Preliminary Material -- Introduction -- Purpose of the Present Study -- Classification of Unilateral Acts -- The Work of the International Law Commission on Unilateral Acts of States -- The Unilateral Nature of Unilateral Juridical Acts -- The Concept of Juridical Acts in International Law -- Unilateral Acts as Juridical Acts -- A Brief Excursus to Unilateral Declarations of Independence -- A Brief Excursus to Unilateral Security Assurances -- Conclusions -- Bibliography -- Index.
"In The Juridical Nature of Unilateral Acts of States in International Law Eva Kassoti explores the question of the legal nature of unilateral acts by focusing on their essential characteristics, namely unilateralism and the manifest intention to be bound. By analysing the legal and factual context surrounding the making of unilateral acts, this volume offers a list of indicators of the elements of unilateralism and manifest intention that will facilitate the determination of the existence of a unilateral juridical act in practice. Kassoti explores the legal nature of unilateral acts from the viewpoint of the theory of international juridical acts and thus, attests to the validity of this theory as a comprehensive framework for the analysis of all juridical acts in international law"--Unedited summary from book cover
On January 17, 2023, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgments in case C-632/20, P Spain v. Commission (Kosovo), ruling that notwithstanding the European Union's non-recognition of Kosovo as a state, Kosovo may participate in an EU agency, namely the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC). The judgment is significant for several reasons: (1) for the European Union's growing engagement with non-recognized territorial entities since it clarifies the meaning of the concept of "third country" and confirms that such entities may participate in EU agencies; (2) for the European Union's engagement with Kosovo—particularly in the light of Kosovo's 2022 bid for EU membership; and (3) more broadly, in the context of the burgeoning debate regarding the CJEU's approach to international law.
The coming of age of the EU as a global actor and the proliferation of its activities on the international plane entail that its courts are increasingly faced with complex and politically laden questions pertaining to territorial entities whose international legal status is far from clear. The EU's engagement with Kosovo is a salient example. Due to strong opposition by some Member States, the EU has not recognized Kosovo as an independent State, but it has developed a policy of engagement therewith. However, this pragmatic approach does not resolve the underlying political tensions and legal questions arising from the EU's dealings with non-recognized territorial entities, as Case C-632/20 P Spain v. Commission (Kosovo) attests to. The judgment is significant: (a) for the EU's growing engagement with non-recognized territorial entities since it clarifies the meaning of the concept of 'third country' and confirms that such entities may participate in EU agencies; (b) for the EU's engagement with Kosovo – particularly in the light of Kosovo's 2022 bid for EU membership; and (c) more broadly, for answering institutional questions pertaining to third-country participation in EU agencies.
AbstractThe article explores the question of interpretation of unilateral acts in international law both from the perspective of ascertaining their binding force (law determination) and from the perspective of ascertaining their content (content determination). It argues that the objective intention of the author to be bound is what distinguishes binding commitments of unilateral origin from non-binding ones. In turn, this involves the interpretation of a unilateral act in accordance with its content and the circumstances surrounding its making. In practice, the use of clear and specific wording in conjunction with a set of contextual indicators are indicia of the intention to create a binding unilateral commitment. Against this backdrop, the article continues by addressing the question of interpretation of unilateral acts from the standpoint of ascertaining their content. It shows that the text of the act is the primary consideration in determining its content—and that its context as well as the circumstances surrounding its making are also interpretative elements that need to be taken into account. Due to the unilateral origin of these acts the interpretative rule applicable to international agreements can only be used as a point of reference when it comes to interpreting the content of these acts. In this light, the article concludes that more practice is needed in order to elucidate the exact role and weight that should be ascribed to non-textual elements in the context of interpreting unilateral acts. At the same time, the article argues in favour of adopting a broader approach to the concept of 'interpretation' in international law. Viewing interpretation not merely as content determination but also as law ascertainment allows us to better assess the persuasive value of arguments in favour or against certain interpretative rules when practice is scant—as is the case with unilateral acts.
First published online: 22 June 2020 ; The Front Polisario cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) brought to the forefront the question of whether the EU is bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights when it concludes trade agreements with third states that may affect the enjoyment of fundamentalrights abroad.This isclosely linked to the broader issue of the extraterritorial application of the Charter. In light of these developments, the article purports to revisit this question with a view to ascertaining the current state of the law. It examines and rejects the argument in favour of transposing the extraterritoriality standard developed by the European Court of Human Rights. Against this backdrop, the article continues by focusing on Article 51 of the Charter, which prescribes the Charter's field of application. The main argument advanced is that territorial considerations are immaterial in the context of determining the Charter's applicability; what seems to matter in this context is whether the situation in question is covered by an European Union (EU) competence.
The EU's identity as a global actor is firmly anchored in a distinct normative and political agenda; it has consistently portrayed itself as a normative power committed to the strict observance of international law. However, more recently, the EU's practice in relation to the conclusion of trade agreements covering occupied territories has increasingly challenged the narrative of "normative power Europe". In this light, the present article attempts a survey of the relevant EU practice by focusing on two case studies: Palestine and Western Sahara. The article argues that, in both cases, the EU has fallen foul of the obligation to promote the right to self-determination and of the corollary obligation of non-recognition. Furthermore, it argues that the EU has adopted a largely inconsistent approach when it comes to the labelling of products originating from occupied territories – something that severely undermines the international credibility and legitimacy of its external action. Overall, this contribution asserts that there is a growing gap between EU identity rhetoric as a promoter of global fundamental values, on the one hand, and realpolitik, on the other.
Abstract The article examines how international constitutionalism has come to grips with the phenomenon of informal law-making by non-State actors. The article identifies two opposing trends within the constitutionalist camp in relation to the question of actor informality. The first strand argues that all normative utterances should be presumed to give rise to law, irrespective of authorship ('presumptive law thesis'). The presumptive law thesis is discussed and rejected on the ground that it rests on a model of participation in decision-making that dramatically departs from the existing one. The article continues by exploring the second strand of constitutionalism, which advocates in favour of retaining the distinction between direct and indirect participation in international decision-making ('the formal/informal participation model'). It is argued that, while this strand of constitutionalism is convincing at the descriptive level, it does not really add much to our existing knowledge. The last part of the article addresses the meta-question of the added value of analysing the phenomenon of actor informality through the lens of constitutionalism. It is argued that, despite its shortcomings, the constitutionalist project bravely attempts to frame the inherently political debate on global governance in legal terms, thereby attesting to the continuing relevance of international law as a regulatory mechanism in modern international relations.
