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We estimate the impact of political coups and top-secret coup planning on asset prices. We use declassified CIA documents and daily stock price data to estimate the effect of private events on asset prices of partially nationalized US companies that stood to benefit from US backed coups. We find that stock markets react to actions classified as top-secret. Private events which raise the likelihood of a coup affect a continued rise in returns on affected assets. After incorporating the impact of private information events occurring before the coup, stock price reactions to coups are substantial.

We exploit the precise timing of natural disasters to provide empirical evidence on the connection between electoral accountability and politicians' support for special interests. We show that, in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, the evening news substantially reduce their coverage of politics. At the very same time, members of Congress become more likely to adopt the positions of special-interest donors as they vote on bills. Our findings are consistent with standard theories of political agency, according to which politicians are more inclined to serve special interests when, for exogenous reasons, they are less intensely monitored.