In spite of a growing number of contemporary publications in the field of political philosophy that are dedicated to the concept of honor and to it's analysis, there still is a lack of a systemic presentation of the conceptual field of honor itself. Political theorists and philosophers that treat the subject of honor state out their definitions of honor and compare them with one another, yet a general overview of the competing definitions and their critical comparison is still a rarety. A systemic presentation of all prominent contemporary philosophical studies that treat the concept of honor is useful in two ways. It facilitates the understanding of the main arguments that determine different definitions of honor, as well as it identifies major polemical issues that set the diferent concepts of honor apart. This article suggests two main arguments – a critical and an adaptational – for interpreting and comparing the different concepts of honor in contemporary political philosophy. Structuring the conceptual field of honor with these two arguments offers an analytic tool for further analyses of honor that are based on concrete polemical issues. It also gives a new perspective to explain the reemergence of honor in contemporary political philosophy.
In spite of a growing number of contemporary publications in the field of political philosophy that are dedicated to the concept of honor and to it's analysis, there still is a lack of a systemic presentation of the conceptual field of honor itself. Political theorists and philosophers that treat the subject of honor state out their definitions of honor and compare them with one another, yet a general overview of the competing definitions and their critical comparison is still a rarety. A systemic presentation of all prominent contemporary philosophical studies that treat the concept of honor is useful in two ways. It facilitates the understanding of the main arguments that determine different definitions of honor, as well as it identifies major polemical issues that set the diferent concepts of honor apart. This article suggests two main arguments – a critical and an adaptational – for interpreting and comparing the different concepts of honor in contemporary political philosophy. Structuring the conceptual field of honor with these two arguments offers an analytic tool for further analyses of honor that are based on concrete polemical issues. It also gives a new perspective to explain the reemergence of honor in contemporary political philosophy. ; Nors tekstų apie garbės sąvoką, priskiriamų XX a. pabaigos–XXI a. politinės filosofijos-politinės teorijos disciplinoms, gausėja, sistemingo šiuolaikinių sąvokos tyrimų lauko pristatymo faktiškai nėra. Apie garbės sąvoką rašantys autoriai referuoja vieni į kitus, tačiau trūksta apibendrinto jų garbės sampratų identifikavimo ir palyginimo. Sistemingas garbės sąvokos tyrimų lauko pristatymas leistų patogiai suprasti, kokiais argumentais grįsti apie garbę rašančių autorių pateikiami sąvokos apibrėžimai, taip pat dėl kokių klausimų yra polemizuojama. Straipsnio tikslas– dviem argumentais (kritiniu ir adaptaciniu) susisteminti ir palyginti, kaip garbės sąvoką tiriantys šiuolaikiniai autoriai aiškina jos reikšmę ir aktualumą. Toks skirtingų autorių argumentų sugrupavimas leidžia nustatyti sąvokos tyrimo lauko kontūrus, identifikuoti svarbiausias polemines skirtis ir taip geriau suvokti, kaip dabartinėje filosofijoje suprantama garbės sąvoka ir jos aktualumas.
In spite of a growing number of contemporary publications in the field of political philosophy that are dedicated to the concept of honor and to it's analysis, there still is a lack of a systemic presentation of the conceptual field of honor itself. Political theorists and philosophers that treat the subject of honor state out their definitions of honor and compare them with one another, yet a general overview of the competing definitions and their critical comparison is still a rarety. A systemic presentation of all prominent contemporary philosophical studies that treat the concept of honor is useful in two ways. It facilitates the understanding of the main arguments that determine different definitions of honor, as well as it identifies major polemical issues that set the diferent concepts of honor apart. This article suggests two main arguments – a critical and an adaptational – for interpreting and comparing the different concepts of honor in contemporary political philosophy. Structuring the conceptual field of honor with these two arguments offers an analytic tool for further analyses of honor that are based on concrete polemical issues. It also gives a new perspective to explain the reemergence of honor in contemporary political philosophy.
The purpose of the doctoral dissertation "The Idea of Honor as a Means to Understand Democracy. The Perspective of XVIII-XIX Century Political Philosophy" is to present the notion of honor as a relevant idea for political philosophy and to prove the necessity of the idea of honor for understanding modern representative democracy. It is claimed that the idea of honor helps to analytically identify and understand two fundamental inner structural contradictions of modern democracy: 1. between the democratic idea of equality and the concept of a political regime; 2. between the model of representative government applied by modern democracies and the principle of political hierarchy that is crucial for political representation to work. Philosophical conceptualization of honor in terms of a political idea is made possible by referring to the democratic and monarchist political theories of XVIII-XIX century. The paper claims that honor serves as an analytical tool to understand both intrinsic tensions of modern democracy, as well as to justify the necessary conditions for political representation to work.
