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This paper presents a historical-institutionalist perspective on the EU's current efforts to modernise its development policy and reform its various relationships with third countries. Applying concepts that endogenise institutional change, the analysis looks into the origin and basis of the policy and describes the various types of development partnership that the EU pursues with third countries. The paper subsequently analyses the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy and the negotiations on EU-ACP post-2020, with a specific focus on how the development of these partnerships over time affects current EU efforts to seek to move beyond donor-recipient relations. It observes a gap between the reform-oriented discourse and the relative continuity in relationships over time, which serves to secure both the support of reform-oriented actors and those seeking to preserve the status quo. Repetition of this strategy over time combined with the need to launch new initiatives as well as changing circumstances affect this broad-based consensus and the legitimacy of the partnerships concerned.

The United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development starts from the premise that global development depends equally on domestic policy action as on international cooperation. The EU strongly pushed for such a 'universal' agenda and called for reviewing the alignment of existing policies to the new agenda in reference to its legal commitment to promoting Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). This article analyses key trends in development evaluation since the 1980s, operationalizes the concept of PCD for evaluation purposes, and assesses the EU's evaluation performance. The findings show a discrepancy between the Union's ambitious 2030 Agenda position and its sub-optimal performance in evaluating PCD. Instrumental use of PCD in international negotiations to push for burden-sharing in development cooperation, an evaluation function focused on defending spending, diverging Member State support, as well as sheer methodological challenges explain this discontinuity that affects the EU's credibility as a norm maker.

Abstract: "The United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development starts from the premise that global development depends equally on domestic policy action as on international cooperation. The EU strongly pushed for such a 'universal' agenda and called for reviewing the alignment of existing policies to the new agenda in reference to its legal commitment to promoting Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). This article analyses key trends in development evaluation since the 1980s, operationalizes the concept of PCD for evaluation purposes, and assesses the EU's evaluation performance. The findings show a discrepancy between the Union's ambitious 2030 Agenda position and its sub-optimal performance in evaluating PCD. Instrumental use of PCD in international negotiations to push for burden-sharing in development cooperation, an evaluation function focused on defending spending, diverging Member State support, as well as sheer methodological challenges explain this discontinuity that affects the EU's credibility as a norm maker."

This paper analyses the policies and priorities of the governments of Cambodia and Malawi with respect to capacity development support (CDS), based on secondary research evidence and perceptions of effectiveness from a wide range of stakeholders. The study concentrates on the two governments' overall objectives and strategies on CDS and contrasts these to the situation in the health and education sectors, as two sectors that generate a strong need for capacity development and attract a significant portion of development cooperation. While CDS is provided in many forms, this study has restricted its analysis to dedicated events and advisory services. The study findings describe a political economy whereby all involved actors have few incentives to radically change the way in which CDS is managed. Instead, ineffective practices are largely reproduced over time, as none of the actors experience any direct costs or consequences for doing so, as well as no direct rewards for change. While some donors have introduced important reforms, the government remains best-placed to fundamentally break through this cycle of low effectiveness. As per these overall findings, this study concludes that it is not formal strategies and policy frameworks, but individual perceptions and attitudes of government officials that decisively influence the role and ability of CDS to support government and develop capacity. In aid-dependent and low-income countries such as Cambodia and Malawi, longer-term CDS interventions are more likely to be effective and sustainable when they promote adaptive and teamwork-oriented approaches under the leadership of strong and respected government officials.

This paper analyses to what extent the aid and development effectiveness agenda has been applied in the area of capacity development support, with a specific focus on the use of developing country systems. The paper is based on a literature review and a limited number of semi-structured interviews, as well as a review of available research evidence on capacity development support practices in Mozambique, Nepal, Rwanda and Vietnam. Three main conclusions are drawn from this paper. First of all, available research confirms that aid and development effectiveness achievements in the area of capacity development have been slow and disappointing, owing to reform-resistance of key stakeholders involved. Secondly, considerable potential remains to strengthen the effectiveness of capacity development support by further adapting approaches to design, deliver and evaluate interventions in reference to key aid and development effectiveness principles. Third, a lack of disaggregation of statistics and low investments in evaluation inhibits learning and accountability, and ultimately the improvement of capacity development results.

Development cooperation encompasses a multitude of accountability relations that do not automatically complement one another. In practice, the strong accountability needs of donor constituencies create perverse incentives to bypass developing-country institutions in an effort to seek "value for money" for "their" development assistance. This reality contrasts with international commitments made to use country systems – i.e. developing countries' own arrangements and procedures for public sector planning, budgeting and accountability – as the default option for development assistance. During the 2011 High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, the strengthening of effective institutions was identified as a principal means for improving accountability; the process of strengthening institutions should be led by developing countries, whereas donors committed to providing capacity-development (CD) support. Most of this support comes in the form of technical cooperation, which takes up a large chunk of official development assistance (ODA). This includes a large variety of actions, including training, twinning, studies and – taking up the bulk of the assistance – short- or long-term experts. It was recognised during discussions in Busan that the effectiveness of CD support ultimately depends on the quality of the relationship between the parties involved. In the public sector, this implies optimising the use of country systems. Seven fundamental changes should be sought to ensure effective and accountable CD support: 1. Ensure that developing countries lead in identifying and articulating demand for CD support. 2. Jointly discuss all possible options for CD support and be fully transparent on financial details for each. 3. Jointly identify CD support objectives and the approach to financing, and make these details available to all relevant stakeholders. 4. Phase out formal and informal tying of support. 5. Regardless of the procurement approach chosen, ensure that developing countries lead recruitment decisions for CD support. 6. Clarify managerial responsibility and ensure that support is primarily accountable to beneficiaries. 7. Ensure full developing-country involvement in monitoring and evaluation of CD support, and that monitoring promotes variation and adaption. Developing countries and their international partners can gain much from pursuing these changes. Optimising the use of country systems presents costs to all involved, but not paying these is clearly more expensive. Despite the lapse of international interest in the aidand development-effectiveness agenda, a stronger and context-sensitive promotion of the use of country systems for CD support remains important, given the strong investments made and the many partners involved

The proposal by the European Union (EU) to build a "Global Gateway" to the world is potentially an important juncture in EU foreign relations. Since its official launch in December 2021, most attention has been put on the initiative's geo­strategic implications and whether the EU can compete with China. Less attention has been paid to the Global Gateway's implications for EU development policy in terms of strategic objectives, decision-making, thematic focus and financing. Two aspects are important in this regard. The first is whether the Global Gateway is a serious proposal that can deliver on its headline promises to massively increase European infrastructure financing in developing countries, provide partners with an alternative economic and political model to that being offered by China, and make a meaningful contribution to their efforts to realise the 2030 Agenda. The EU's announcement that the Global Gateway will generate up to EUR 300 billion in investment by 2027 grabbed headlines, many of them sceptical. There is, however, no reason to doubt that the initiative will be adequately financed. Although the planning for the EU's international aid budget for 2021-2027 has mostly been completed, a significant proportion remains flexible and could be spent on Global Gateway projects. As for the EU's implementing capacity, the Gateway's financial toolbox draws on the EU's recent experiences with the Juncker Investment Plan and the External Investment Plan, which have both been utilised by development banks and private investors. The second aspect is whether the Global Gateway heralds a change in the EU's motivations, objectives and modalities for cooperation with developing countries and regions. On the surface, the Global Gateway does not seem to change much. There are many thematic overlaps with existing strategic frameworks for engaging with Africa and the EU's Neighbourhood. There is even a sense that the Global Gateway turns back the clock to the days when the EU focussed aid spending on infrastructure and ...