Suchergebnisse

Die militärstrategische Lage und der politische Hintergrund machen es unausweichlich, daß die Strategische Initiative (SDI) der USA für Monate und Jahre eine Quelle von Meinungsverschiedenheiten zwischen den USA un ihren NATO-Verbündeten sein wird. Der Aufstz stellt die Frage dieser Meinungsunterschiede zur Diskussion. Er schildert die europäischen Reaktionen und ihren politischen Zusammenhang, erörtert einige politische Auswirkungen von SDI (Glaubwürdigkeit der USA, strategische Aspekte für Europa, Probleme der atomaren Eskalation, Rolle der konventionellen Streitkräfte der NATO, Auswirkungen auf die nuklearen Streitkräfte Frankreichs und Großbritanniens, sowjetische Gegenmaßnahmen, Auswirkungen auf die Rüstungskontrolle, Verträglichkeit mit dem ABM-Vertrag). Er gibt Hinweise, wie ein erfolgreiches Management der NATO die Probleme von SDI behandeln sollte. (BIOst-BwD/Hie)

Strategic and other implications for NATO; based on conference paper. European responses and reactions; arms control aspects.

Politically accountable officials must depend on career subordinates for the expertise which informs policy choices & for the implementation which translates decisions into actions. These career subordinates are the products of closed personnel systems reputed to be homogenizing, insular, & unresponsive. The careers of 1,156 Air Force line officers who served in the four general grades from 1953 to 1972 are examined for insights into the behavior of that service's closed personnel system. Three complementary models of career systems which illuminate the results are also presented. The findings suggest strategies for mitigating the insularity of closed personnel systems & for giving politically accountable officials greater leverage over the system's behavior. 3 Tables, 2 Figures. Appendix. Modified HA.

It is commonly held that Congress has made only inconsequential changes in the President's requests for defense appropriations. Scholarly studies of the budgetary process, notably the work of Fenno and Wildavsky, do not include defense spending in their analyses. For nondefense spending they find that Congress has primarily afiscalrather thanprogrammaticorientation toward appropriations.House and Senate changes in the President's defense appropriations requests were analyzed for the fiscal years 1960 through 1970. It was found that small Congressional changes in total defense spending obscured more substantial activity in particular budget categories. The concentration of Congressional activity in two of these categories—Procurement and R&D—indicates that Congress has had a significant programmatic orientation toward defense spending. Changes in the level of Congressional activity across time confirm this hypothesis.Efforts to measure the relative influence of the House and Senate proved inconclusive. The Senate dominated the conference committee, but the Senate's influence was concentrated in the least important budget categories. The House made most of the changes in the President's budget requests, but very few of such changes were appealed by the Defense Department to the Senate.