The purpose of the doctoral dissertation "The Idea of Honor as a Means to Understand Democracy. The Perspective of XVIII-XIX Century Political Philosophy" is to present the notion of honor as a relevant idea for political philosophy and to prove the necessity of the idea of honor for understanding modern representative democracy. It is claimed that the idea of honor helps to analytically identify and understand two fundamental inner structural contradictions of modern democracy: 1. between the democratic idea of equality and the concept of a political regime; 2. between the model of representative government applied by modern democracies and the principle of political hierarchy that is crucial for political representation to work. Philosophical conceptualization of honor in terms of a political idea is made possible by referring to the democratic and monarchist political theories of XVIII-XIX century. The paper claims that honor serves as an analytical tool to understand both intrinsic tensions of modern democracy, as well as to justify the necessary conditions for political representation to work.
The purpose of the doctoral dissertation "The Idea of Honor as a Means to Understand Democracy. The Perspective of XVIII-XIX Century Political Philosophy" is to present the notion of honor as a relevant idea for political philosophy and to prove the necessity of the idea of honor for understanding modern representative democracy. It is claimed that the idea of honor helps to analytically identify and understand two fundamental inner structural contradictions of modern democracy: 1. between the democratic idea of equality and the concept of a political regime; 2. between the model of representative government applied by modern democracies and the principle of political hierarchy that is crucial for political representation to work. Philosophical conceptualization of honor in terms of a political idea is made possible by referring to the democratic and monarchist political theories of XVIII-XIX century. The paper claims that honor serves as an analytical tool to understand both intrinsic tensions of modern democracy, as well as to justify the necessary conditions for political representation to work.
The purpose of the doctoral dissertation "The Idea of Honor as a Means to Understand Democracy. The Perspective of XVIII-XIX Century Political Philosophy" is to present the notion of honor as a relevant idea for political philosophy and to prove the necessity of the idea of honor for understanding modern representative democracy. It is claimed that the idea of honor helps to analytically identify and understand two fundamental inner structural contradictions of modern democracy: 1. between the democratic idea of equality and the concept of a political regime; 2. between the model of representative government applied by modern democracies and the principle of political hierarchy that is crucial for political representation to work. Philosophical conceptualization of honor in terms of a political idea is made possible by referring to the democratic and monarchist political theories of XVIII-XIX century. The paper claims that honor serves as an analytical tool to understand both intrinsic tensions of modern democracy, as well as to justify the necessary conditions for political representation to work.
The purpose of the doctoral dissertation "The Idea of Honor as a Means to Understand Democracy. The Perspective of XVIII-XIX Century Political Philosophy" is to present the notion of honor as a relevant idea for political philosophy and to prove the necessity of the idea of honor for understanding modern representative democracy. It is claimed that the idea of honor helps to analytically identify and understand two fundamental inner structural contradictions of modern democracy: 1. between the democratic idea of equality and the concept of a political regime; 2. between the model of representative government applied by modern democracies and the principle of political hierarchy that is crucial for political representation to work. Philosophical conceptualization of honor in terms of a political idea is made possible by referring to the democratic and monarchist political theories of XVIII-XIX century. The paper claims that honor serves as an analytical tool to understand both intrinsic tensions of modern democracy, as well as to justify the necessary conditions for political representation to work.
The purpose of the doctoral dissertation "The Idea of Honor as a Means to Understand Democracy. The Perspective of XVIII-XIX Century Political Philosophy" is to present the notion of honor as a relevant idea for political philosophy and to prove the necessity of the idea of honor for understanding modern representative democracy. It is claimed that the idea of honor helps to analytically identify and understand two fundamental inner structural contradictions of modern democracy: 1. between the democratic idea of equality and the concept of a political regime; 2. between the model of representative government applied by modern democracies and the principle of political hierarchy that is crucial for political representation to work. Philosophical conceptualization of honor in terms of a political idea is made possible by referring to the democratic and monarchist political theories of XVIII-XIX century. The paper claims that honor serves as an analytical tool to understand both intrinsic tensions of modern democracy, as well as to justify the necessary conditions for political representation to work.
The purpose of the doctoral dissertation "The Idea of Honor as a Means to Understand Democracy. The Perspective of XVIII-XIX Century Political Philosophy" is to present the notion of honor as a relevant idea for political philosophy and to prove the necessity of the idea of honor for understanding modern representative democracy. It is claimed that the idea of honor helps to analytically identify and understand two fundamental inner structural contradictions of modern democracy: 1. between the democratic idea of equality and the concept of a political regime; 2. between the model of representative government applied by modern democracies and the principle of political hierarchy that is crucial for political representation to work. Philosophical conceptualization of honor in terms of a political idea is made possible by referring to the democratic and monarchist political theories of XVIII-XIX century. The paper claims that honor serves as an analytical tool to understand both intrinsic tensions of modern democracy, as well as to justify the necessary conditions for political representation to work.
