Suchergebnisse

This contribution to "Kosovo Situation Analysis Conducted at the Institute of Europe, RAN" questions whether & how Kosovo can become a sustainable nation, lacking, as it does, recognition from Serbia & the UN. Under the conflicting jurisdictions of not only the UN & the European Union, but also Serbia & Kosovo itself, how can anything be decided? The Albanian question will be even harder to manage. Adapted from the source document.

The article concentrates on the agreements between Belgrade and Pristina reached on February 27, 2023 in Brussels, and on March 18, 2023 in Ohrid through mediation of the EU and the USA. It also traces the chronology of the process that led to the current result and discusses "The Agreement on the Path to Normalisation of Relations between Kosovo and Serbia" and the "Implementation Annex". The analysis indicates the perception of the documents by society and political forces both in Kosovo and Serbia. Based on sociological surveys the study examines the attitude towards various ways of resolving the "Kosovo problem", towards the EU, NATO, and Russia. It also draws attention to the change in the position of the influential Serbian Orthodox Church, and speculates on the reasons for this turn. The article makes an assumption regarding the future course of behavior of the leaders of Kosovo and Serbia along with representatives of the EU and the United States. Whether Serbia joins the anti-Russian sanctions is an open question. The choice should be made between interests and emotions, national mythology and material goods, tradition and the future. The Western push to further promote accession of Serbia to the EU in exchange for recognition of Kosovo's independence means essential revision of the national Serbian national identity. It is about a historical choice, which will require a corresponding response from Russia.

The article is devoted to the early elections held in Serbia on December 17, 2023 – parliamentary, metropolitan and partly local. The main motive for their early holding: the desire to confirm the legitimacy of power after mass protests of the opposition, also to demonstrate its political impotence, and simultaneously buy time on the foreign policy stage to reduce pressure from Washington and Brussels. The outcome of the election was another victory for President A. Vučič and ruling Serbian Progressive Party. She was not a mystery to observers or participants beforehand. You could only argue about the account. But in the capital, the opposition had good chances, and this was confirmed. The voting results were considered and an assessment was given of the opposition demonstrations after the elections, as well as the degree and nature of involvement in these events of Brussels and Washington. The reasons for the persistent invincibility of the ruling «progressives», the partial strengthening of the pro-Western «democratic» opposition and the unexpected success of the new populist movement «We are a voice from the people» have been revealed. The logic of political behavior and the relationship between foreign and political balancing of the President of Serbia were analyzed. It was concluded that A. Vučič mainly achieved his goals and retained such a structure of power that provides him with a central role in Serbian politics, as well as free hands in further orientation in the international arena. It will not be unambiguous and straightforward in any case. But his room for maneuver has narrowed, and the direction of drift will be determined by the balance of power in the confrontation between West and East.

This article examines the protracted and controversial process of government formation in Montenegro in the aftermath of the presidential (19.03–02.04.2023) and early parliamentary elections (11.06.2023), although their results had already indicated who won, who lost. The problems revealed during the negotiations between the candidates for participation in power, which clearly characterize the mores of the subjects of the political scene of the country and the prospects of the new cabinet, are analyzed. Its structure and program are considered. The balance of power in the parliament is correlated with the sentiments of citizens revealed by polls. The forecast of Montenegro's foreign policy orientation under the new government and the likelihood of its early admission to the EU are given. It was stated that normalization of relations with Serbia is possible, but in any case, no change in the general anti-Russian vector of foreign policy should be expected.

The article examines two parameters of the subject stated: policies of the state governments of South-Eastern Europe in view of the new developments in Ukraine, widespread attitudes, and the configuration of political forces in these countries which may provide a chance to pro-Russian circles. An analysis is based on both national and international opinion polls and the results of the last elections. As is shown, the traditionally strong Russophile sentiments in many countries of the region have reverberated again and affected the perception of the conflict. However, the potential of the pro-Russian forces is insufficient for a fundamental change in policies although the ruling circles cannot completely ignore it. The article concludes that the status and prospects of Russian cooperation with the countries of the region will remain unfavorable until the end of military operation in Ukraine, although the EU and the US are unlikely to succeed in achieving complete abandonment of Russian energy sources in a short time.

