Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality. By Ronald Dworkin. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. Pp. 503. $35.00 (cloth)
In: Social service review: SSR, Band 75, Heft 1, S. 184-187
ISSN: 1537-5404
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In: Social service review: SSR, Band 75, Heft 1, S. 184-187
ISSN: 1537-5404
In: American political science review, Band 95, Heft 3, S. 720-721
ISSN: 0003-0554
In: Welfare in the Kantian State, S. 135-162
In: Welfare in the Kantian State, S. 109-134
In: Welfare in the Kantian State, S. 36-61
In: Welfare in the Kantian State, S. 85-108
In: Welfare in the Kantian State, S. 62-84
In: American political science review, Band 91, Heft 4, S. 807-817
ISSN: 1537-5943
Contemporary communitarians argue that a proper consideration of ontological questions of identity and community forecloses deontological liberalism as a viable option, since deontological liberalism cannot ground a sufficiently strong form of immediate identification with the ethical life of the community. Hegel's ethical theory constitutes perhaps the most fully realized account of such identification. Yet, I argue, Hegel's ethics does not require the strong form of immediate identification required by communitarians. My analysis emphasizes the strands in Hegel's account which suggest that a weaker form of identification, reconcilable with deontological liberalism, can plausibly ground a stable form of civil society. In particular, Hegel's notion of patriotic trust is designed to ground both a direct and a reflective relation between individuals and their ethical and political tradition. Hegel's analysis anticipates and offers insights to supplement recent accounts of trust as a form of social capital.
In: The journal of political philosophy, Band 5, Heft 1, S. 69-92
ISSN: 1467-9760
In: American political science review, Band 91, Heft 4, S. 807-817
ISSN: 0003-0554
Contemporary communitarians argue that a proper consideration of ontological questions of identity and community forecloses deontological liberalism as a viable option, since deontological liberalism cannot ground a suffiently strong form of immediate identification with the ethical life of the community. Hegel's ethical theory constitutes perhaps the most fully realized account of such identification. Yet, I argue, Hegel's ethics does not require the strong form of immediate identification required by communitarians. My analysis emphasizes the strands in Hegel's account which suggest that a weaker form of identification, reconcilable with deontological liberalism, can plausibly ground a stable form of civil society. In particular, Hegel's notion of patriotic trust is designed to ground both a direct and a reflective relation between individuals and their ethical and political tradition. Hegel's analysis anticipates and offers insights to supplement recent accounts of trust as a form of social capital. (American Political Science Review / FUB)
World Affairs Online
In: The review of politics, Band 59, Heft 1, S. 25-52
ISSN: 0034-6705
In: The journal of political philosophy, Band 5, Heft 1, S. 69-92
ISSN: 0963-8016
In: The review of politics, Band 59, Heft 1, S. 25-52
ISSN: 1748-6858
Rousseau and Kant both argue for contractarian theories of justice. In spite of their common contractarianism, however, Rousseau and Kant argue for conceptions of legitimacy which differ markedly. The substantive differences between their accounts of legitimacy, I suggest, illustrate the political implications of disagreement regarding the status of practical reason. Rousseau, in assigning reason to a merely instrumental status, anticipates both postmodern and empiricist skepticism regarding the power of reason to ground the choice of ends. Kant is the forerunner of contemporary accounts of justice which reject such skeptical views of practical reason. Rousseau's skepticism about practical reason ties his criterion of legitimacy directly to the actual preferences of individuals. Kant's more robust conception of practical reason (1) allows him to argue for a criterion of great generality and flexibility, but (2) ties the plausibility of his account of legitimacy directly to the soundness of his conception of practical reason.