Suchergebnisse

More often than not production processes are the joint endeavor of people having different abilities and productivities. Such production processes and the associated surplus production are often not fully transparent in the sense that the relative contributions of involved agents are blurred; either by lack of information about the actual performance of collaborators or because of random noise in the production process or both. These variables likely influence the surplus sharing negotiations following the production. By means of a laboratory experiment, we systematically investigate their role for the whole bargaining process from opening offers to (dis)agreements and find that uncertainties in surplus production and (even) a very coarse performance information lead to bargaining asymmetries. In addition, we find that bargainers' subjective entitlements are also influenced by performance information and the randomness inherent in the production process. These differences in subjective entitlements together with the differences in entitlements between better and worse performers influence the whole bargaining process and significantly contribute to the differences in bargaining outcomes. -- bargaining ; performance information ; randomness in production process ; entitlements ; experiments

Part I: Theoretical foundations of bargaining research -- Chapter 1: Field Experiments in Bargaining -- Chapter 2: Commitment Tactics in Bargaining -- Chapter 3: The Role of Emotions in Bargaining -- Chapter 4: New Empirical Perspectives on Bargaining -- Chapter 5: Reputational Bargaining -- Chapter 6: Theoretical Approaches to Legislative Bargaining -- Part II: Traditional applications to bargaining research.-Chapter 7: Bargaining Theory and Climate Change Negotiations -- Chapter 8: Markets, Price Posting, and Bargaining -- Chapter 9: Bargaining and War -- Chapter 10: Reference-dependent Behavior in Bargaining -- Part III: Future Directions -- Chapter 11: Perspectives on Computerized Negotiation -- Chapter 12: Focal Points in Bargaining Games -- Chapter 13: Bargaining in Operations Management Research -- Chapter 14: Gender Differences in Negotiation Skill and Policy for Improvement -- Chapter 15: Applications of Bargaining in Empirical IO: Vertical Markets -- Chapter 16: Dynamic Bargaining with Private Information -- Chapter 17: Distributive justice and the Nash bargaining solution -- Chapter 18: Experiments on Legislative Bargaining -- Chapter 19: Machine Learning, AI, and Bargaining Experiments.