The article discusses the prerequisites and results of the presidential (19.03 – 02.04.2023) and early parliamentary elections (11.06.2023) in Montenegro. It analyses the dispositions of the electorate in view of the polls data and the election results. The results of the vote are interpreted: the defeat of the long-term ruler of the country M. Djukanovic in the struggle for the post of the head of the state and the loss of his party's dominant position in the Assembly. An explanation is given of the reasons for the resounding success of the newly created movement «Europe Now!» and the preservation of relatively strong positions by the Democratic Party of Socialists. Suggestions have been made about the possible composition of the new ruling coalition and government. The forecast is given of the foreign policy orientation of the future cabinet and the prospects of Montenegro's early admission to the EU. It is stated that in any development no change in the general anti-Russian vector of foreign policy is expected.

The article discusses the prerequisites and results of the fifth elections to the People's Assembly called during the two year period and held on April 2, 2023 It analyses the dispositions of the electorate in view of the Eurobarometer polls data and the election results. The past vote, despite some changes in the party structure of the People's Assembly, testified once again to the deep disappointment of the weary Bulgarian voter in the entire political class. At the same time, it has recreated the stalemate in Parliament. The leaders of the warring majority camps (GERB-SDS vs «We Continue the changes» – «Democratic Bulgaria») already fear of being branded as the culprits of a new failure leading to appointment of one more temporary technocratic government by the president and the next snap elections. Such a prospect does not bode well for them, while their coalition is potential of seriously damaging their reputation. In such circumstances, the fighting forces are trying to find a magic formula for formation of a coalition cabinet. The near future will show whether the instinct of self-preservation will work or selfish party interests will prevail followed by déjà vu. However, in any development no change in the general anti-Russian vector of Bulgarian foreign policy is expected.

This article discusses the regular general election hold in Bosnia and Herzegovina (02.10.2022), the course of their electioneering, and the voting results. The analysis reveals the same main actors flashed on the political scene, the same principle collisions repeated, and even the methods of winning victory with the help of nationalist rhetoric remaining unchanged. However, the realignment of political forces has led to a new formula of power both in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and at the national level. The loser was the leading Islamist-nationalist Party of Democratic Action of the Bosniaks, which already bored its Western patrons with its destructive activity. Keeping up with these developments, an assessment of the prospects of the coalition government of Bosnia and Herzegovina formed by 21 political actors is suggested. Among them are the Croatian Democratic Union and the parties blocking with it, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats with their partners from Republika Srpska and also eight secular Bosnian parties. A significant factor in maintaining the cabinet cohesion is the need to demonstrate to the EU its «cooperation», a sine qua non for Western support and funding. The Federation theoretically could face problems with the losers being able to block the process of authorities formation. However, according to the common understanding, Christian Schmidt, the High Representative of the international community in the country, will not allow this. It can be assumed that under the current international climate (when the Russian Federation is absorbed by the conflict in Ukraine, and Serbia is barely able to withstand Western pressure and the aggravation of the situation in Kosovo), even the allegedly pro-Russian President of the Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik will be forced to take into account new political realities. If Brussels and Washington are smart enough to not push the Serbs «to the limit», the new Bosnia and Herzegovina government will finally have a chance to get down to business and do something useful for their citizens.

This article analyzes the background and results of the fourth elections held within 18 months to elect members of the National Assembly (02.10.2022). As predicted, the coalition government formed on the third attempt and led by Kiril Petkov, a leader of the new movement «We Continue the Change» did not last long. It fell victim to a no-confidence vote initiated by its main opponent, the GERB party of ex-premier Boyko Borisov. The latter gained unexpected support from Slavi Trifonov's «There is such a people» movement, a member of the previous multi-party cabinet. This election, despite some changes in the party structure of the National Assembly, actually testified to the deep disappointment of the disillusioned Bulgarian voters in the entire political spectre. At the same time, they replicated the stalemate in the Parliament. Under such conditions, the formation of a new coalition cabinet is extremely unlikely and one should expect «déjà vu»: another caretaker government appointed and next elections announced by the president. The general conclusion to be drawn from the present developments is that the political system with parties being called upon as the main subjects of the parliamentary model and diligently exercising in discrediting parliamentarism instead is deeply sick. There is seemingly no way out of the protracted political crisis!

