Suchergebnisse

Abstract
Within the study of mediation, a common argument is that mediators are often successful because they provide credible information to combatants thereby reducing asymmetries of information. Unfortunately, there are a number of reasons to assume that rebel groups are providing misinformation to mediators as well as to the government. Equally, mediators must also deal with an incumbent government that may not be negotiating in good faith. This study suggests that rebel group structure may assist with this problem. Rebel groups that operate parallel political wings often inadvertently signal their reservation points in an effort to mobilize support. Mediators also seek signals that the government is willing to credibly commit to a settlement. Leadership turnover may be one such signal, as new leaders are not beholden to old vested interests. To evaluate these propositions, a statistical test of mediation efforts in civil wars is conducted from 1989 to 2005.

New research has emerged that suggests there is a troubling relationship between elections and civil wars; primarily, elections increase the risk of civil war recurrence. I investigate this relationship further by examining the economic factors associated with the connection between postwar elections and peace failure. Specifically, how does the presence of oil wealth impact the risk posed by postwar elections. Drawing on previous findings in the democratization literature, I suggest the immobility of oil wealth dramatically increases the stakes associated with postwar elections. As postwar elites use irregular electioneering to consolidate their control of oil revenue, it increases the incentives for postwar opposition to use violence as a means to achieve their objectives. Using post-civil war data from 1945 to 2005, I demonstrate that postwar elections that occur in oil-rich economies dramatically decrease the durability of postwar peace. Once controlling for petro elections, though, I demonstrate that subsequent postwar elections actually increase the durability of postwar peace.

New research has emerged that suggests there is a troubling relationship between elections and civil wars; primarily, elections increase the risk of civil war recurrence. I investigate this relationship further by examining the economic factors associated with the connection between postwar elections and peace failure. Specifically, how does the presence of oil wealth impact the risk posed by postwar elections. Drawing on previous findings in the democratization literature, I suggest the immobility of oil wealth dramatically increases the stakes associated with postwar elections. As postwar elites use irregular electioneering to consolidate their control of oil revenue, it increases the incentives for postwar opposition to use violence as a means to achieve their objectives. Using post-civil war data from 1945 to 2005, I demonstrate that postwar elections that occur in oil-rich economies dramatically decrease the durability of postwar peace. Once controlling for petro elections, though, I demonstrate that subsequent postwar elections actually increase the durability of postwar peace.

As part of a recent effort to bridge the studies of terrorism and civil war, new research has begun to emerge on the use of terrorism by rebel groups as a strategy of war. Building on these findings, we examine the role of affiliated political wings in shaping the use of terrorism by rebel groups during civil wars. We contend that the presence of an affiliated political wing during the civil war should increase the use of terrorism by rebel groups only in countries where there are relatively few restrictions on the freedom of the press. As political wings are often designed to engage with the civilian population through the dissemination of information, these apparatuses are in a key position to frame the use of terrorism as part of the rebel's broader war effort. To test this proposition, we examine the use of terrorism by all rebel groups from 1970 to 2011. The results from the analysis provide strong support for our argument that political wings increase the use of terrorism by rebel groups only when the press is allowed to independently cover terrorist attacks.

New research has begun to underscore the complicated relationship between democratic institutions and the duration of civil wars. Specifically, greater constraints placed on executives often lead to considerably longer civil wars as leaders are limited in how they bargain with dissidents. This presents a puzzle as democracies are often seen as credible negotiators in international disputes. This article suggests that the size of the government's winning coalition represents a double-edged sword. Larger winning coalitions allow governments to bargain more credibly but also place constraints on what governments can offer since peace agreements may alienate coalition members. Fortunately, future access to postwar oil wealth provides the feasibility for the governments to compensate hard-liners who may lose out on any settlement, making them more likely to allow concessions to rebels. This combined credibility of large winning coalitions and the feasibility provided by oil wealth allows for peace agreements, therefore shortening the duration of civil wars. We test these propositions by examining the conditional relationship between oil wealth and coalition size on the duration of all civil wars between 1950 and 2009.

Abstract
Despite decades of rigorous research on the use of government-sponsored violence in armed conflicts, there remains significant uncertainty as to when and where leaders choose to target civilians in war. We argue that the variation in the use of state repression is explained in part by how soldiers perceive battlefield gains by rebel forces. Specifically, while strong opposition forces are often a necessary condition for elites convincing agents to engage in state-sponsored brutality, this is modified by the soldiers' beliefs surrounding the outcome of the war. If government soldiers believe that rebels are likely to win the war, we posit that they will likely shirk orders to target civilians, fearing post-war accountability. We test this argument by examining subnational variation in battlefield dynamics and the use of government one-sided violence from 1992 to 2010.

