Essays on adverse selection: a dynamic perspective
In: Tinbergen Institute Research Series 275
In: Research series
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In: Tinbergen Institute Research Series 275
In: Research series
In: YGAME-D-22-00581
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In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 74, S. 102164
In: Karamychev , V A & Swank , O H 2022 , ' A social image theory of information acquisition, opinion formation, and voting ' , European Journal of Political Economy . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2021.102164
Recent empirical research on voter turnout has revealed a variety of regularities. Citizens who expect to be asked about their turnout decisions after the elections are more likely to vote. Parents whose children enter the electorate are more likely to vote when their children live home than when they left home. Citizens without social networks acquire less information about politics. We develop a model that can explain these and other empirical findings. In our model, citizens receive disutility from being perceived not to have voted. This motivates a citizen to vote. Moreover, a citizen feels worse being perceived not to have voted when he is thought to have a strong opinion as this raises expectations about his voting behavior among peers. When a citizen anticipates that he will likely vote, the latter concern motivates him to acquire information, to participate in political discussions, and to vote. However, when a citizen anticipates that he will likely abstain from voting, he shies away from politics to lower his peers' expectations.
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In: CESifo Working Paper No. 8995
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In: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2021-005/VII
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Mobile payments (m-payments) increase the accessibility of large segments of society to financial services while before the traditional banking system excluded these for lack of proof of identity and because of unsafe environments. This constitutes a key driver of new growth strategies of the developing world. Smartphones are essential to perform m-payments. In that regard, recent criticism from different sides has expressed the view that manufacturers' strategies generate partial market coverage whereby the purchase of a phone and financial inclusion also remain out of reach for the group of poor consumers. Our aim in this paper is to examine the theoretical premises of this conjecture in a small open economy and uncover the conditions under which full market coverage is efficient and desirable. We analyze subgame perfect equilibria of a vertical duopoly model characterized by consumers' taste for quality. The government uses taxes and/or subsidies to modify the market equilibrium. Given this, the following issues are considered: (a) What is the impact of different standards of payment security on the equilibrium number of low- and high-quality users? (b) What are the aggregate welfare gains of complete financial inclusion? (c) What happens if phone makers are foreign?
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This paper considers a government auctioning off multiple licenses to firms who compete in a market after the auction. Firms have different costs, and cost efficiency is private information at the auction stage and the market competition stage. If only one license is auctioned, standard results say that the most efficient firm wins the auction (license) as it will get the highest profit in the aftermarket, i.e., it has the highest valuation for the license. This paper argues that this result does not generalize to the case of multiple licenses and aftermarket competition. In particular, we determine conditions under which auctions may select inefficient firms and therefore lead to an inefficient allocation of resources. Strategic interactions in the aftermarket, in particular firms' preferences to compete with the least cost-efficient firms rather than with the most efficient firms, are responsible for our result.
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In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 120, Heft 549, S. 1319-1344
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 166, Heft 2, S. 286
ISSN: 1614-0559