A Diagramatic Illustration of the Labour Cooperative, a Note
In: The American economist: journal of the International Honor Society in Economics, Omicron Delta Epsilon, Band 30, Heft 1, S. 73-74
ISSN: 2328-1235
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In: The American economist: journal of the International Honor Society in Economics, Omicron Delta Epsilon, Band 30, Heft 1, S. 73-74
ISSN: 2328-1235
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 8, Heft 1, S. 65-71
ISSN: 0165-1889
In: Journal of political economy, Band 87, Heft 1, S. 193-195
ISSN: 1537-534X
In: The Economic Journal, Band 85, Heft 338, S. 338
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 7748
SSRN
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 12466
SSRN
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6570
SSRN
Working paper
In: Journal of economic studies, Band 35, Heft 4, S. 323-332
ISSN: 1758-7387
PurposeThere appears to be a puzzle associated with the observation that individuals both donate and volunteer to charity. If the purpose of a giving individual is to maximize the effect of his/her donation, then he/she should give as effectively as possible. This implies that an individual should donate either time or money but not both. Yet, simultaneous volunteering and donating money is extremely common. Indeed, it may be viewed as the rule rather than the exception. This paper aims to offer a solution to this puzzle.Design/methodology/approachThis theoretical paper models giving behavior by individuals and takes into account the disutility of volunteer and income related work.FindingsBy modeling the difference between an individual's volunteer and income‐related work, it can be understood why individuals' giving behavior of donating money and volunteering.Research limitations/implicationsFuture research should test these findings empirically.Originality/valueTheoretical contribution to our understanding of giving behavior as to why individuals donate money and time even if is not economically efficient to do both.
In: Public choice, Band 133, Heft 1-2, S. 31-40
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 133, Heft 1, S. 31-40
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 21, Heft 2, S. 429-443
In: Economica, Band 71, Heft 283, S. 501-506
ISSN: 1468-0335
The legal owner of a stolen good generally puts a higher value on that good than does the thief. There are therefore potential gains from trade between a legal owner and a successful thief. However, by trading with a thief, the legal owner is encouraging theft for 'ransom'. Should then negotiations between legal owners and thieves be outlawed? In this paper we suggest a framework for answering this question. We find that allowing such negotiations to take place may enhance the ex ante expected utility of owners.
In: Public choice, Band 102, Heft 1, S. 149-162
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Public choice, Band 102, Heft 1-2, S. 151
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 12, Heft 4, S. 599-607