Suchergebnisse

After 27 years of stalemate and inability to make any progress in dealing with domestic terrorism, in 2002 the Greek police finally arrested members of the `Revolutionary Organization November 17', the most lethal terrorist group ever to operate in Greece. The arrest of the terrorists raised several questions that have not yet been satisfactorily answered. Why did Greece take so long before a decisive strike against domestic, left-wing terrorism was recorded? What were the factors that led to the arrest of the terrorists? In answering these questions it is necessary to analyse not just the operational changes in the Greek counter-terrorist strategy that began to materialize at the turn of the millennium, but also the deep-rooted conceptual changes that led to the inclusion of terrorism in the Greek security agenda for the first time. I utilize and extend the theory of `securitization' as developed by the Copenhagen school, and argue that the state's failure to curtail terrorist activity in Greece resulted from the erroneous belief that terrorism was not a direct threat to Greek security. In turn, the belated securitization of terrorism was the key to the arrest of the terrorists that held Greece hostage for almost three decades.

This volume investigates the policies and politics of extreme austerity, setting the crisis in Greece in its global context. Featuring multidisciplinary contributions and an exclusive interview with former Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou, this is the first comprehensive account of the economic crisis at the heart of Europe.

The 'securitisation' of migration is argued to rest on a process of framing migrants as a threat to key values, principally identity. Yet, the socially constructed nature of 'identity' implies the potential for dual usage: support and contestation of the security frame. Using the UK as an illustrative case, this overlooked dynamic is explored through mixed-methods, incorporating elite political and religious discourse (2005–2015) and original public attitudinal survey evidence. The discourse analysis reveals that the preservation of an imperilled British identity ('tolerance') is a frame invoked, in different ways and by different actors, to either support or contest the securitisation of migration. Similarly, British citizens who deeply value the preservation of 'Britishness' have diverse, positive and negative views on migration, challenging the notion that identity as a referent object is deterministically linked to anti-immigration attitudes. The innovative concept of 'counter-securitisation' is utilised and developed, unpicking these nuances and their implications.

The 'securitisation' of migration is argued to rest on a process of framing migrants as a threat to key values, principally identity. Yet, the socially constructed nature of 'identity' implies the potential for dual usage: support and contestation of the security frame. Using the UK as an illustrative case, this overlooked dynamic is explored through mixed-methods, incorporating elite political and religious discourse (2005–2015) and original public attitudinal survey evidence. The discourse analysis reveals that the preservation of an imperilled British identity ('tolerance') is a frame invoked, in different ways and by different actors, to either support or contest the securitisation of migration. Similarly, British citizens who deeply value the preservation of 'Britishness' have diverse, positive and negative views on migration, challenging the notion that identity as a referent object is deterministically linked to anti-immigration attitudes. The innovative concept of 'counter-securitisation' is utilised and developed, unpicking these nuances and their implications.

The apparent ubiquity of protest in recent years and the rise of Occupy movements across the world fuelled claims about a new style of mobilisation emerging that is markedly different from previous social movements. Analysing a series of original survey data, this article engages with this debate by providing a panoramic account of how the anti-austerity movement evolved in Greece, comparing the drivers of protest in three distinct protest waves. Contrary to expectations, the rise of the Greek version of the Indignados during 2011 did not decisively transform the anti-austerity movement that emerged in 2010, which mainly displayed characteristics typically associated with 'old' social movements. However, elements of the 'new social movements' approach featured more prominently in the third wave of protest, beginning in mid-2012 and culminating in January 2015 with victory for SYRIZA, the party that channelled the anti-austerity movement into the political scene. The model developed to study protest in non-electoral arenas also performs well to explain the success of SYRIZA in the electoral arena, highlighting the reciprocal but understudied relationship between mobilisation and electoral politics.

