Suchergebnisse

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- List of Abbreviations and Glossary -- Note on Translation -- List of Illustrations -- Introduction -- 1 Introduction "October Has Caught Up with the Church" The Separation of Church and State, 191 8-1923 -- 2 Monuments to the Golden Age The Canons of Preservation, 1924-1928 -- 3 Churches in the Socialist City Crash Industrialization, Rational Atheism, and City Planning, 1 929-1940 -- 4 The Great Patriotic Church? Wartime Destruction, Postwar Reconstruction, 1941-1953 -- 5 The Scientific Assault on God Church-Monuments in the Khrushchev Era, 1953-1964 -- 6 Cynosures of the City Church Buildings as Notional Heritage, 1965-1988 -- Conclusion -- A Note on Sources -- Notes -- Select Bibliography -- Index

Introduction: city panorama -- Moscow Station and Palace Bridge -- Making a home on the Neva -- "The Hermitage and my own front door" : City spaces -- Initiation into the working class -- Eliseev and Aprashka -- Theatre Street -- From Nord to Saigon -- The twenty-seventh kilometre -- The last journey -- Afterword

AbstractIn Soviet sources from the Brezhnev era, the history of architectural preservation after 1917 was presented as a triumph of rational state‐building and cultural organisation: with the support of Lenin, the Bolshevik government had rapidly put in place effective measures to protect historic buildings for future generations. As this article shows, the evolution of legislative and practical measures was considerably more complicated than this optimistic representation would suggest. In the early Soviet period, a highly ideologised understanding of the past meant that preservationist ambitions might (especially during the 'Great Break' of 1928–1932) be seen as intrinsically reactionary. The canon of historical buildings was shaped by perceptions of centrality to Soviet values, as well as historical and aesthetic importance. The article also explores the transformation of attitudes to architectural heritage as a response to destruction by the invading forces during the 'Great Patriotic War', after which commitment to preservation became far more whole‐hearted, although enforcement and financial support continued to be inconsistent. The Soviet case indicates not just the importance of heritage preservation to the cultural ambitions and self‐image of the modern state but the limits of commitment to preservation and the pressure placed on this by the commitment to all‐out modernisation and to the propaganda of new identities and values.

Soviet culture was obsessed with youth. At the same time, real problems of puberty and adolescence could not be discussed. The ambivalence of this transitional stage of life was pushed aside. The aesthetics of socialist realism demanded clarity. On top of that, there existed in Russian culture an older tradition of hostility towards the body. The verbal taboo fell during Perestroika. However, the apparent post-Soviet liberality in this matter does not mean that puberty has become a phase of life free of fear for Russia's youth. Adapted from the source document.

Jugend war eine idée fixe der sowjetischen Kultur. Gleichzeitig durfte über reale Probleme von Pubertät und Adoleszenz nicht gesprochen werden. Die Ambivalenz des Übergangsalters wurde verdrängt. Die Ästhetik des sozialistischen Realismus verlangte nach Eindeutigkeit. Dazu kam eine ältere Tradition der Körperfeindlichkeit in der russischen Kultur. Das verbale Tabu ist in der Perestrojka gefallen. Doch die scheinbare postsowjetische Freizügigkeit bedeutet nicht, dass die Pubertät für Jugendliche in Russland zu einem angstfreieren Lebensabschnitt geworden wäre. (Osteuropa (Berlin) / SWP)