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"This book provides a comprehensive introduction to general equilibrium theory, covering the standard topics as well as the developments of the theory over the past fifty years. This ensures that the reader gains a thorough account of what has been established both in pure theory and in applications. In addition to the basic topics, this book elaborates on fields which are relevant but not mentioned frequently in this context. The material covered includes international trade, growth, finance and implementation, and it offers a broader view than what is usual in texts on general equilibrium theory. This book would make for suitable reading for undergraduate and graduate courses in macroeconomics"--Publisher's website

"As a relatively young discipline, health economics as it appears today contains many features which can be traced back to its beginnings. Since it arose in the interface between the medical sciences and economics, the way of dealing with problems were often influenced by traditions which were well-established in the medical profession, while the classical way of thinking of economists came was filtering through at a slower pace. This means that much of both teaching and research in health economics puts the emphasis on collecting and analysing data on health and healthcare as well as on public and private outlays on healthcare. This is an extreme useful and worthwhile activity, and much new and valuable information is produced in this way, but occasionally there is a need for in-depth understanding of what is going on, rather than an estimated equation which comes from nowhere. This is where economic theory can offer some support. The present book is an introduction to health economics where the emphasis is on theory, with the aim of providing explanation of phenomena as far as possible given the current level of economics."--Publisher's website

"Economics of Banking presents a thorough overview and analysis of the key aspects of financial intermediation necessary to understand this field. Based on the latest theory, and supporting arguments with practical examples, Hans Keiding discusses the problems of competition, risk taking in banks and the irregularities that may occur as a result. Banks in distress and avoiding bank failures through suitable regulation are also treated in a rigorous, yet easy-to-understand way. Economics of Banking: [bullet] treats financial intermediation both from the point of view of the bank itself and from that of society [bullet] covers both microeconomics of banking and risk management in banks [bullet] offers more complicated mathematics as optional A comprehensive advanced undergraduate or master's level textbook for students in banking, economics and finance who need to get to grips with the economic theory of banks"--

AbstractWe present a simple model of research, in which it is possible to compare the cost of private versus public research activity. The principal aim is to find conditions under which private firms might decide to provide funding, partially or fully, for research carried out by public research organizations. Since the underlying research problem is given, differences in cost depend mainly on the contracts between the firm or the public organization on one side and the researchers employed in the project on the other, together with the incentives which are implied by these contracts. We find that under suitable assumptions it is advantageous for the private firm to outsource its research to a public organization. The free access for the general public to research results obtained by public research organizations may however be an obstacle to outsourcing, unless some public funding is forthcoming.

We view political activity as an interaction between forces seeking to achieve a political agenda. The viability of a situation depends on the compatibility of such agendas. However even in a conflictual situation a compromise may be possible. Mathematically a political structure is modeled as a simplicial complex and a viable configuration as a simplex. A represented compromise is a viable configuration obtained by the withdrawal of some agents in favor of some friendly representatives. A delegated compromise is a sophisticated version of a compromise obtained by the iteration of the withdrawal process. Existence of such solutions depends on the discrete topology of the simplicial complex. In particular we prove that the existence of a delegated compromise is equivalent to the strong contractibility of the simplicial complex.

We view political activity as an interaction between forces seeking to achieve a political agenda. The viability of a situation depends on the compatibility of such agendas. However even in a conflictual situation a compromise may be possible. Mathematically a political structure is modeled as a simplicial complex and a viable configuration as a simplex. A represented compromise is a viable configuration obtained by the withdrawal of some agents in favor of some friendly representatives. A delegated compromise is a sophisticated version of a compromise obtained by the iteration of the withdrawal process. Existence of such solutions depends on the discrete topology of the simplicial complex. In particular we prove that the existence of a delegated compromise is equivalent to the strong contractibility of the simplicial complex.

We view political activity as an interaction between forces seeking to achieve a political agenda. The viability of a situation depends on the compatibility of such agendas. However even in a conflictual situation a compromise may be possible. Mathematically a political structure is modeled as a simplicial complex and a viable configuration as a simplex. A represented compromise is a viable configuration obtained by the withdrawal of some agents in favor of some friendly representatives. A delegated compromise is a sophisticated version of a compromise obtained by the iteration of the withdrawal process. Existence of such solutions depends on the discrete topology of the simplicial complex. In particular we prove that the existence of a delegated compromise is equivalent to the strong contractibility of the simplicial complex.

Front Cover; Microeconomics: Institutions, Equilibrium and Optimality; Copyright Page; INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES; PREFACE; Table of Contens; Chapter 1. FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS; 1.1. What is Microeconomics?; 1.2. General systems; 1.3. Agents and commodities; 1.4. Institutions; 1.5. Choice situations; one agent; 1.6. Group choice and aggregation of preferences; 1.7. Social choice and manipulation; 1.8. Strategic behaviour: Game Theory; 1.9. Remarks; Chapter 2. THE CONSUMER; 2.1. Consumption sets; 2.2. The utility function; 2.3. Consumer behaviour in the market. The demand function.