The problem addressed in this article is the lifting of the Bulgarian veto on the start of the EU accession negotiations with Northern Macedonia (and Albania). It traces the main stages of the prolonged Bulgarian-Macedonian dispute and the development of the postures of both parties. It also explicates the domestic political situation in both countries and the causes under which the dispute aggravates and mitigates. Consequently, the unexpected willingness of Brussels for maximum concessions to Sofia's ultimatums, actually contradictory to its principles, is explained. An apparently impulsive decision to grant, notwithstanding the established procedures, a candidate status for admission to Ukraine and Moldova tested the EU's relations with the Balkan region. After having long stood in line, the leaders of the Western Balkan states viewed this step with jealousy and did not hide their disappointment. Under these conditions, the European Union felt it imperative to do something at any cost to revive the idea of «enlargement» in their eyes and restore its authority. However, in the end, the Bulgarian-Macedonian dispute is only ostensibly resolved, but in fact only mothballed. Therefore the difficult socio-political situation and the balance of power in both countries will not provide for rapid progress either in their relationship or in the EU negotiation with Skopje. The forecast in conclusion is that such tactics are unlikely to have a positive impact on the authority of the European Union in the Western Balkans. But the new idea of the «EU political community» put forward by Emmanuel Macron and supported by Olaf Scholz will probably continue to disguise the obvious fact that the EU in its current form is not ready to accept new members.

The article deals with the parliamentary elections held in Slovenia on April 24, 2022. The extremely high voter turnout and the result of the voting would appear unprecedented in the political history of the country. A crushing victory (with an unusually high score: 41 mandates out of 90 in the State Assembly) was won by the new «Freedom Movement» created shortly before the elections and led by Robert Golob. However, a more in–depth analysis leads to a different conclusion: what happened is nothing else but déjà vu. This is the fourth time that Slovenian society has expressed its distrust of the political class and traditional parties, pinning all its hopes on the next messiah called upon to miraculously solve all problems. The election held is reviewed in terms of its outcome and the balance of power inside and outside the parliament. The result is also scanned in view of the present developments in Ukraine and Slovenia's relationship with Russia. The Slovenian electorate's attitude regarding the party structure is examined, and prospects of Robert Golob's new cabinet are also assessed. It is concluded that the new government is able to change the situation in the country and make its policy more predictable. Nevertheless, it is unlikely to be able to disrupt the wellestablished algorithm of the Slovenian political system's performance, especially at the times of extremely high turbulence in the international arena, to which small states are particularly sensitive.

This article deals with the general elections (presidential, parliamentary and partly local) held in Serbia on April 3, 2022 The main motive for the snap National Assembly elections was the intention to get the Parliament legitimized, since the existent body with no opposition discredited the country and its head applying for admission into the EU. The outcome of the elections – another win of President Alexandar Vučić and his ruling Serbian Progressive Party – was not a secret from the start for either observers or participants. The only thing to argue about was the score. However, the developments in Ukraine have made their own adjustments to the calculations of both the authorities and their opponents, and the results of voting along with their perception by winners and losers. The article also addresses the reasons for the persistent invincibility of the ruling «progressists», the long-term failures of the pro-Western «democratic» opposition and the unexpected success of the pro-Russian right-wing nationalist blocs, which previously miserably dragged out on the political margins. The mood of the Serbian electorate in relation to the party structure is also the object of special consideration. The logic of political behavior and the relationship between the external and internal political balancing of the President of Serbia are analyzed. An explanation of his seemingly strange post-election move is suggested: taking a time-out in the formation of the government, he took a step towards the defeated «democrats». It is concluded that A. Vučić is aiming at structuring the government in a way that will preserve both his central role in Serbian politics and free hand in further adaptation on the international arena, which in any case will not be single valued and straightforward. The general vector of the drift will be determined by the balance of forces in the confrontation between the West and the East at present at its climax.