Suchergebnisse

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Regulatory Federalism and the EU -- 2 Environmental Regulation in the EU -- 3 Environmental Regulation in the United States -- 4 Environmental Regulation in Germany -- 5 Environmental Regulation in Australia and Canada -- 6 Food and Drug Safety Regulation in the EU -- 7 Institutional Structure and Regulatory Style -- Notes -- References -- Cases Cited -- Index

What can American policymakers learn from the experiences of European democracies in confronting our common policy challenges? We can look to our own history and to the ideas emanating from our own public sphere, but by looking abroad, we can learn how our European allies have dealt with such issues as rising healthcare and pension costs, large-scale immigration, childcare and work-life balance, and climate change. Simply put, we can learn lessons from European policies that have proven both successful and from approaches that have failed. The contributors in this volume ask whether such policies might prove effective in the U.S. context, as well as what pitfalls we might avoid. Chapters have been written by policy area experts and are geared for an upper-level undergraduate audience ...

Intro -- Contents -- List of Figures -- 1. The Juris Touch -- 2. The Political Economy of Eurolegalism -- 3. Europe's Shifting Legal Landscape -- 4. Securities Regulation -- 5. Competition Policy -- 6. Disability Rights -- 7. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Acknowledgments -- Index.

Despite western Europe's traditional disdain for the United States' "adversarial legalism," the European Union is shifting toward a similar approach to the law, according to Daniel Kelemen. Coining the term "eurolegalism" to describe the hybrid, he shows how the political and organizational realities of the EU make this shift inevitable.

"In The Rules of Federalism, Kelemen shows that both the structure of the EU's institutions and the control these institutions exert over member states closely resemble the American federal system, with its separation of powers, large number of veto points, and highly detailed, judicially enforceable legislation. In the EU, as in the United States, a high degree of fragmentation in the central government yields a low degree of discretion for member states when it comes to implementing regulatory statutes."--Jacket

AbstractThis epilogue to the special issue of the Swiss Political Science Review on "Democratic Challenges of Differentiated (Dis)Integration" raises some notes of caution about differentiated integration in the European Union (EU). While the articles in this special issue identify challenges concerning differentiated integration, they generally view it in a positive light as a set of institutional arrangements that is likely to enhance the legitimacy and democratic accountability of the EU. This epilogue calls into question some of the main benefits widely associated with differentiated integration and emphasizes instead its dangers. The epilogue underlines some reasons why differentiated integration may be problematic from a democratic standpoint and explains why, if taken to an extreme, differentiated integration could even encourage the disintegration of the EU.

This article argues for a radical recasting of the European Union democratic deficit debate. Critics have long argued that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit and that growing EU power undermines national democracy. But recent backsliding on democracy and the rule of law in Hungary and Poland reminds us that grave democratic deficits can also exist at the national level in member states and that the EU may have a role in addressing them. This article will place the EU's struggles with democratic deficits in its member states in comparative perspective, drawing on the experience of other democracies that have struggled with pockets of subnational authoritarianism. Comparative analysis suggests that considerations driven by partisan politics may allow local pockets of autocracy to persist within otherwise democratic political unions.

For years, the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court of Justice) and national constitutional courts – particularly the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht; FCC) – have engaged in what developmental psychologists might term 'parallel play'. The courts have played alongside each other, but not with each other. They have shared an interest in the same object (ultimate legal supremacy), and each has seen that object as its own. Many EU law scholars have celebrated this unsettled state of affairs, labelling it 'constitutional pluralism'. But constitutional pluralism is unsustainable, and just as children grow out of parallel play, so too must Europe's courts. The FCC's reference to the Court of Justice in the Gauweiler case not only has profound implications for the survival of the Eurozone, but the case also seems to signal the end of an era: Europe's two most powerful courts must finally confront the incompatibility of their positions on the issue of Kompetenz-Kompetenz.