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Introduction and overview -- Climate policies in the United States -- Theories of climate policy -- The structural theory applied to the cases -- Causes of climate policies in the fifty states -- California : air-pollution and energy policy making (the 1940s to the 1980s) -- California : climate policy making (the 2000s to the present) -- New York State : energy and climate policy making -- Federal government : energy and climate policy making -- Conclusions : political opportunities for climate policy in the United States.

AbstractThe adoption of climate policies with visible, substantial costs for households is uncommon because of expected political backlash, but British Columbia's carbon tax and California's cap‐and‐trade program imposed such costs and still survived vigorous opposition. To explain these outcomes, this article tests hypotheses concerning policy design, framing, energy prices, and elections. It conducts universalizing and variation‐finding comparisons across three subcases in the two jurisdictions and uses primary sources to carry out process tracing involving mechanisms of public opinion and elite position‐taking. The article finds strong support for the timing of independent energy price changes, exogenous causes of election results, reducing the visibility of carbon pricing, and using public‐benefit justifications, as well as some support for making concessions to voters. By contrast, the effects of the use of revenue, industry exemptions/compensations, and making polluters pay are not uniform, because the effects of revenue use depend on how it is embedded in coalition building efforts and a middle path between exempting or compensating industry and burdening it appears to be more effective than pursuing just one or the other approach.

AbstractGermany is an exemplary case of an energy transition from nuclear energy and fossil fuels toward renewables in the electricity sector, but it also demonstrates repeated, increasingly successful countermobilization by energy incumbents and their allies. The course for Germany's energy transition was largely set with the adoption of a feed‐in tariff law in 1990, but since then the energy transition has been altered by a series of policy‐making episodes, each of which was shaped by the outcomes of the previous episodes; there has been a combination of reinforcing and reactive sequences. This article uses policy windows and advocacy coalition theory, supplemented by work on resistance to carbon pricing, to analyze the four periods in which opponents of the energy transition had the greatest opportunities to limit or reverse it. It makes three main arguments intended to influence future research on energy transitions: (1) episodes of opposition to the feed‐in tariff policy occurred when problem awareness and political commitment converged, (2) the outcomes of those conflicts depended on the balance of mobilization by advocacy and opposing coalitions, and (3) rising household costs due to the renewable energy surcharge drove both problem awareness and the composition of the opposing coalition, which helped lead to a more far‐reaching retrenchment of renewable energy policy in 2014 than in earlier periods.

Much literature on federalism and multilevel governance argues that federalist institutional arrangements promote renewable energy policies. However, the U.S. case supports a different view that federalism has ambivalent effects. Policy innovation has occurred at the state level and to some extent has led to policy adoption by other states and the federal government, but the extent is limited by the veto power of fossil fuel interests that are rooted in many state governments and in Congress, buttressed by increasing Republican Party hostility to environmental and climate policy. This argument is supported by a detailed analysis of five periods of federal and state renewable energy policy-making, from the Carter to the Trump administrations. The negative effects of federalism on national renewable energy policy in the United States, in contrast to the West European cases in this special issue, are mainly due to the interaction of its federalist institutions with party polarization and a strong domestic fossil fuel industry.