Suchergebnisse

Oil prices on global markets have plunged from United States (U.S.) $115 per barrel in mid-June of 2014 to U.S. $48 at end-January 2015, while other fuel prices have continued the slow downward trend of recent years. The rapid decline in oil prices by about 60 percent was accompanied by U.S. dollar appreciation against the major global currencies (except the Swiss franc), partly offsetting the oil price decline measured in currencies other than the dollar. The impact assessment of the oil price shock was conducted using a multi-county, multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, PLACE, maintained by the Center for Climate Policy Analysis (CCPA). The effects of a permanent 60 percent oil price shock are assessed against a baseline scenario through 2020 based on the International Energy Agency (IEA) 2012 world energy outlook assuming a high oil price scenario of U.S. $118 in 2015 and U.S. $128 in 2020 (both in 2010 constant prices) and correlated price changes of coal (by 50 percent), and natural gas (by 30 percent). Model simulations show that, first, oil exporters will suffer substantial double-digit welfare losses through 2020 due to significant deterioration in their terms of trade. Second, the European Union (EU), as a large oil importer, will benefit significantly from lower oil prices, with the new member states being relatively better off, as a consequence of their relatively high energy intensity. Third, if the assumed permanent oil price shock occurs at half the level of the headline 60 percent scenario (proxying for U.S. dollar appreciation or reflecting a rebound in oil prices from their early 2015 levels through 2020), welfare effects will be smaller and less than proportional for most countries. Finally, in the EU, the existing emissions cap constrain the use of cheaper fossil fuels and limits the welfare increase by about 0.5 percentage points. The interpretation of results from the CGE model has been supported by regression, attributing the diversity of the simulated welfare effects by region to certain characteristics of regional economies, such as refined oil products-to- gross domestic product (GDP) and net exports of crude oil-to-GDP ratios.

This study analyzes the performance of social assistance and family benefit programs in eight new member states of the European Union from the perspective of fiscal impact and effectiveness. It is based on household survey data for six of the countries, as well as budget data and information on program design collected at the national level. The paper finds that, although social assistance programs in the new member states are small in terms of coverage and expenditure levels (reaching 2 to 5 percent of the population), the programs are an important safety net for the poor. Programs are relatively well targeted, with between 30 and 60 percent of resources going to the poorest quintile of the population. For those who receive them, benefits can make up as much as 37 percent of average consumption of the poor.

Unilateral climate policy can be detrimental to global climate protection. Our objective is to provide insight into such a policy, to quantify the risk of carbon leakage, and to investigate the effects related to potential anti-leakage measures. We analyze existing definitions of carbon leakage and propose an alternative, rigorous one, which is different in three respects. The definition is then tested using computable general equilibrium analysis of the global economy and decomposition analysis. We identify a list of parameters that affect not only the magnitude but also the sign of the carbon leakage rate. Manipulating elasticities of substitution suggests that carbon leakage can be either positive or negative. Computable general equilibrium models, which are widely applied, including by the European Commission in this area, should be transparent, and their assumptions call for careful validation. We find that emission limits are properly distributed between sectors covered by the European Union Emissions Trading System and other sectors for the first commitment period (ended in 2012) but not for the second one (ending in 2020), where the target for the non-trading sectors should be reduced relative to the target for the trading sectors in order to equlize marginal abatement costs.