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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction -- Why a Rethink? -- U.S. Interests and Strategic Goals in a Changing Regional and Global Environment -- A Road Map for Building An Alternative Regional Strategy: Organization of the Report -- CHAPTER TWO: Toward Aligning Partnerships with U.S. Interests -- The Rationale for Partnerships -- Partnership Challenges and Mitigation Measures -- Past Experience Prioritizing Among Partners -- Themes of U.S. Partnerships in the Middle East -- Current Prioritization of Partners -- Risks of Current Prioritization -- Neglected Opportunities -- Toward a New Framework for Middle East Partnerships -- CHAPTER THREE: Managing Adversaries -- Dealing with Iran -- Addressing Shi'a Militias -- Syria: Mitigating the Damage -- The Sunni Extremist Threat -- Conclusion -- CHAPTER FOUR: Global Competitors in the Middle East -- Chinese and Russian Interests in the Middle East -- Chinese and Russian Actions in the Middle East -- China and Russia in a Reimagined U.S. Middle East Policy -- Conclusion: Great Powers as an Adjunct to U.S. Policy -- CHAPTER FIVE: Recalibrating Policy Tools -- U.S. Policy Tools -- The Case for Rebalance -- Current Apportionment of U.S. Assistance -- Security Cooperation -- Force Posture -- Changing the Balance from Military to Nonmilitary Tools: A Paradigm Shift -- Conclusion -- CHAPTER SIX: Conclusion -- The Case for a Policy Reset -- Strategic Adjustments Required by a New Strategy -- Key Findings -- Policy Recommendations -- Sustainable Partnerships, Strategic Investments: Toward a New U.S. Strategy in the Middle East -- APPENDIX: A. Security-Focused Grants and Sales to Middle East Partners.

Arabs and Israelis have battled one another in political and military arenas, seemingly continuously, for some fifty years. The 1991 Madrid Peace Conference sought to change this pattern, launching bilateral and multilateral tracks in the Arab-Israeli peace process. As a result, a broad group of Arab states sat down with Israel and began to cooperate on a wide range of regional issues in what became known as the Middle East multilaterals. Yet why did enemies reluctant even to recognize one another choose to cooperate on regional problems? And once this process began, what drove the partie

Rethinking track two diplomacy -- Key issues and questions -- The state of the field -- A normative framework -- Defining track two -- Applying track two -- A regional focus -- Historical precedents -- Comparing the Middle East and South Asia -- Roles for track two dialogues -- Socialization of participating elites: creating a constituency for regional cooperation -- Filtering: making others' ideas your own -- Transmission: turning ideas into new policies -- Limits of track two dialogues -- Regional security dialogues in the Middle East -- Introduction -- Overview of dialogues -- UCLA and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation -- The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) -- The search for common ground -- Depaul University -- United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) -- Cooperative Monitoring Center -- Canadian-sponsored maritime activities -- The U.S. Geological Survey and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory: regional seismic monitoring cooperation project -- European-sponsored activities -- Gulf security track two forums -- Roles -- Socialization -- Filtering -- Policy impact -- Limits -- Elites -- Domestic constraints -- The regional environment -- Conclusion -- Regional security dialogues in South Asia -- Introduction -- Overview of dialogues -- Neemrana process -- Balusa group -- Kashmir Study Group (KSG) -- Shanghai process -- Stimson Center dialogues -- CSIS meetings on nuclear risk reduction centres (NRRCs) -- Cooperative Monitoring Center, Sandia National Laboratories -- Maritime activities: the confidence and cooperation in South Asian Waters Project -- Roles -- Socialization -- Filtering -- Policy impact -- Limits -- Elites -- Domestic constraints -- Regional environment -- Conclusion -- Conclusion -- Central arguments -- Regional comparisons -- Regional lessons -- Improving track two dialogues -- Expand the types of participants -- Create or strengthen institutional support and mentors for track two activities -- Localize the dialogues -- Bibliography

The US & Europe are not bound to cooperate in the Middle East, but they are also not fated to conflict. Rather, cooperation must be actively cultivated to forge common strategic approaches, such as these, that can no longer be taken for granted. Adapted from the source document.