Suchergebnisse

Trade unions in Zambia and in several other developing countries have been understood to create 'detribalising' class consciousnesses. In contrast, we argue that Zambian understandings of unionism have developed through similar political economic processes to those that generated 'tribes'. Values and structures that enable concepts of the good life more commonly found among Bemba speakers and Eastern Zambians have been naturalised into Zambia's mining unions, guiding union policy and practice in a manner which limits North Western Zambians' union participation. Utilising Lazar's (2018) understanding of unionism as kinship, we explore how Zambians of various tribes attempt to utilise unions to achieve what they see as human flourishing and social justice. We foreground that people's understandings of the good life frequently incorporate gendered and gerontocratic hierarchies and we demonstrate that intra-national unionisms are co-created through (and influence) local cultural norms and political histories. This encourages anthropologists of trade unionism to ask what values and hierarchies are rendered invisible in other union 'families', and to explore intertwinements between unions and communities enabled through kinship, rather than through Civil Society Organisations. ; Peer reviewed

Based on a Zambian case study of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), this paper applies the behavioural theory of party competition to explain how, through vote-seeking and office-seeking strategies, political parties may employ rapacious predatory co-optation of members from competing political parties as a mobilisation strategy. The paper concludes that in the absence of a dominant political party, parties and political elites may resort to predation to bolster their electoral fortunes. While predatory co-optation may strengthen some parties, it also weakens others and undermines or reverses party system institutionalisation and vertical accountability.

Based on a Zambian case study of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), this paper applies the behavioural theory of party competition to explain how, through vote-seeking and office-seeking strategies, political parties may employ rapacious predatory co-optation of members from competing political parties as a mobilisation strategy. The paper concludes that in the absence of a dominant political party, parties and political elites may resort to predation to bolster their electoral fortunes. While predatory co-optation may strengthen some parties, it also weakens others and undermines or reverses party system institutionalisation and vertical accountability.