The purpose of the doctoral dissertation "The Idea of Honor as a Means to Understand Democracy. The Perspective of XVIII-XIX Century Political Philosophy" is to present the notion of honor as a relevant idea for political philosophy and to prove the necessity of the idea of honor for understanding modern representative democracy. It is claimed that the idea of honor helps to analytically identify and understand two fundamental inner structural contradictions of modern democracy: 1. between the democratic idea of equality and the concept of a political regime; 2. between the model of representative government applied by modern democracies and the principle of political hierarchy that is crucial for political representation to work. Philosophical conceptualization of honor in terms of a political idea is made possible by referring to the democratic and monarchist political theories of XVIII-XIX century. The paper claims that honor serves as an analytical tool to understand both intrinsic tensions of modern democracy, as well as to justify the necessary conditions for political representation to work.
[only abstract in English; full article, abstract in Lithuanian]
The purpose of this article is to suggest an innovative theoretical approach to modern democracy and its implicit contradiction between the idea of public sovereignty and the model of political representation. The apparent practical problem arising from this contradiction is the lack of legitimacy in democratically elected officials and parliament in general. The article argues that the issue with democratic representation cannot be explained sociologically, but must include a theoretical analysis of the normative contradiction between the egalitarian principle of sovereignty of the people and the hierarchical model of political representation.
The article develops its argument from the conceptual framework laid down in the political theory of Montesquieu. Montesquieu's thoughts on political regimes offer important insights about modern representative democracy, highlighting the structural relationship between what he called the "nature of democracy" (the rule of the people) and the "generating principle of democracy" (love for equality). Three contemporary interpretations of Montesquieu's theory (by Fred Dallmayr, Michael Mosher and Sharon Krause) are introduced and critically evaluated.
The article concludes that:
Representative democracy suffers from a structural tension between the democratic idea of the rule of the people and its practical implementation through the model of representation, which was inherited from predemocratic monarchic regimes. The problem is not sociological but structural.
Montesquieu's theory offers a conceptual framework for analyzing the inner tension of representative democracy between the ideas of egalitarianism and political hierarchy. Contemporary authors suggest different interpretations of Montesquieu's thought and offer several strategies for the possible improvement of democratic rule, such as (1) redrawing the notion of representation, (2) creating a more empowered civic society and (3) introducing a meritocratic educational system for individuals. Yet, they all miss the original idea posed by the Enlightenment philosopher regarding the balance between the democratic principle (passion for equality) and its natural claim to represent the people with "intermediary institutions" that mitigate the adverse tendencies of the democratic form of government.
Philosophical discussions about democratic legitimacy should consider one Montesquieu's statement that is rarely theoretically acknowledged: that democratic political representation needs non-egalitarian social ideas. This means that democracy must tolerate certain non-democratic social ideas (such as honor) for its own benefit, because they provide the necessary balancing institutions. Such an idea would benefit the ongoing debates about democracy by providing a more structural outlook on the fundamental source of the problem (which is a structural collision of contradictory ideas: "equality" vs. "hierarchy") than those offered by the sociological strategies of democratization or civic empowerment.
