1 Introduction -- 2 Nation-building and the Afghan state -- 3 Bureaucratic politics and Nation-building -- 4 The US Foreign Policy Bureaucracy and Nation-building in Afghanistan -- 5 Security -- 6 Infrastructure Development -- 7 Counter-Narcotics, Law & Governance -- 8 The Failure of collaborative Mechanisms -- 9 Provincial Reconstruction teams: -- 10 Conclusion.
Why has the US so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominant explanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflicts inside the US state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistan by exploring the significant role of these divisions in the US's difficulties in the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. The main objective of the book is to deepen readers' understanding of the impact of bureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on the Bush administration. It rejects the 'rational actor' model, according to which the US functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions within the foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internal tensions and contradictions that bedevilled US nation-building efforts.
Why has the US so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominant explanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflicts inside the US state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistan by exploring the significant role of these divisions in the US’s difficulties in the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. The main objective of the book is to deepen readers’ understanding of the impact of bureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on the Bush administration. It rejects the ‘rational actor’ model, according to which the US functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions within the foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internal tensions and contradictions that bedevilled US nation-building efforts. The book also contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the US should engage in nation-building at all, and if so under what conditions.
Why has the U.S. so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominant explanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflicts inside the U.S. state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistan by exploring the significant role of these divisions in the U.S.'s difficulties in the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. The main objective of the book is to deepen readers' understanding of the impact of bureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on the Bush administration. It rejects the 'rational actor' model, according to which the U.S. functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions within the foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internal tensions and contradictions that bedevilled U.S. nation-building efforts. The book also contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the U.S. should engage in nation-building at all, and if so under what conditions.
Why has the US so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominant explanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflicts inside the US state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistan by exploring the significant role of these divisions in the US's difficulties in the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. The main objective of the book is to deepen readers' understanding of the impact of bureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on theBush administration. It rejects the "rational actor" model, according to which theUS functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions within the foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internal tensions and contradictions that bedevilled US nation-building efforts. The book also contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the US should engage in nation-building at all, and if so under what conditions.
Why has the US so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominantexplanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflictsinside the US state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistanby exploring the significant role of these divisions in the US’s difficultiesin the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. Themain objective of the book is to deepen readers’ understanding of the impact ofbureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on theBush administration. It rejects the ‘rational actor’ model, according to which theUS functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions withinthe foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internaltensions and contradictions that bedevilled US nation-building efforts. The bookalso contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the US should engage innation-building at all, and if so under what conditions.
A compelling case can be made to develop a NATO's missile defence system in response to the advancement of missile technology and the danger of nuclear weapons. However, this development also undermines Russia's retaliatory capacity, and consequently heightens the offensive potential of nuclear weapons. This article explores the offence/defence posture of NATO's missile defence plans in terms of both capabilities and strategy. It is argued that NATO is incrementally increasing the strength and reach of its missile defence components, while rejecting any international treaty to regulate and limit their future expansion. This corresponds with a strategy of achieving invulnerability through counterforce and utilising NATO as an 'insurance policy' against Russia, to be activated when conflicts arise. We conclude that NATO has the capacity to distinguish between an offensive and defensive posture by discriminating between potential targets, but it has displayed no intention to do so.