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AbstractBackgroundWork on whites' mobility behavior finds that they tend to move to less diverse neighborhoods than minorities. Work on white mobility preferences finds that whites who dislike diversity prefer less diverse neighborhoods. Do liberal whites practice what they preach, and do conservative whites really avoid diversity?ObjectiveCombine data on white ethnocentrism and migration behavior to analyze liberal and conservative white mobility in the United Kingdom and the United States.MethodOrdered logit and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models of destination choice predicted by attitudes toward Brexit, Trump, and immigration.ResultsWhites select significantly less diverse neighborhoods than nonwhites, but there is little or no racial difference in the destinations that white liberals and conservatives, British Brexiteers and Remainers, and American Trump supporters and opponents move to.ConclusionEthnicity matters for segregation, but conscious white ethnocentrism is much less important. Future work could explore unconscious ethnocentrism, differing ethnic information about neighborhoods or ethnically divergent amenities as potential explanations.

AbstractBackgroundA set of 'New Culture Wars' over questions of majority identity protection and free speech have become important in American politics, but have not received attention from empirical political scienceObjectiveCompare the relative size of partisan differences on issues of 'Cancel Culture' and 'Critical Race Theory'.MethodLogistic regression models using attitudes toward real‐world Cancel Culture and Critical Race Theory examples to predict partisanship.ResultsData show that Republican voters are no more likely to fear career consequences or dismissal for speech than Democrats. Republicans are also more opposed to teaching critical perspectives on race and history in schools than they are to employees being fired for dissenting speech within organizations. Strong white identifiers are both more opposed to diversity training which emphasizes white racism and less opposed to firing people for disputed cases of racist or sexist speech.ConclusionDue to the distinctive moral foundations of conservative voters, this paper argues that perceived attacks on white and American identity are a more powerful source of grievance for Republican voters than concerns over freedom of expression. It is hypothesized that the conservative moral foundation of group loyalty helps to explain these findings.

AbstractAs the white share of America continues to decline, white identity is becoming more important for politics. I show that white identity is considerably stronger among whites who are attached to their ancestry, i.e. Irish, 'American' or Italian. Accordingly, we should see it as more reflective of cultural attachment than a desire for politico-economic advantage. In addition, a separate dynamic I term ethno-traditional American nationalism, is important. This is not white nationalism, but a form of American national identity in which ethnocultural elements form an important part but do not, like the American accent, form a condition of equal national membership. Ethno-traditional nationalism is about the 'what is American' question of symbolic attachment, rather than the 'who is American' question of which groups belong and are excluded, that has received the lion's share of academic attention.

AbstractThe rise of the populist right in the West is emerging as the most discussed manifestation of nationalism in the world today. In this paper, I argue that this 'new nationalism' is largely driven by immigration, which affects ethnic majorities within nation‐states. This in turn alters the ethnic character of the nation, challenging what I term the ethno‐traditions of nationhood. Our inherited concepts of ethnic and civic nationalism were developed in an earlier period when immigration was limited and territorial revisionism animated nationalist movements. Only on the furthest reaches of the extreme right is the worldview one of ethnic nationalism. In our demographically churning yet territorially static western world, we need a new term to describe the cultural nationalism of the anti‐immigration right. I characterise this as ethno‐traditional nationalism, a variety of nationalism which seeks to protect the traditional preponderance of ethnic majorities through slower immigration and assimilation but which does not seek to close the door entirely to migration or exclude minorities from national membership.

Britain's vote to leave the European Union highlights the importance of White majority opposition to immigration. This article presents the results of a survey experiment examining whether priming an open form of ethno-nationalism based on immigrant assimilation reduces hostility to immigration and support for right-wing populism in Britain. Results show that drawing attention to the idea that assimilation leaves the ethnic majority unchanged significantly reduces hostility to immigration and support for Hard Brexit in the UK. Treatment effects are strongest among UK Independence Party, Brexit and White working-class voters. This is arguably the first example of an experimental treatment leading to more liberal immigration policy preferences.