Suchergebnisse

Defying a trend across the industrialized world, Sweden is one of the few countries to fundamentally restructure its public pension system. This reform has spurred interest in explaining how the Swedish political system accomplished a feat that has eluded so many other nations. Anderson claims it was largely due to politically powerful unions and industrial groups supporting government efforts, while Feltenius counters that Anderson underestimates the influence of smaller, issue‐oriented pressure groups, the pensioners' organizations. The Anderson‐Feltenius dispute reflects disagreement over Pierson's theory of welfare state development and retrenchment, as well as the persistence and influence of corporatism. We re‐examine, in detail, the argument proffered by Feltenius and suggest, as a theoretical matter, both he and Pierson neglect the importance of informal rules in political decision making. We also present additional evidence, ignored by Feltenius, that unions—and by inference corporatism—remained influential during Sweden's reform. We thus argue Sweden's experience is unlikely to be valuable for noncorporatist countries.Related ArticlesAngelaki, Marina, and Leandro N. Carrera. 2015. "Radical Pension Reforms after the Crisis: A Comparative Analysis of Argentina and Greece." Politics & Policy 43 (3): 378‐400. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12117König, Pascal D. 2015. "Moral Societal Renewal or Getting the Country Back to Work: Welfare State Culture as a Resource and a Constraint for Policy Discourse." Politics & Policy 43 (5): 647‐678. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12130Pierson, Chris, and Louise Humpage. 2016. "Coming Together or Drifting Apart? Income Maintenance in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom." Politics & Policy 44 (2): 261‐293. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12150

Cover title. ; "September, 1987." ; Includes bibliographical references (p. 29). ; Mode of access: Internet.