- In Griechenland lebten 2017 etwa 543.000 Drittstaatsangehörige. Dies entspricht etwa 5 Prozent der Gesamtbevölkerung des Landes. Überwiegend stammen sie aus dem benachbarten Albanien. - Im Unterschied zu den starken Einwanderungswellen der frühen 1990er Jahre hat sich Griechenland im Zuge der Flüchtlingsmigration der letzten Jahre vom Zielland zum Transitland gewandelt. - Gesetze zur Legalisierung von Migranten standen um die Jahrtausendwende im Zentrum der Integrationspolitik des Landes. Darauf folgten ab 2006 erste sozioökonomische Maßnahmen. - Einwanderer sind überwiegend in hochprekären Beschäftigungsverhältnissen angestellt. Die Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise hat ihre Lage im Land erschwert. - Flüchtlinge wurden bisher kaum in den Arbeitsmarkt und die Gesellschaft integriert. Die einheimische Bevölkerung steht deren Integration überwiegend skeptisch gegenüber. - Wo nationale Systeme nicht ausreichen, müssen häufig NGOs oder internationale Organisationen eingreifen. Unter der angespannten wirtschaftlichen Lage und anhaltenden Sparmaßnahmen leidet auch die Integrationspolitik des Landes.

The apparent ubiquity of protest in recent years and the rise of Occupy movements across the world have fuelled claims that a new style of mobilisation is emerging which is markedly different from previous social movements. Analysing a series of original survey data, this article engages with this debate by providing a panoramic account of how the anti-austerity movement evolved in Greece, comparing the drivers of protest in three distinct protest waves. Contrary to expectations, the rise of the Greek version of the Indignados during 2011 did not decisively transform the anti-austerity movement that emerged in 2010, which mainly displayed characteristics typically associated with 'old' social movements. However, elements of the 'new social movements' approach featured more prominently in the third wave of protest, beginning in mid-2012 and culminating in January 2015 with victory for SYRIZA, the party which channelled the anti-austerity movement into the political scene. The model developed to study protest in non-electoral arenas also performs well to explain the success of SYRIZA in the electoral arena, highlighting the reciprocal but understudied relationship between mobilisation and electoral politics.

The apparent ubiquity of protest in recent years and the rise of Occupy movements across the world have fuelled claims that a new style of mobilisation is emerging which is markedly different from previous social movements. Analysing a series of original survey data, this article engages with this debate by providing a panoramic account of how the anti-austerity movement evolved in Greece, comparing the drivers of protest in three distinct protest waves. Contrary to expectations, the rise of the Greek version of the Indignados during 2011 did not decisively transform the anti-austerity movement that emerged in 2010, which mainly displayed characteristics typically associated with 'old' social movements. However, elements of the 'new social movements' approach featured more prominently in the third wave of protest, beginning in mid-2012 and culminating in January 2015 with victory for SYRIZA, the party which channelled the anti-austerity movement into the political scene. The model developed to study protest in non-electoral arenas also performs well to explain the success of SYRIZA in the electoral arena, highlighting the reciprocal but understudied relationship between mobilisation and electoral politics.

The widespread opposition to unprecedented austerity measures in Greece provides a unique opportunity to study the causes of mass protest. This article reports the results of a survey of the adult population in which two-thirds of the respondents supported protest and 29 per cent reported actual involvement in strikes and/or demonstrations during 2010. Relative deprivation is a significant predictor of potential protest, but does not play any role in terms of who takes part in strikes or demonstrations. Previous protest participation emerges as a key predictor of actual protest. This study seeks to place these results within a comparative context, contrasting Greece with other countries facing similar challenges, and discusses the implications for the future of austerity politics. Adapted from the source document.

Can governments that introduce extreme austerity measures survive elections? Contrary to economic voting expectations, the PASOK government in Greece initially appeared to cope quite well, claiming victory in regional elections in 2010 despite widespread anti-austerity protests. In this article, we interpret this result with the help of a post-election survey, which also covered future voting intentions. The explanatory power of models based on theories of economic voting and blame attribution as well as the electoral impact of the government's representation of the crisis as an existential threat are assessed. Our analysis challenges the interpretation of the 2010 election as an indication of support for PASOK's austerity policies and reveals weaknesses in its support base, which help contextualise its downfall in the 2012 parliamentary elections. The article also underlines the importance of studying the impact of crisis discourses on voting choice, particularly since blame attribution receives little support in this case.