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Even thought the concept of personal identity enjoys great popularity in normative debates about the public standing of culture, nationalism, and civic equality, the concept itself remain very unclear. In various disciplines, including sociology, social psychology, and psychoanalysis, that concept has different meanings, which stands in the way of its unambiguous use in political theory debates. An important obstacle to the clearer delineation of the concept of identity is methodological, and concerns the disagreement over the correct approach to studying identity. One of the most influential participants in this debate is Charles Taylor, who argues that identity cannot be defined as a property of individuals, but only as a property of social groups. If plausible, this view undermines all variants of the liberal approach to identity, which all maintain that the worth of identity must be understood in relation to the rights and interests of individuals. This paper examines the plausibility of Taylor's argument, and defends the possibility of individualism about identity. Adapted from the source document.

This paper examines the concept of self-identity as a factor that influences agents' choices in moral conflicts. The main questions it concerns itself with are whether there is a connection between self-identity & reasoning in moral dilemmas &, given the strong reasons to believe that such a connection exists, how we should most properly understand self-identity. I examine some of the most notable recent contributions on the topic of personal identity, those of Sandel & Taylor, & find them wanting because of their one-sided interpretation of identity. I follow Rorty & Wong in arguing for a more heterogeneous concept of self-identity, which would respect the various diverse sources of personal identification. After discussing briefly the types & sources of moral conflict, the paper examines two widely accepted accounts of reasoning in moral dilemmas, the position of particularist rationality & the quasi-existentialist position. This is done with reference to the two main issues of interest here, the extent to which these accounts acknowledge the importance of self-identity for moral conflict reasoning, & the plausibility of their conceptions of personal identity. The Aristotelian position of contextual reasoning is deemed unsatisfactory because it does not include considerations of self-identity among the resources for resolving the hard choices, & because it suffers from certain conceptual flaws. The quasi-existentialist approach to reasoning in moral conflicts pays more attention to agents' self-identifications. However, it is found unconvincing because it focuses solely on one aspect of the agent's heterogeneous identity, arguing that adopting a holistic view of one's life requires choosing in line with the kind of person one wants to become. Conversely, this paper argues that agents can maintain the feeling that their choices are connected to one another by consistently choosing in line with any of their diverse identifications. 23 References. Adapted from the source document.

This article integrates empirical and normative discussions about why global economic inequalities matter in critically examining an approach known as derivative global egalitarianism (DGE). DGE is a burgeoning perspective that opposes excessive global economic inequality not based on the intrinsic value of equality but inequality's negative repercussions on other values. The article aims to advance the research agenda by identifying and critically evaluating four primary varieties of DGE arguments from related but distinct literatures, which span a number of disciplines, including economics, international relations, and political philosophy. Overall, DGE offers a number of persuasive arguments as to why current levels of global inequality are of concern, but aspects of DGE beg further philosophical and empirical examination. By situating DGE within the wider theoretical and empirical contexts, this article provides resources for its critical assessment and theoretical development.