[only abstract in English; full article, abstract in Lithuanian] The purpose of this article is to suggest an innovative theoretical approach to modern democracy and its implicit contradiction between the idea of public sovereignty and the model of political representation. The apparent practical problem arising from this contradiction is the lack of legitimacy in democratically elected officials and parliament in general. The article argues that the issue with democratic representation cannot be explained sociologically, but must include a theoretical analysis of the normative contradiction between the egalitarian principle of sovereignty of the people and the hierarchical model of political representation. The article develops its argument from the conceptual framework laid down in the political theory of Montesquieu. Montesquieu's thoughts on political regimes offer important insights about modern representative democracy, highlighting the structural relationship between what he called the "nature of democracy" (the rule of the people) and the "generating principle of democracy" (love for equality). Three contemporary interpretations of Montesquieu's theory (by Fred Dallmayr, Michael Mosher and Sharon Krause) are introduced and critically evaluated. The article concludes that: Representative democracy suffers from a structural tension between the democratic idea of the rule of the people and its practical implementation through the model of representation, which was inherited from predemocratic monarchic regimes. The problem is not sociological but structural. Montesquieu's theory offers a conceptual framework for analyzing the inner tension of representative democracy between the ideas of egalitarianism and political hierarchy. Contemporary authors suggest different interpretations of Montesquieu's thought and offer several strategies for the possible improvement of democratic rule, such as (1) redrawing the notion of representation, (2) creating a more empowered civic society and (3) introducing a meritocratic educational system for individuals. Yet, they all miss the original idea posed by the Enlightenment philosopher regarding the balance between the democratic principle (passion for equality) and its natural claim to represent the people with "intermediary institutions" that mitigate the adverse tendencies of the democratic form of government. Philosophical discussions about democratic legitimacy should consider one Montesquieu's statement that is rarely theoretically acknowledged: that democratic political representation needs non-egalitarian social ideas. This means that democracy must tolerate certain non-democratic social ideas (such as honor) for its own benefit, because they provide the necessary balancing institutions. Such an idea would benefit the ongoing debates about democracy by providing a more structural outlook on the fundamental source of the problem (which is a structural collision of contradictory ideas: "equality" vs. "hierarchy") than those offered by the sociological strategies of democratization or civic empowerment. ; [straipsnis, santrauka lietuvių kalba; santrauka anglų kalba] Straipsnio tikslas yra konceptualiai apžvelgti ir išryškinti moderniai atstovaujamajai demokratijai būdingą vidinį prieštaravimą tarp lygybės idėja grįsto liaudies suverenumo principo ir hierarchiją įtvirtinančio politinės reprezentacijos mechanizmo. Siekiant šio tikslo palyginama filosofo Montesquieu politinių santvarkų teorijoje pristatoma demokratijos samprata ir trys šiuolaikinės jos interpretacijos. Straipsnyje ginama retai dabartinių politikos filosofų akcentuojama mintis, kad politinės valdžios atstovaujamojoje demokratijoje legitimumo stoka yra ne socialinės, bet politinės kilmės problema. Chroninis nepasitikėjimas demokratiškai išrinktais atstovais nėra tik visuomenės brandos ar pilietiškumo trūkumo požymis. Tai – struktūrinės įtampos tarp modernaus liaudies valdžios principo ir jo pritaikymo iš monarchijos laikų paveldėtam parlamentiniam reprezentacijos mechanizmui padarinys. Šio atstovaujamajame valdyme užkoduoto politinių idėjų prieštaravimo negali išspręsti socialinė inžinerija ar piliečių demokratizavimo strategijos. Straipsnyje mėginama aktualizuoti Apšvietos epochos filosofų mintį, kad demokratinei politinei reprezentacijai efektyviai veikti reikalinga nedemokratinė hierarchinė socialinio etoso idėja.
The purpose of this article is to suggest an innovative theoretical approach to modern democracy and its implicit contradiction between the idea of public sovereignty and the model of political representation. The apparent practical problem arising from this contradiction is the lack of legitimacy in democratically elected officials and parliament in general. The article argues that the issue with democratic representation cannot be explained sociologically, but must include a theoretical analysis of the normative contradiction between the egalitarian principle of sovereignty of the people and the hierarchical model of political representation. The article develops its argument from the conceptual framework laid down in the political theory of Montesquieu. Montesquieu's thoughts on political regimes offer important insights about modern representative democracy, highlighting the structural relationship between what he called the "nature of democracy" (the rule of the people) and the "generating principle of democracy" (love for equality). Three contemporary interpretations of Montesquieu's theory (by Fred Dallmayr, Michael Mosher and Sharon Krause) are introduced and critically evaluated. The article concludes that: Representative democracy suffers from a structural tension between the democratic idea of the rule of the people and its practical implementation through the model of representation, which was inherited from predemocratic monarchic regimes. The problem is not sociological but structural.
The purpose of this article is to suggest an innovative theoretical approach to modern democracy and its implicit contradiction between the idea of public sovereignty and the model of political representation. The apparent practical problem arising from this contradiction is the lack of legitimacy in democratically elected officials and parliament in general. The article argues that the issue with democratic representation cannot be explained sociologically, but must include a theoretical analysis of the normative contradiction between the egalitarian principle of sovereignty of the people and the hierarchical model of political representation. The article develops its argument from the conceptual framework laid down in the political theory of Montesquieu. Montesquieu's thoughts on political regimes offer important insights about modern representative democracy, highlighting the structural relationship between what he called the "nature of democracy" (the rule of the people) and the "generating principle of democracy" (love for equality). Three contemporary interpretations of Montesquieu's theory (by Fred Dallmayr, Michael Mosher and Sharon Krause) are introduced and critically evaluated. The article concludes that: Representative democracy suffers from a structural tension between the democratic idea of the rule of the people and its practical implementation through the model of representation, which was inherited from predemocratic monarchic regimes. The problem is not sociological but structural.
