Suchergebnisse

Provisions within the Affordable Care Act, including the introduction of subsidized, Exchange-based coverage for lower income Americans lacking access to employer coverage, are expected to greatly expand the size and importance of the individual market. Using multiple federal surveys and administrative data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, we generate national-, regional-, and state-level estimates of the individual market. In 2009, the number of nonelderly persons with individual coverage ranged from 9.55 million in the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey to 25.3 million in the American Community Survey. Notable differences also exist between survey estimates and National Association of Insurance Commissioners administrative counts, an outcome likely driven by variation in the type and measurement of individual coverage considered by surveys relative to administrative data. Future research evaluating the impact of the Affordable Care Act coverage provisions must be mindful of differences across surveys and administrative sources as it relates to the measurement of individual market coverage.

Abstract
The ownership and governance of for-profit (FP), nonprofit (NP), and local government (LG) organizations are different. Therefore, the objectives of these different types of organizations and their performance may differ. We conjecture that in markets where there is substantial asymmetric information between providers and customers, FP firms, LG organizations and NP organizations provide similar levels of quality attributes that are observable to their customers and are well understood by them. However, FP firms are likely to provide lower levels of less-well observed and less-well understood desirable but costly quality attributes than their NP and LG counterparts. Using a rich dataset, we study the quality of outcomes for Minnesota nursing homes, which do not compete on prices. We find support for our theoretical conjectures: FP homes provide lower quality on a number of dimensions, especially those that are less observable by nursing home residents and their families.

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) included financial and regulatory incentives and goals for states to bolster their health insurance rate review programs, increase their anticipated loss ratio requirements, expand Medicaid, and establish state-based exchanges. We grouped states by political party control and compared their reactions across these policy goals. To identify changes in states rate review programs and anticipated loss ratio requirements in the individual and small group markets since the ACAs enactment, we conducted legal research and contacted each states insurance regulator. We linked rate review program changes to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) criteria for an effective rate review program. We found, of states that did not meet CMSs criteria when the ACA was enacted, most made changes to meet those criteria, including Republican-controlled states, which generally oppose the ACA. This finding is likely the result of the relatively low administrative burden associated with reviewing health insurance rates and the fact that doing so prevents federal intervention in rate review. However, Republican-controlled states were less likely than non-Republican-controlled states to increase their anticipated loss ratio requirements to align with the federal retrospective medical loss ratio requirement, expand Medicaid, and establish state-based exchanges, because of their general opposition to the ACA. We conclude that federal incentives for states to strengthen their health insurance rate review programs were more effective than the incentives for states to adopt other insurance-related policy goals of the ACA.

The cost of health insurance has been the primary concern of small business owners for several decades. State small group health insurance reforms, implemented in the 1990s, aimed to control the variability of health insurance premiums and to improve access to health insurance. Small group reforms only affected firms within a specific size range, and the definition of the upper size threshold for small firms varied by state and over time. As a result, small group reforms may have affected the size of small firms around the legislative threshold and may also have affected the propensity of small firms to offer health insurance. Previous research has examined the second issue, finding little to no effect of health insurance reforms on the propensity of small firms to offer health insurance. In this paper, we examine the relationship between small group reform and firm size. We use data from a nationally representative repeated cross-section survey of employers and data on state small group health insurance reform. Contrary to the intent of the reform, we find evidence that small firms just below the regulatory threshold that were offering health insurance grew in order to bypass reforms.