sovereign citizen) and communist establishment (strong vs. weak). A strong communist state at the initial state of transition produces autocratic outcomes although proximity to Brussels may change political trajectory whereas a strong autonomous society generates trajectory leading to democracy. Surprisingly, the choice of the rules of political game bore little resemblance to what literature might suggest: ordinary political struggle has determinedthe choice of institutions with constitutions as a legal act being the result rather than a product of conscientious intellectual design.JEL: A10; A12; B25; P10; P20; P21; P30

This paper critically assesses Acemoglu and Robinson's framework for examining economic development. The framework is applied to cases taken from a period of more than two thousand years, yet it—and consequently its implementation—suffer from serious methodological flaws. First, the authors fail to define their basic concepts and terms precisely. Their choice of critical junctures generating breakthroughs is similarly limited to those that produced changes but ignores others that did not. Furthermore, their major claim that institutions are the only determinant of prosperity does not withstand scrutiny. Other factors, including the much-criticized ones of culture and geography, may be shown to be more critical under some circumstances. Last but not least, their failure to establish links between their framework and the literature on democracy and capitalism is rather striking. Juxtaposing their analysis and this literature could generate new insights. Nevertheless, this is not to suggest that their framework is 'old wine in new bottles'. To the contrary, their analysis will undoubtedly stimulate further research into the complexity of relations between political and economic institutions and their impact on social and economic development.

Recent years have witnessed the publication of a number of research papers and books seeking to assess threats of electoral victories of anti-establishment politicians and political parties, described as authoritarian populists. This essay focuses on three books directly addressing the origins and threats of authoritarian populism to democracy. It consists of six sections and the conclusion. The first section presents findings (Norris and Inglehart) based on surveys of values of voters of various age cohorts concluding that authoritarian populism is a temporary backlash provoked by the post-materialist perspective. The second section examines the contention, spelled out in Levitsky and Ziblatt, that increase in openness of American political system produced, unintentionally, a degradation of the American political system. The third section continues brief presentations focusing on to the causes and implications of "illiberal democracy," and "undemocratic liberalism" (Mounk). The fourth section examines developments in the quality of democracy in the world showing that despite the decline in Democracy Indices, overall there was no slide towards non-democratic forms of government in 2006–2019. The next two sections deal with dimensions missing in reviewed books; the notion of nation-state, international environment, civic culture and, in particular, dangers of radical egalitarianism to democracy. The last section concludes with regrets that the authors ignored rich literature on fragility of democracy and failed to incorporate in their analyses deeper structural factors eroding democracy: by the same token, return to the pre-populist shock trajectory is unlikely to assure survival of liberal democracy.