Despite decades of rigorous research on the use of government-sponsored violence in armed conflicts, there remains significant uncertainty as to when and where leaders choose to target civilians in war. We argue that the variation in the use of state repression is explained in part by how soldiers perceive battlefield gains by rebel forces. Specifically, while strong opposition forces are often a necessary condition for elites convincing agents to engage in state-sponsored brutality, this is modified by the soldiers' beliefs surrounding the outcome of the war. If government soldiers believe that rebels are likely to win the war, we posit that they will likely shirk orders to target civilians, fearing post-war accountability. We test this argument by examining subnational variation in battlefield dynamics and the use of government one-sided violence from 1992 to 2010.

Within the study of intrastate armed conflicts, many scholars rely on a bargaining model when explaining why some civil wars are intractable. Primarily, scholars posit that commitment problems represent a key barrier to settling conflicts through negotiations. Yet, some civil wars are more easily resolved than others. If commitment problems are a universal feature of civil wars, what explains why commitment problems are more salient in some conflicts as compared to others? We argue that ideological differences between combatants enhance commitment problems in civil wars. Assuming that ideology is used by combatants to generate support, concessions that violate the ideological goals of each side may alienate supporters. With extreme ideological polarization, concessions may be viewed as relative as opposed to absolute, making it difficult for either side to credibly commit to offer concessions. To test these claims, we quantitatively examine the duration and outcome of all intrastate conflicts from 1975 to 2011.

In this article, we argue that because governments fear that accepting mediation and reaching agreements with opponents may signal weakness to other potential challengers, civil war governments tend to resist mediation as a means of demonstrating their resolve. Building on current theories of reputation in civil war, we argue that the threat of future challenges from other groups is likely to be particularly acute in states with multiple ethnic groups, especially states with high levels of ethnic exclusion. We therefore expect that civil wars in these states will be less likely to see mediation and to produce agreements when they do. By examining all instances of mediation in intrastate conflict from 1990 to 2008, we test this argument empirically and find that mediation is more likely to emerge in civil wars where there are a large number of ethnic groups, but is less likely to occur when many of those ethnic groups are excluded from the political process. Once mediation is underway, however, it is less likely to yield a negotiated settlement when there are a large number of ethnic groups, but more likely to end in a negotiated settlement when many of the ethnic groups are excluded from the political process.

New research has begun to underscore the complicated relationship between democratic institutions and the duration of civil wars. Specifically, greater constraints placed on executives often lead to considerably longer civil wars as leaders are limited in how they bargain with dissidents. This presents a puzzle as democracies are often seen as credible negotiators in international disputes. This article suggests that the size of the government's winning coalition represents a double-edged sword. Larger winning coalitions allow governments to bargain more credibly but also place constraints on what governments can offer since peace agreements may alienate coalition members. Fortunately, future access to postwar oil wealth provides the feasibility for the governments to compensate hard-liners who may lose out on any settlement, making them more likely to allow concessions to rebels. This combined credibility of large winning coalitions and the feasibility provided by oil wealth allows for peace agreements, therefore shortening the duration of civil wars. We test these propositions by examining the conditional relationship between oil wealth and coalition size on the duration of all civil wars between 1950 and 2009.

Land reform has been depicted by some as an effective element of counterinsurgency strategy in nations experiencing peasant-based civil conflict. While some studies have argued that land reform reduces civilian support for insurgency, other research has demonstrated that these reforms are often undermined by brutal state repression. The study of land reform has also been driven largely by qualitative case study research, which has limited what we know about the cross-national efficacy of these reforms. This study contributes to the current literature by looking at the efficacy of land reform as part of the post-civil war peace process. Specifically, we examine whether land reform provisions included in comprehensive peace agreements reduce the risk of renewed civil war. Measuring the risk of civil war recurrence in all comprehensive peace agreements from 1989–2012, we find that the inclusion of land reform provisions in the post-war peace process substantially reduces the risk of renewed fighting.

Land reform has been depicted by some as an effective element of counterinsurgency strategy in nations experiencing peasant-based civil conflict. While some studies have argued that land reform reduces civilian support for insurgency, other research has demonstrated that these reforms are often undermined by brutal state repression. The study of land reform has also been driven largely by qualitative case study research, which has limited what we know about the cross-national efficacy of these reforms. This study contributes to the current literature by looking at the efficacy of land reform as part of the post-civil war peace process. Specifically, we examine whether land reform provisions included in comprehensive peace agreements reduce the risk of renewed civil war. Measuring the risk of civil war recurrence in all comprehensive peace agreements from 1989–2012, we find that the inclusion of land reform provisions in the post-war peace process substantially reduces the risk of renewed fighting.